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Summary
The problems which exist for a discussion about the 
relationship between the so-called mentally-disordered offender 
or accused and the notion of criminal responsibility and 
punishment are complex. They can not be fully understood without 
a consideration of the definition of crime, criminal 
responsibility, and of theories of punishment. Problems are not 
simply confined to a theoretical level. Accordingly, there is a 
need to understand the reality of mental disorder as perceived by 
psychiatrists and lawyers. This thesis, in chapter 1, looks at 
the concept of crime and attempts to establish a comprehensive 
definition. This may specify the circumstances in which the 
mentally disordered person is likely to become involved with the 
state and thereby be subject to a particular or special 
relationship with the law. Accordingly, chapter 1 explores the 
concepts of crime, its elements, and its limitations.
Chapter 2 considers the various theories of punishment in 
order to seek to establish whether there are sufficient reasons 
to justify the way we deal with mentally disordered persons and 
whether they are rooted in concepts of fairness and justice.
The next chapter explores the notion of mental disorder and 
examines the medical basis for understanding the condition. It
2
attempts to examine whether the condition is "medical" and indeed 
whether it is an "illness". The relationship between the medical 
model and the legal model of mental disorder is studied in 
addition to the role played by psychiatrists.
Chapter 4 examines the lawyer's approach to the mentally 
disordered person and seeks to determine whether the legal 
definition of insanity is in any way different from the medical 
concept of mental disorder and the consequences that flow from 
the various defences of insanity.
Chapter 5 looks at the reality of the interaction between 
the mentally disordered person and the various institutions with 
which he comes into contact. Thus, state hospitals, the disposal 
of mentally disordered offenders or accused persons and the 
various sentences or restriction orders are examined.
The final chapter considers possible areas for reform, and 
makes certain recommendations, which if implemented might serve 
to remove some of the difficulties that have been identified.
The investigation includes the situation with regard to 
mental disorder and criminal responsibility in Iraqi criminal law 
as we 11 .
The main purpose of this thesis is to find out the
3
appropriate theory of punishment which might be used to resolve 
the problem with mentally disordered people (both responsible and 
non-responsib1e) in respect of the sentencing process in U.K.
C H A R T E R  O N E
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C H A F  T E R  O N E  
THE CRIME
1. The Concept of Crime:
Any attempt to examine the concept of crime must involve an 
examination of the definition of crime and an explanation of its 
very nature. It must also be recognised at this stage that any 
definition of the concept of crime will vary with the particular 
perspective or viewpoint which is adopted. Thus, for instance, a 
sociological definition of crime will be different from a purely 
legal one, which itself will differ from the perspective adopted 
by psychiatrists. Indeed, the contrast between a legal definition 
or understanding of criminal responsibility and a medical or 
psychological definition is examined later in chapter 3 and 
below. Another problem with attempting to define a "crime" is 
that if there is a so-called "correct" definition then it should 
allow us to recognise any act or omission to be either a crime or 
not a crime by simply examining whether it contains all the parts 
of the definition. This difficulty is examined below. Ideally 
"crime" should be capable of a definition that makes it 
reasonably clear what conduct, or situation, may be considered 
"criminal". It is recognised that such a definition, despite its 
difficulties[11, is important because "crime" represents an 
important and distinct area of the law which, as we shall see, 
has particular importance for mentally disordered people as well
as in society in general[2].
In order to elucidate the legal concept of crime, it is 
necessary to examine the differences between criminal and civil 
wrongs and indeed the differences, if any, between what 
constitutes a "crime" and what constitutes an "offence".
In early law, there was no clear difference between criminal 
and civil wrong[3]. Now the distinction is considered obvious and 
clear. Some experts, however, argue that it should not be so, 
since there is no fundamental difference between criminal and 
civil wrong[4]. It is suggested that conduct which harms 
individual people also harms society as a whole, accordingly 
criminal and civil wrong have the same result. Nevertheless, in 
spite of the fact that conduct may involve both criminal and 
civil wrong[5], for instance, murder, assault or arson, there are 
many differences between crimes and civil wrongs[61. An 
examination of the distinctions between civil and criminal wrongs 
in general terms shows that the characteristics of a crime are as 
follows :“
a. Acts Harmful to the Public
A characteristic generally found in acts which are 
considered as crimes is that they are acts which have or are 
believed to have a harmful effect on society or the public and go 
beyond affecting private rights or obligations which fall in the 
area of civil law. The position is best stated by Allen: 'crime
7
is crime because it consists in wrong doing which directly and in 
serious degree threatens the security or well being of society, 
and because it is not safe to leave it redressable only by 
compensation of the party injured'[7].
Allen's view was attacked by Williams, who states that,'we 
have rejected all definition purporting to distinguish between 
crimes and other wrongs by reference to the sort of thing that is 
done or the sort of physical, economic or social consequences 
that follow from it. Only one possibility now remains. A crime 
must be defined by reference to the legal consequences of the 
act... A crime then becomes an act that is capable of being 
followed by criminal proceedings, having one of the types of 
outcome (punishment, etc.) known to follow those proceedings'. 
And later, 'in short, a crime is an act capable of being followed 
by criminal proceedings having a criminal outcome, and a 
proceeding or its outcome is criminal if it has certain 
characteristics which make it criminal. In a marginal case the 
court may have to balance one feature, which may suggest that the 
proceeding is criminal, against another feature which may suggest 
the contrary'[83.
We may put these views together and say that crimes are 
wrongs which the judges have held, or Parliament from time to 
time has laid down, are sufficiently injurious to the public to 
warrant the application of criminal procedure to deal with them.
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This does not enable us to recognise an act as a crime when we 
see one, but it indicates the general nature of the conduct that 
is of significance for criminal law.
b. The Act as Moral 1v Wrong :
The second characteristic of crimes is that they usually are 
acts which are considered morally wrong. Indeed, it has been 
stated by Fitzgerald that a crime is immoral and harmful in 
itse1f[91.The distinction between crimes which are morally wrong 
and crimes which are merely legally wrong is often made. Most 
people would not talk of betting in a public house as a crime. 
Many of the problems of road traffic offences arise from the fact 
that the public, including juries, refuse to regard such offences 
as morally wrong and therefore, as real crimes like homicide and 
rape. The modern approach, however, adopted by Hogan and others 
denies this position[10]. Despite the fact that this idea is 
traditional, there are many types of acts which are regarded as 
immoral and harmful to the community in the eyes of society but 
which are not classified as a crimes[11]. Adultery, for instance, 
is no longer a crime. The criminal law, therefore, cannot be 
considered as implying immoral conduct. In other words, as Renton 
and Brown note, 'the criminality of an act or omission is not
dependent upon the degree of moral guilt which it implies. An
immoral offence may not be a crime, a crime may not be a breach
of the moral law'[12]. Hogan, also, states that 'it is a trite
observation, but nonetheless a true one, that crime or 
criminality is a conferred quality. No conduct is inherently
9
criminal, inherently deviant, or inherently immoral; it becomes iso only because society makes it so by some formal process't13]. jI
I
IIt must be recognised that there are many acts which most j
societies will state to be criminal and for very good reasons. If |
the law did not proscribe homicide, rape, and robbery, and try to i
prevent them, then we would spend much of our time providing for 
our own self-preservation.
The enforcement of morality by the criminal law is also 
questioned. The view of the Wo1 fenden Committee on Homosexual 
Offences and Prostitution is that the enforcement of morality is 
not a proper object of the criminal law. The function of criminal 
law, as they saw it, is ' ... to preserve public order and decency, 
to protect the citizen from what is offensive or injurious, and 
to provide sufficient safeguards against exploitation and 
corruption of others, particularly those who are specially 
vulnerable. It is not... the function of the law to intervene in 
the private lives of citizens, or to seek to enforce any 
particular pattern of behaviour, further than is necessary to 
carry out the purposes we have outlined'[14].
This view was challenged by Lord Devi in[15], who argued that I
there is a public morality which is essential to keep society i
together, and that society may use the criminal law to preserve j
morality. The standard of morality is that of "the man in the
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jury box", based on the "mass of continuous experience half 
consciously or unconsciously accumulated and embodied in the 
morality of common sense". The argument which can be put to 
Devlin's view is that it is not proper for the state to enforce 
the general morality without asking whether it is based on 
ignorance, superstition or misunderstanding. In the case of 
Knuller Ltd v. D.P.P. in 1973, the House of Lords, also, did not 
favour the idea that it has power to extend the criminal law to 
enforce morals.The enforcement of morality, as such, by the 
criminal law is losing ground as an approach[16).It is important 
for us to realise that no code of morality commands universal 
acceptance. This does not mean that because we know this, then we 
should abandon what is implied in the distinction between malum 
in se and mala prohibita. Simply stated, the distinction is that 
there are certain offences which can only be condemned on legal 
grounds, types of behaviour which had they not been legally 
prohibited, would incur no blame and that there are other 
offences such as homicide which condemned not only on legal but 
also moral grounds.
Historically, some writers have said that crimes are divided 
into two categories. MacDonald classifies them into "true crimes" 
like murder, robbery and rape, and "public welfare offences" for 
which its perpetrators deserve a fine, for instance, road traffic 
offences[17].
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others have divided crimes by a different method, that is, 
they have classified them into "immoral acts" which equate with 
"true crimes" (in keeping with MacDonald), where it is thought 
that these kind of crimes are something evil in themselves and 
severely punishable malum in se, and public welfare offences,for 
example, offences which have been declared by parliament mala 
prohibita, which were enacted to provide a remedy without any 
intermixture of moral guilt[18].
These divisions or categorisations of crimes were regarded 
by Turner as unscientific[19], and the idea of malum in se was 
thought by Friedmann to belong to natural law theories which 
identified certain acts that were thought contrary to the "law of 
nature"[20]. The position is well summed up by Hume:'The criminal 
law will always in some measure be bent and accommodated to the 
temper and exigencies of the times'[21],
At present not all crimes are regarded as always and 
everywhere immoral and harmful. The approach varies from 
community to community and from time to time. For example, 
ethical reprobation at homicide, homosexuality, libel and slave 
trading is not the same in all countries[22]. Despite the fact 
that as a general rule crimes such as murder are regarded as good 
examples of immoral and harmful crimes, some circumstances which 
accompany such crimes may change their "criminality" or preclude 
the act from being criminal at all in some countries, but not in
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others[23]. Thus, in the Iraqi Penal Code if someone kills his 
wife and her lover because of their adulterous relationship, the 
degree of criminality changes the punishment; this will be less 
severe[24]. Recently, the Iraqi Legislature have deemed this kind 
of act as legal. It was said in the Guardian on 6th March 1990 
that 'over the weekend, the Iraqi Government announced a new 
legal exemption for Iraqi men; they were entitled to kill women 
members of their family, including mothers, grandmothers and 
cousins, if they suspected them of adultery'[25].
As a result, acts may be regarded as a crime by the courts 
or the legislatures, not by reason that they are immoral and 
harmful, but because they deemed as crimes in the courts or by 
legislation[26]. As said earlier, whether a crime is thought 
wrong in itself or only legally wrong will depend on the moral 
code current in a society.
A third and useful way to examine the concept of crime is to 
look at its procedures, although it is recognised that this is a 
limited approach because procedures of whatever nature only 
follow from the commission of crime. Lord Atkins in the case of 
Proprietary Articles Trade Association v. A.G. for Canada said 
that 'the criminal quality of an act cannot be discerned by 
intuition, nor can it be discovered by reference to any standard 
but one; is the act prohibited...with penal consequences'[27].
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The differences between criminal and civil proceedings, 
therefore, becomes important and this section of the chapter 
looks at a few of the significant points. Before doing so it must
be noted that any effort to distinguish between crimes and delict
or torts faces the same type of difficulty as that involved in 
attempting to define crime in general terms. For English law, 
more so than for the Scots law of delict, torts can be crimes,
although some torts are not crimes and some crimes are not torts.
As Smith and Hogan point out 'it is not in the nature of the act, 
but in the nature of the proceedings that the distinction 
consists; and generally both types of proceeding may follow where 
an act is both a crime and a tort'[28].
Another important reason to look at the procedures involved 
in the criminal law is that the rules of procedure limit the 
activities of the institutions of society, for example, prisons, 
hospitals and so on, which are concerned with the prevention of 
crime. It should also be recognised at this stage, although the 
point is examined in later chapters, that society, whilst 
pursuing the objective of preventing crime, must also take into 
account other interests. As we shall see in chapters 4 and 5, 
society has to keep a check on the measure of state interference 
with individual liberty, otherwise there is a real danger that 
society will lose more in the way of other forms of liberty than 
it gains by way of freedom from crime.
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The important procedural differences between criminal and 
civil wrongs are reflected in the consequences arising from them. 
A person who is held liable for a civil wrong will usually be 
required to compensate the victim of the wrong, whilst a person 
who is held to have committed a crime will invariably be liable 
to some form of "punishment", which as we shall see later, might 
include some forms of compulsory "treatment"[29]. The theory of 
punishment is examined in detail in chapter 2.
The state brings criminal proceedings when there is a 
criminal wrong, because the state wants to protect society; in 
civil wrong, it is up to the individual to decide whether to go 
to law for a remedy against the wrongdoer, as for example in 
breach of contract or tort[30].
The burden of proof in civil procedure is upon the pursuer 
(plaintiff) whilst in criminal procedure the burden of proof 
rests on the crown prosecutor[31], the procurator fiscal or the 
Lord Advocate in Scotland or the Director of Public Prosecutions 
or Crown Prosecution Service in England and Wales.
While there are many differences between criminal and civil 
wrong in terms of rules of evidence and appeal procedures, the 
above is sufficient to illustrate the more general differences 
between these branches of law.
Iraqi Law recognises some of the difficulties outlined above
15
with the concept of crime and the problems of labelling. The 
underlying theory of the Iraqi Criminal Law Code attempts to 
resolve difficulties of classification by looking at the "social 
consequences" of a particular type of behaviour. In other words, 
the criterion used is one of "social danger" according to the 
seriousness of the outcome. If the act is of very minor 
consequence, then it is put through a non-criminal legal 
process[32].
Nevertheless, it is apparent that the Iraqi system cannot 
avoid classifications which are in themselves incomplete, since 
the boundaries between social danger and non-social danger not 
always clear, and in some instances artificial.
It must be recognised that other factors influence the 
definition of crime, namely, the political and economic nature of 
the particular state[33].
From the above, the element which establishes whether or not 
conduct should be regarded as criminal is a declaration as such 
by the courts or legislature, not whether it is harmful or 
wrongful or whatever other reason which leads the courts or 
legislature to deem it a crime[34]. This view appears very simple 
but reflects the practical reality.
A point worth noting here is the distinction between the
16
terms "crime" and "offence". It seems that these terms have often 
been used synonymously in law. Some writers and judges, however, 
have recognised a distinction between them. For example. Lord 
Sand said that 'every crime is an offence, but every offence is 
not crime'[35].
It is thought by Williams that the artificial distinction 
which is made between them is fundamental because it helps 
differentiation between serious crimes and less serious 
crimes[36]. By this simple device, a person who commits a crime 
is called "criminal" and one who commits an offence is called 
"offender"[37]. It appears, therefore, that a criminal is one who 
commits a particular type of crime for which there usually is a 
prison sentence available, whereas the offender is a person who 
commits a particular offence for which there may be a pecuniary 
penalty. Despite the above argument such a distinction between 
the two terms has not become established and they are normally 
regarded as having no effective difference in meaning. As Gordon 
states 'the general rules of criminal law apply to all branches 
of criminal law, whether they are described as crimes or 
offences'[38]. The crux of any argument might be the use of the 
word "criminal". It is thought too severe as a label when it is 
applied to someone who commits a simple wrong act such as driving 
a car without licence, yet appropriate for one who kills. 
Clearly, there are important consequences when labelling someone 
either as an "offender" or "criminal". Indeed, when we consider
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punishment as a method of reforming those who are involved in 
committing crimes, we ought to consider that the effects of using 
such words, which may be contrary to the reform process.
We can conclude from the above that there are difficulties 
in finding a comprehensive definition of crime. For present 
purposes, the definition used is:
"Acts or omissions for which a person is liable to criminal 
prosecution and punishment".
This is, of course, not circular if we state what "criminal" 
prosecution and "punishment" involves. This is discussed in 
chapter two. Of course, what sort of acts or omissions ought to 
be crimes remains a separate question. Obviously, in this context 
social harms are relevant.
While it cannot be overemphasised that no definition of 
crime is perfect or complete, it is useful to look at the so- 
called elements as standardly defined by courts since this may 
lead to a fuller understanding of the nature of crime. 
Consequently, this involves examining the concept of actus reus 
and mens rea.
2. The Elements of Crimes
From the latin maxim 'actus non facit reum nisi mens sit 
rea' (which when properly translated means 'an act does not make
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a man guilty of crime unless his mind be also guilty')[39], it 
follows that every crime is made up of two elements, actus reus 
and mens rea (dole). The extent to which this rule always applies 
will be examined in connection with offences of strict liability 
later. The crime, therefore, exists only when the actus reus is
accompanied by the appropriate mens rea. These elements,
therefore, differ from crime to crime[40]. While looking at actus
reus and mens rea, voluntariness will be considered as an 
independent point in this chapter in order to give, as far as 
possible, some proper idea of the concept of crime. As we shall 
see, the main problems of the general part of the criminal law is 
the requirement of the criminal state of mind "mens rea". As 
discussed below in chapters 3 and 4, mens rea creates
considerable problems of reconciling the principle of equality 
before the law with the need to protect society. The problems of 
mens rea cannot be adequately discussed without a preliminary 
explanation of the nature of actus reus.
a- Actus Reus:
If we accept that a private thought is not sufficient to
found responsibility, then it is invariably true that a crime
requires an act. Lord Mansfield said that 'so long as an act rest 
in bare intention, it is not punishable by our laws'[41].
The reason for such a rule is based upon the impossibility
of proving a mental state. For example, it can be argued that a
19
tribunal cannot punish for what it cannot know.
The only major qualification to the above rule comes from 
the fact that there are situations where an intention may not be 
declared in words or conduct but be inferred from acts. Another 
reason for the rule is because of the difficulty of 
distinguishing between a day-dream and a fixed intention in the 
absence of behaviour tending towards the crime intended.
The actus reus contains all the elements of the offence 
except the accused's mental element[42]. Since there is no crime 
without actus reus[43], the definition of every crime should 
therefore refer to element of actus reus.
An analysis of actus reus shows several features:-
i. The conduct (act, omission or state of affairs),
ii. The attendant circumstances, and
iii. The result[44].
i- The conducts
Criminal conduct does not merely include acts, it also 
includes omissions and a state of affairs[45]. So what do these 
terms mean?
The act is a fundamental part of the actus reus and includes 
"possible act" or "physical act" or "bodily movement". As we
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shall see later, the problems with "acts" and those individuals 
who are considered mentally disordered is one which has given 
rise to much debate. The act differs from crime to crime. For 
example, the act of causing death by reckless driving is driving 
recklessly and killing...while in case of murder or manslaughter 
it requires the killing of another and so on[46]. Similary, if we 
analyse sec.20 of the Sexual Offence Act 1956, which provides 
that ' it is an offence for a person acting without lawful 
authority or excuse to take an unmarried girl under the age of 
sixteen...'[47], we find that the physical act in this offence is 
"taking away the girl".
Another kind of criminal conduct is an omission or failure 
to act where there is a duty to act; these offences are less 
common as a basis of criminal responsibility[48]. In some 
instances an omission will create criminal responsibility without 
any positive act. It is recognised that there are difficulties in 
the definition of "act". Some argue that an act includes an 
omission, because if wanting to distinguish them, we could speak 
of positive and negative acts respectively. Of course we could 
use the word "conduct" for both. There are legislative 
difficulties with the prohibition of omissions, and therefore the 
penal law must generally settle for keeping people from doing 
harm, and lets public opinion and teachers of morality and 
religion encourage people in doing positive good. Therefore, it 
follows that the criminal law does not necessarily place a duty
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on someone to act to prevent a consequence whenever it imposes a 
duty not to bring about the consequence. An omission is not a 
crime unless there is a duty to act imposed by law which is 
breached by an offender[49]. There is, therefore, no criminal 
responsibility for omitting to prevent an event where there is no 
duty[50].
Some common types of legal duty fall into the following 
situations :
First, where a legal duty has been imposed on parents or
relatives[51]. Secondly, where the law Imposes a duty on the 
public or an official. For example, members of the public must 
report to the police when they are aware of the commission of 
treason, or a police officer must try to prevent someone who 
wants to kill another person ,if he is aware of it[52]. Thirdly, 
omitting to implement a contract may be regarded as a criminal 
conduct in the law in some cases[53], but these depend almost 
entirely upon the consequences of the breach. The law relating to
omissions is, therefore, not coextensive with the law relating to
acts. It is, however, partly coincident in manslaughter and 
murder, but, in these circumstances, the fact of death leads the 
law to look upon the omission with special severity.
The last type of criminal conduct is a "state of affairs" or 
"event" or "status". An offence in some cases may be committed 
without any act or omission as mentioned above. A suitable
22
example in this case is provided by sec.25 of the Theft Act 
1968[54], in which a person is considered guilty of an offence 
if, when not at his place of abode, he has with him any article 
for use in the course of or in connection with any burglary or 
theft.
ii. The Attendant Circumstances:
There are two types of circumstances. The first type is 
regarded a fundamental part of an actus reus. Unless, therefore, 
these circumstances are present there is no actus reus, and so no 
crime[55]. For instance the absence of consent by a woman is an 
essential constituent of the actus reus in the case of rape. If 
the woman has consented, there is no crime[56]. As another 
example, the killing of a person is homicide, but, if this act 
was done in self-defence, it is not regarded as a crime because 
there is no actus reus. In other words, the definition of crime 
includes the circumstances by which the actus reus existed. This 
is why, for an indictment to be good, it must show an act and, 
usually, the circumstances required to make it criminal, what 
Gordon calIs"defeasing" circumstances. For example, the offence 
under sec.25 of the Theft Act can be committed only by somebody 
who is not at his place of abode. Also in the definition of theft 
it must be proved that someone dishonestly appropriated property 
belonging to another.
The second category of circumstances take form of
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consequences or results.
iii. The Result:
As stated by Gordon, there are many crimes in which the 
consequence is separated in time and in place from the criminal 
conduct creating it. This he calls "result crimes"[58].
Gordon illustrates the distnction between "conduct" crimes 
and "result" crimes using the example of perjury. This is giving 
false evidence on oath, not the bringing about of any particular 
result[59], and is a conduct crime, whereas with a result crime 
the actus reus is divisible in time and place.
Smith and Hogan have criticised this approach; they say that 
'the law is no less interested in the conduct which brings about 
the result in a result crime than in a conduct crime. A case can 
indeed be made out that in all crimes the law should have regard 
only to the conduct and not to the result'[60]. They state that 
‘whether or not the conduct results in harm is generally a matter 
of chance and does not alter the blameworthiness and 
dangerousness of the actor. For example, if "D" throws a stone, 
being reckless whether he injures anyone, he is guilty of a crime 
if the stone strikes "P", but commits no offence if by pure 
chance no one is injured. From a retributive point of view, it 
might be argued that "D" should be equally liable in either 
event. On utilitarian grounds, however, it is probably
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undesirable to turn the whole criminal law into "conduct crimes". 
The needs of deterrence are probably adequately served in most 
cases by "result crimes"; and the criminal law should be extended 
only where a clear need is established'[61].
Smith and Hogan added that the actus reus in the result 
crime includes both "conduct and result"[62]. The law should have 
regard to the conduct and to the result in crime because, when we 
say that the death of a person is the essential element of the 
actus reus in the crime of murder and homicide, it does not mean 
that we should forget the conduct which brought about the result. 
The conduct is still important, although less so than the result. 
We can therefore see that the characterisation of crime may 
change, according to the nature of the criminal conduct. In other 
words, the conduct may still be regarded as a crime but without 
result will be characterised as a different kind of crime.
Article 28 of the Iraqi Penal Code also emphasises the 
importance of conduct. This is seen in the Iraqi concept of Al- 
feal Al- jormy (actus reus) which is defined as follows: 'Al-feal
Al-jormy (actus reus) of crime is the criminal conduct to commit 
an act or omission which is prohibited by the law'[63].
Despite the divisions or characterisations of acts as 
postulated above, it is useful to remember that, in summary, the 
law's refusal, generally, to punish anything other than actions
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involves several things. First, the law is normally concerned 
with positive conduct as opposed to mere inactivity. Secondly, as 
we have already outlined, the law only prohibits acts as opposed 
to thoughts or intentions. Thirdly, the law penalizes "acts" as 
contrasted with bodily states and forms of involuntary behaviour. 
This is looked at in more detail in later chapters.
At this stage it is sufficient to note that while actus reus 
has been shown to have at least these features in terms of any 
understanding of criminal responsibility, it is artificial to 
consider it without a proper examination of mens rea.
By defining an act as involving a voluntary movement, the 
definition takes some of the mental element of crime on to the 
physical element. The mental requirement for an act, therefore, 
should rule out reflexes, like yawning and sleepwalking. This 
will be explored in detail in the section dealing with 
voluntariness. The remaining section of this chapter examines the 
concept of mens rea.
b . Mens rea:
The concept of mens rea is complex, because there are many 
opinions which are given by judges and writers which are 
inconsistent[64].
The early notion of mens rea in England was traced as a
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general element of evil intent or moral blame-worthiness required 
for criminal responsibility[65]. This notion conforms with the 
notion of mens rea as "dole" in Scotland. Hume has defined this 
as '...corrupt and evil intention, which is essential...to the 
guilt of any crime'[66]. For example in Cawthorne v. H . M . Adv., 
Lord Guthrie said that 'mens rea, or dole, in our criminal law is 
the wicked and felonious intention which impels the criminal to 
commit a crime. It is a state of mind which results in a criminal 
act, and I fail to see how there can be a distinction between the 
wickedness resulting in murder and the wickedness resulting in an 
attempt to murder'[67].
Certainly, this approach may be appropriate in some crimes 
which cause physical harm, like murder with aforethought. But it 
is not relevant with other crimes which are minor or when there 
are other kinds of attendant circumstances surrounding grave 
crimes[68], such as murder under diminished responsibility 
(mental impairment). this point has been developed in chapter 
four.
On another view, mens rea is not the desire to do wrong but 
the intent or carelessness to do that which causes social 
injury[69]. Thus, the essence of Holmes' approach to mens rea is 
that criminal law imposes responsibility when a person either 
knows or should know the disposition of his acts to cause 
prohibited consequences[70]. Holmes, therefore, admits that the
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state of mind could be relevant to criminal responsibility. For 
example, if an accused has a knowledge of circumstances which 
make a particular act dangerous, or has actual foresight of harm, 
he will be liable. In brief. Holmes stated that an accused was 
liable if he committed a prohibited act either with an actual 
conscious state of mind about the harmfulness of his behaviour or 
if he should have understood the harmfulness of the conduct[71].
Theorists like Stephen, Sayre, Flecher, Turner and Williams 
believe that the mental element required by common law or statute 
is part of the definition of a crime.Under this approach, mens 
rea involves an investigation into the actual state of mind of a 
particular accused at the time he committed a crime[72]. In 
addition, according to Williams, the courts have found that the 
easiest way to stretch the mehaning of criminal responsibility on 
social or moral grounds is to 'envelop the mental element of 
crime in considerable confusion'[73].
Williams said that 'it is lamentable that after more than a 
thousand years of continuous legal development English law should 
still lack clear and consistent definitions of words expressing 
its basic concepts'[74].
It can be inferred from the above that the notion of mens 
rea has generally been used in two distinct senses. First, it has 
been used to refer to the various mental elements, for example.
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intention, recklessness and negligence which are generally 
required as a part of the definition of most crimes. Secondly, 
mens rea has been used as a synonym for "criminal responsibility" 
as we will see from more detail about this point in the next
chapter. To say that "R" did not have the mens rea for crime "F"
is, in fact, to say that "R" did not have the mens rea required
to commit "F". The position relating to the responsibility of
the insane person must therefore be considered in light of the 
distinct senses being used for mens rea.
For the purposes of this thesis, the description of mens rea 
given by Smith and Hogan is used: 'intention or recklessness with
respect of all the consequences and circumstances of the 
accused's act or (the state of affairs) which constitute the 
actus reus, together with any ulterior intent which the 
definition of crime requires'[75]
The Iraqi Penal Code has defined Al-kaced Al-jormy (mens 
rea) as follows: 'Al-kaced Al-jormy (mens rea) is that the
offender directs his will to commit a crime'[75].
From this definition, it can be inferred that the offender 
has to direct his thought processes towards what he wants to do. 
The Iraqi Penal Code does not emphasise that the offender must 
have a guilty mind or "dole", but according to the above 
definition mens rea must include "capacity" and "choice"[76].
29
Thus it is required as a basic notion of criminal responsibility. 
The importance of "capacity" and "choice" will be examined later, 
but it is clearly crucial when we consider the insane or mentally 
disordered person. To summarise the position thus far, the 
difficulty of grasping what is meant by mens rea in general 
arises from the fact that it differs from crime to crime. The 
basic notion is that unintentional wrongdoing is excluded from 
criminal responsibility, just as part of the notion of actus reus 
is that involuntary behaviour is excluded. The exclusion from 
actus reus allows for the plea "I could not help it", mens rea 
allows for the plea "I never meant to do it". At this stage, it 
is important to keep separate the plea "I could not help it" 
from the plea "I never meant to do it", because it shows the need 
to be aware of the fact that the lack of ability to control one's 
behaviour is important for determining criminal responsibility as 
well. This point will be developed in chapter four.
3— Voluntariness:
So far, in discussing the elements of crimes, i.e. actus 
reus and mens rea, it is clear that the question of voluntariness 
requires examination in order that an overall understanding of 
the concept of crime can be gained, and also of criminal 
responsibi1ity.
As discussed earlier, it is submitted that generally 
speaking, the fundamental principle of criminal law is that
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before a person can be convicted of any crime his act or omission 
has to be a voluntary one. If the act is found to be involuntary, 
the accused cannot generally be held to be criminally 
responsible[77]. As a preliminary point, the criminal law's 
apparent refusal to penalize involuntary behaviour together with 
mere states of body and mind is based on the moral principle that 
a man should not punished for events beyond his control. It would 
appear to be an accepted moral principle that condemnation must 
only be applied to matters over which the person has control or 
the ability to control. The underlying notion in punishment, 
which is explored in more detail in the next chapter, is that 
rewards and punishment is some way guide actions. Simply stated, 
to praise or reward a person for some act encourages the person 
to continue to behave in this way and encourages othprs to follow 
by example. To blame or punish a person prevents him from 
repeating his acts and deters others from following him. 
Obviously, if the event or act is outside the person's control 
and is something about which he has no choice, then praise and 
blame, reward and punishment fail to have any encouraging or 
preventing effect. Clearly, where choice is absent there is 
nothing that can be guided. As we will see in the next chapter, 
withholding blame and punishment for events beyond the person's 
control is linked up with the very meaning of blame and 
punishment. From this we can see that voluntariness is another 
criterion which is important in criminal responsibility. There
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are two main approaches to understanding voluntariness :-
a. The Volitional Approach:
Volition is regarded as an essential element. Stephen takes 
the approach in the following form '...that inward state which, 
as experience informs us, is always succeeded by motion, whilst 
the body is in its normal condition'[79].
Austin illustrates the position as follows; 'Certain 
movements of our bodies follow invariably and immediately our 
wishes or desire for those same movements: provided, that is, 
that the bodily organ be sane, and the desired movements be not 
prevented by any outward obstacle...These antecedent wishes and 
these consequent movements, are human volitions and acts strictly 
and properly so called...and as these are the only volitions so 
are the bodily movements, by which they are immediately followed, 
the only acts or actions (properly so called). It will be 
admitted on the mere statement that the only objects which can be 
called acts, are consequences of volitions. A voluntary movement 
of the body, or a movement which follows a volition, is an act. 
The involuntary movements which are the consequence of certain 
diseases, are not acts. But as the bodily movements are the only 
objects, to which the term "acts", can be applied with perfect 
precision and propriety'[80].
It is clear from this approach that the voluntary act is "a 
wi1 led muscular movement". Consequently, involuntary movements
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are not acts[81].
b. Hart's Approach to Voluntariness:
Hart attacks the above analysis of volition and believes 
that the idea which upon which such an approach has depended is 
an outdated fiction. He says that 'it is a piece of eighteenth 
century psychology which has no real application to human 
conduct'[82]. He continues,'we do not have to launch our muscles 
into action by desiring that they contract as the Austinian 
terminology of "acts" caused by "volitions" suggests'[83]. He 
maintained that the desire to contract our muscles is a very rare 
happening which does nothing to explain ordinary action[84]. He 
suggests that ' it assumes unrealistically that the agent is 
normally aware of the muscular contractions involved in action 
and desires them before acting'[85].
The essential feature in this approach is that the muscular 
contractions are not desired, despite the fact that there should 
be a desire present in voluntary action. Hart says that '...it 
presupposes the ordinary man's ordinary description of what he 
does and desires to do in terms, not of muscular contractions, 
but of such things as kicking a ball, hitting a man, or writing a 
letter * [86].
It can be seen, therefore, that the definition, meaning and 
importance of the concept of voluntariness is one which is open
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to debate and this is particularly so when it is examined in 
isolation. Indeed, in terms of actus reus and mens rea, another 
problem arises.
If the principle that an accused must be proved to commit a 
crime voluntarily is an accepted one, it faces problems of 
classification. Should voluntariness be included within the actus 
reus of crime? Theorists and judges are divided in this area[87].
It appears that classifications are not easy, and therefore 
some courts have not attempted them. In R v. Dodd it was stated 
that the idea of the mental element in crime as belonging partly 
to the actus reus and partly to the mens rea is not easily 
justifiable on logical grounds[88]. A number of modern writers 
regard the voluntariness of the accused's conduct as an element 
in his mens rea but leave open the debate on whether as a matter 
of logic it ought to be so as part of the law[89].
Some academic writers support the idea that voluntariness is 
part of mens rea. They believe that mens rea in this sense 
relates to the mental attitude of the accused's conduct but not 
to the result of his conduct[90]. An accused who can prove that 
his act was involuntary must not be responsible for any result 
produced by it because the mens rea was lacking, despite the fact 
that there is an actus reus which has been proved.
34
Adams thinks that voluntariness and mens rea are subjected 
to the same principle and it is difficult to make any difference 
between them[91]. There can be found judicial support for this 
approach. Windeyer J. stated that 'voluntariness is generally 
spoken of as a necessary quality of a criminal act but it is 
perhaps more accurately regarded as a mental quality or
attributes of the actor'[92].
Those who argue that voluntariness is part of actus reus, 
justify their opinion that mens rea is not required in crimes of 
strict liability, so if we regarded the voluntariness as part of 
mens rea, an accused charged with a crime of strict liability 
could be convicted for an involuntary act. On the other hand, if 
voluntariness is part of the actus reus, the accused must not be 
convicted of an involuntary act[93].
Lord Simon in Lvnch v. P.P.P. supported this idea. He stated 
that '...there may be physical movements which are not the 
subject of choice - cases of so-called "automatism". On the other 
hand exceptionally the criminal law will exert its sanctions 
although the accused exercised no choice: this arises in crimes 
of absolute liability...'[94].
Smith and Hogan show that there is a flaw in this argument, 
because if voluntariness is part of actus reus, it is impossible 
to dispense with it [95]. They summarise their position as
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follows: 'the fact is that even in offences of strict liability,
a limited degree of mens rea must be proved, and a jurist may, if 
he chooses, classify voluntariness of the accused's act as part 
of the limited degree of mens rea. It is a matter of convenience 
only'[96]
It appears that the fundamental principle that an accused 
can only be held responsible for a voluntary act leads to 
difficulties: First, departure from such a principle must be
justified, for instance, when an accused commits an involuntary 
act for which he has to be held liable . It is not easy to 
justify a departure from basic principles[97]. Secondly, an 
involuntary act is commonly regarded as not being an act at all 
and voluntariness forms part of the actus reus. In principle, 
therefore, there is no way in which an accused can be held 
responsible for any such movement since he cannot be regarded in 
law as having done anything[98].
Clearly there are difficulties which arise from an attempt 
to work within the limits of fundamental principle.Gordon puts 
the point forcefully; 'to say that a man acted voluntarily is in 
effect to say that he did something when he was not in one of the 
conditions specified in the list of conditions which preclude 
responsibility'[99].
It has to be asked whether there is any need to regard it as
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part of actus reus or mens rea, since it does not refer to some 
additional quality which is present in every act and consequently 
need not be regarded as a constituent element of every crime. 
This does not deny the importance of voluntariness, but simply 
restricts its application to cases where it is directly in issue 
rather than to admit to any fundamental principle being present 
in all cases. In this way, voluntariness can be used as a general 
term which summarises the absence of all the relevant types of 
conditions which preclude responsibility. Accordingly, there is 
not the same difficulty in holding a person responsible for an 
involuntary act since such precluding conditions may be 
restricted so as to operate only in certain circumstances. To 
take an obvious example, intoxication may cause an accused to 
commit an involuntary act[100]. Such a condition, however, will 
only result in acquittal if it is not self-induced. In this way 
modification to existing conditions can be made without having to 
justify a change in the terms of the fundamental principle of 
voluntariness.
It is clear from the definition of Al-kaced Al-jormy (mens 
rea) in Article 33 of the Iraqi Penal Code that it has adopted 
the stance that "voluntariness" is part of mens rea[101].
The above discussion has proceeded without a proper 
examination of offences which fall into the category of "strict 
liability" or "statutory" offences.
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Crimes which are said not to require intention, recklessness 
or negligence as to one or more elements in the actus reus are 
known as offences of strict liability. It has been stressed in 
many cases both in Scotland an England that strict responsibility 
for statutory criminal offences is the exception rather than the 
rule, and that penal statutes should be interpreted as requiring 
mens rea as to the elements which give rise to guilt.
In Scotland, in Duquld v. Fraser, Lord Justice Clerk Cooper 
said that ‘our reports already contain many examples of cases in 
which it has been held that a malum prohibitum has been created 
by statutory enactment in such terms and under such circumstances 
as to imposes an absolute obligation of such a kind as to entail 
this wider liability. In all such cases it has, I think, been the 
practice to insist that the crown should show that the language, 
scope and intendment of the statute require that an exception 
should be admitted to the normal and salutary rule of our law 
that mens rea is an indispensable ingredient of a criminal or 
quasi-criminal act; and I venture to think that it would be a 
misfortune if the stringency of this requirement were 
relaxed'[1023.
The case law in this area is very helpful and is worth 
examining in order to assess the scope of the law. In England,in 
Sweet V . Parsley, cannabis was found on property let out by the
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appellant who did not know her tenants were using the premises 
for the purposes of smoking cannabis. She was convicted of being 
concerned in the management of premises used for smoking 
cannabis, under sec.5 of Dangerous Drugs Act 1965[1033, and 
appealed to the House of Lords[104].
Lord Reid said that ‘where it is contended that an absolute 
offence has been created, the words of Alderson B. in Attorney- 
General V .  Lockwood (1842) 9 M. and W. 378 have often been
quoted; The rule of law, I take it upon the construction of all 
statutes, and therefore applicable to the construction of this, 
is whether they be penal or remedial, to construe them 
accordingly to the plain, literal, and grammatical meaning of the 
words in which they are expressed, unless that construction leads 
to a plain and clear contradiction of the apparent purpose of the 
act, or to some palpable and evident absurdity'[105].
But this view is limited as a general rule and where there 
is no legal presumption. There are many criminal acts where the 
words of the act make it an offence[106], but where it is agreed 
that there cannot be a conviction without proof of mens rea in 
some shape or form.
In Sheppard the attitude of the House of Lords towards 
strict liability offences was expressed by Lord Diplock; he said 
that 'the climate of both Parliamentary and judicial opinion has :t
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been growing less favourable to the recognition of absolute 
offences over the last few decades'[107].
Lord Pearce stated that ' the notion that some guilty mind 
is a constituent part of crime and punishment goes back far
beyond our common law, and at common law mens rea is a necessary
element in a crime. Since the Industrial Revolution the 
Increasing complexity of life called into being new duties and 
crimes which took no account of intent. Those who undertake 
various industrial and other activities, especially where these 
affect the life and health of the citizen, may find themselves 
liable to statutory punishment regardless of their own acts or 
neglect and those of their servants. But one must remember that
normally mens rea is still an ingredient of any offence. Before
the court will dispense with the necessity for mens rea it has to 
be satisfied that parliament so Intended. The mere absence of the 
word "knowingly" is not enough. But the nature of the crime, the 
punishment, the absence of social obloquy, the particular 
mischief and the field of activity in which it occurs, and the 
wording of the particular section and its context, may show that 
parliament intended that the act should be prevented by 
punishment regardless of intent or knowledge'[108].
A better understanding of the nature of mens rea in both 
common law and statutory offences is found in the judgment of 
Stephen in R v. Toison (1889); he said that 'the full definition
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of every crime contains expressly or by implication a proposition 
as to a state of mind. If the mental element of any conduct, 
therefore, alleged to be a crime is proved to have been absent in 
any given case, the crime so defined is not committed; or, again, 
if a crime is fully defined, nothing amounts to that crime which 
does not satisfy that definition'[109]..
In spite of being a traditional idea, it still has validity. 
Where the crime consists of doing an act which is prohibited by 
statute the proposition as to the state of mind of the offender 
which is contained in the definition of crime must be understood 
from the words and subject matter of the statute. As Stephen 
pointed out that 'the proposition may be stated explicitly by the 
use of such qualifying adverbs as "maliciously", "fraudulently", 
"negligently" or "knowingly" - expressions which in relation to 
different kinds of conduct may call for judicial exegesis. And 
even without such adverbs the words descriptive of the prohibited 
act may themselves connote the presence of a particular mental 
element'[110].
Thus, where the prohibited conduct consists in permitting a 
particular thing to be done, the word "permit" suggests at least 
knowledge of reasonable grounds for suspicion on the part of the 
permitter that the thing will be done and an unwillingness to use 
means available to him to prevent it and to have in one's 
possession a prohibited substance connotes some degree of
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awareness of that which was within the possessor's physical 
control.
Sometimes the actual words used by Parliament to define the 
prohibited conduct are in themselves descriptive only of a 
physical act and bear no connotation as to any particular state 
of mind on the part of the person who does the act. Nevertheless, 
the fact that Parliament has made the conduct a criminal offence 
gives rise to same implication about the mental element of the 
conduct proscribed. For example, in M'Nauqhten's case (1843) one 
implication as to the mental element is that the offender should 
be sane (within the M'Naughten rules). But this part of the full 
definition of the offence is often left unexpressed by 
Parliament. Stephen in R v. Toison suggested in circumstances 
where offences of strict liability are the creation of statute, 
the courts say that they are simply enforcing the expressed 
intention of Parliament. This is not always true. Smith and Hogan 
argue that Parliament is not concerned with the interpretation of 
mens rea because this is a matter they have left to the 
judges till]. The judges do not ignore the words of the statute 
but give close attention to them - certain words are said to 
impose mens rea into an offence, for example, "unknowingly", but 
no single word is conclusive. Usually, the court's decision is 
influenced by what the courts think to be the social object of 
the statute. The courts are influenced by the degree of social 
danger which they believe to be involved with a particular
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statute. Drugs, road accidents, pollution, therefore, are all 
considered in their social context.
To summarise, this chapter has been concerned with examining 
basic concepts of criminal law in the U.K. It is fairly clear 
that no definition of the concept of crime will be sufficient to 
satisfy the variety of perspectives which exist when examining a 
particular phenomenon in society. What is significant is that 
what amounts to a crime will vary from time to time and place to 
place. In other words, criminality is a conferred concept. This 
is also seen in offences of strict liability.
The approach adopted to assist in understanding the concept 
of crime was to look at the ingredients of actus reus and mens
rea. While it is apparent that there are limitation to both
concepts, it has to be recognised that they may create serious 
consequences for the mentally disordered person who finds himself 
in circumstances which bring him into the area of criminal law.
We have observed the difficulties of ascribing the notion of mens
rea to those persons who can not be in the position mentally to 
formulate the necessary mens rea. Thus, persons with a mental
disorder may perform the actus reus of a crime and yet lack the 
ability to have the requisite mens rea. If they are to be
restrained from continuing to harm others this may involve
detention without the proof of mens rea. This appears to run
counter to the basic principles of criminal law and to render
1
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them liable to the injustice of what is in effect a "conviction"
without their being responsible for their actions in the legally 
relevant sense. In other words, it would appear that utility is
overriding justice.
We also noted that the moral principle underlying the law's 
reluctance to penalize involuntary acts has serious implications 
for underlying principles involved in punishment and, indeed, the 
extent to which both these are linked. In chapters 3 and 4, the 
argument that very few persons with mental disorders can be said 
not be able to "act" in a voluntary manner is explored.
The position of Iraqi law in terms of a definition of crime is 
restricted to the Iraqi Penal Code and therefore avoids the 
conceptual difficulties which have been outlined. Nevertheless, 
it is clear that, while Iraqi law has similar concepts to actus 
reus and mens rea, it, too, faces problems of classification 
which do not help towards finding a single universally accepted 
definition of crime.
From the analysis of the concept of crime, it is clear that 
the study of mental disorder and the criminal law must examine 
the nature of criminal procedure and, in particular, what it 
seeks to establish and must investigate the nature and purpose of 
punishment. Accordingly, chapter 2 looks at punishment and 
criminal responsibility, chapter 3 examines the legal and medical
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meaning of mental disorder and chapters 4 and 5 consider the 
consequences for the mentally disordered person.
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OHARTER TWO
PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY
1. Introduction:
In attempting to understand the effect of mental disorder on 
the issue of criminal responsibility and punishment, and the 
extent to which concepts such as actus reus and mens rea are 
linked to theories of punishment and responsibility, it is 
necessary to examine the scope of such theories. Accordingly, 
this chapter will discuss the following points:
1. Definition of punishment.
a) Utilitarian theory.
b) Retributive theory.
c) Compromise theory,
2. The Concept of Responsibility.
a) The retributivist rationale of excuses.
b) The utilitarian rationale of excuses.
c) Hart's rationale of excuses.
2. Definition of Punishment:
As will be shown below the meaning of punishment is far from 
clear. In discussing punishment some writers talk about the 
existing criminal law, others deny its premises and suggest 
substitutes for themll]. It is argued that the term "punishment" 
is vague and open-textured. Mabbott says that this can be seen
■|
,:,r1
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from its different uses '(a) of criminals (by the state); (b) of 
blacklegs (by union); (c) of bad man (by God); (d) of foolish man 
(alcoholism for overdrinking); (e) of villages or hostages (by an 
occupying power); (f) of innocents (as scapegoats); (g) of 
children (by parents); (h) of animals (by their masters); (i) of
toys (by children); (j) of one sporting team/individual (by
another team/individual‘[2 ].
Our interest in punishment in this thesis is confined to the 
general framework of criminal law. Punishment, like crime, cannot 
be precisely defined. Accordingly, an attempt is made to examine 
the various theories.
The different meanings of "punishment" result from 
differences of interest. The philosopher concerns himself with 
the exact justification, the lawyer with legal categories and 
penalties and the criminologist is occupied primarily with the 
empirical aspect[3].
The most influential analysis of the meaning of punishment 
has been put forward by Hart, who considers state or legal 
punishment in terms of five elements: '(i) It must involve pain
or other consequences normally considered unpleasant, (ii) It 
must be for an offence against (legal) rules, (iii) It must be 
for an actual or supposed offender for his offence, (iv) It must 
be intentionally administered by human beings other than the
56
offender, (v) It must be imposed and administered by an authority 
constituted by a legal system against which the offence is 
committed'[4].
While Hart's analysis is, at least, concrete, the definition 
can be criticised in a number of ways. For instance, it is a 
little narrow because of its need to include "pain"[5] which may 
mean a type of action such as torture, or corporal punishment. 
Today, there are many punitive sanctions which do not involve 
pain, for example prisons nearly always run a series of 
rehabilitative programmes for prisoners. These activities can 
hardly be classified under the criteria of Hart and they are 
often confused with punishment.According to Hart's definition of 
punishment, offences should be, as we have already seen in
Punishment has to be carried out by a special authority 
which is provided by the law. So any other practice which 
includes these elements but where it is or has been carried out 
by people who are not authorised (by the state) is not punishment 
within the criminal law.
Feinberg is critical of Hart's definition and states that 
it; 'Leaves out of its ken altogether the very element that makes 
punishment theoretically puzzling and morally disquieting'[6].
I
chapter one, acts or omissions for which a person is liable to 
criminal prosecution and punishment.
II
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According to Feinberg, the concept of punishment has an 
expressive function which is part of its meaning. He argues that 
■punishment is a ...device for the expression of attitudes of 
resentment and indignation and of judgements of disapproval'[6],
We will see in chapter five that if compulsory treatment is 
substituted for punishment, it will also contain an element of 
resentment and public disapproval. Hart says that 'if we imprison 
a man who has broken the law in order to deter him and by his 
example others, we are using him for the benefit of society, and 
for many people... this is a step which requires to be justified,
by (inter alia) the demonstration that the person so treated
could have helped doing what he did. The individual according to 
this outlook...has a right not to be used in this way...unless he 
could have avoided doing what he did'[7].
This position is one which has been shared by many jurists
and legal theorists including James Stephen, Jerome Hall and even 
Hart himself[8]. Although we are concerned in this thesis with 
legal punishment, it should also be noted that Hart's definition 
covers only legal punishment and not all punishment is legal. 
Having introduced the idea that there is no one perfect theory of 
punishment at the beginning of this chapter, it is now worthwhile 
looking at some of the theories in detail in order to find out 
what are the appropriate justifications of punishment.
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a> Utilitarian Theory:[9]
Utilitarian theories find their justifications in a future 
good, namely that the result of the punishment should give good 
consequences[10]. So, utilitarianism is regarded as forward 
looking.
A well known theorist of the utilitarian philosophy is 
Jeremy Bentham. He argues that the promotion of general happiness 
must be the aim of the legislator, by looking at the nature of 
conduct in terms of its consequences and not by the underlying 
motives. Bentham argues that 'the only sovereign masters, to 
which conscious beings are subject, are pleasure and pain'[11].
According to the utilitarian theory, the purpose of criminal 
jurisprudence is to punish the criminal, but ultimately and 
essentially it should be to repress crime and prevent its 
commission. In other word, the primary object is to secure 
protection for society and not to inflict pain on the offender. 
Punishment is, therefore, to be imposed only when it excludes 
greater evil. According to this theory the circumstances in which 
punishment reduces crime and therefore harm are various and are 
as follows:
(i) Reform:
The proper purpose of criminal procedure according to the
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utilitarian theory should be to seek to reform the criminal so 
that he may become adjusted to the "social order". The criminal 
is reformed in the sense that punishment affects his behaviour 
and changes it, so he will not commit such offences because he 
believes that these offences are wrong. He may abandon his evil 
way by the aid of religion and moral advice in prison[12]. So, 
the imposition of punishment is justified by its ability to re­
educate an offender and thereby to return him to society as an 
"adjusted" human being. The criminal is no longer seen as a "bad 
agent", but as a sick agent[13]. We shall see how this notion has 
developed in the fifth chapter[14].
(ii) Prevention:
The second consequence of punishment is the idea that 
punishment serves as a means of preventing crime. Traditionally, 
the word "prevention" has been associated with the "deterrent 
effect" of punishment. It should be noted, however, that "general 
prevention" is the deterrent effect which punishment of the 
criminal "as an example" has upon the rest of the population. 
"Individual prevention" is its effect upon the criminal himself, 
either as a deterrent, or if he is imprisoned, as a physical 
restraint. The idea behind this theory is that society has the 
right to protect itself and prevent crime by detaining the 
criminal if there is some reason to believe that it would be 
dangerous to set him free[15].
The main question that arises here is how punishment and its
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severity can be limited.
In order to limit the punishment according to the 
utilitarian theory it is supposed that each category of crime in 
criminal law has a scale of possible punishment. Accordingly, the 
utilitarian theory would choose a penalty for each class of 
offence which prevents great harm to the public but at the same 
time does not inflict too much suffering on the of fender[16] . So 
this theory compares harm to the community on the one hand and 
harm to the offender on the other hand. If the justification of 
punishment is mostly deterrence for others, mens rea will be not 
important to determining responsibility, punishment and the 
severity of punishment. Accordingly, if deterrence is the primary 
goal, then there will be no concern with excusing conditions, for 
example, people who are found not guilty by reason of insanity, 
provocation and so on have to be punished. It is obvious, 
according to this theory, that criminal conduct is seen as a 
physical act; this criterion conflicts with the legal ground of 
responsibility and punishment which should primarily depend upon 
the notion of mens rea. It is difficult to make a person 
responsible and therefore to punish him for his act unless we 
make an examination of his intention.
According to Wootton's approach, mens rea can be taken into 
account when the punishment is imposed on the offender. In this 
case not only must the consequences of punishment be considered
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(forward looking) but one should also look back at the I
circumstances surrounding the act. This point will be argued in ;
more detail later in this chapter under the heading "criminal |
responsibility"[17]. The underlying rationale of a utilitarian 
theory of punishment can be rebutted by examining the 
consequences of such a theory. This is done in chapter 4 and 5.
b) Retributive Theory:
It is difficult to state the basis of retributive theories 
precisely[18], but the theories attempt to prove a link between 
punishment and "moral" guilt. The theories differ in their 
reasons, scope and in their accounts of how punishment should 
"fit the crime". The retributive approach can be attributed to 
Kant, and may be summarised in the following way:
(i) The only acceptable reason for punishing a man is that he 
has committed a crime.
(ii) The only acceptable reason for punishing man in a given 
manner and degree is that the punishment is "equal" to the 
crime for which he is punished.
(ii) Whoever commits a crime must be punished in accordance with 
his desert[19].
Accordingly, retributivism is described as "backward- 
looking". Retribution is therefore "punishment" in pure form. No 
other motive is involved other than that of inflicting pain on 
the guilty. Anybody 'who has done harm shall suffer harm
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regardless of any reformation or prevention'[20]. 'What a man 
sows, then let him reap'[21]. Lord Denning points out that it is 
a mistake 'to consider the object of punishment as being 
deterrent or reformative or preventive and nothing else...The 
ultimate justification of any punishment is not a deterrent, but 
that it is the emphatic denunciation by the community of crime, 
and from this point of view there are some murders which, in the 
present state of public opinion, demand the most emphatic 
denunciation of all, namely the death penalty'[22].
We can see how Lord Denning's statement illustrates the 
point made by Feinberg and quoted at the beginning of this 
chapter. It is fairly clear for such theories that the offender 
has to be morally guilty to be deserving of punishment.
The pure retributive theory, as it is stated above, is not 
reasonable, because, as Ten says, 'if indeed the legal authority 
has an absolute duty to punish, then it follows that punishment 
is required even when disastrous consequences will come about, 
even "when the skies will fall". For example, suppose that the 
punishment of an offender will lead to a vast increase in violent 
crime which will terrorize law-abiding citizens who would all 
much prefer that the punishment not be meted out. The theory 
would still insist on punishment. It is a strange notion of 
justice whose demands benefit nobody, and whose execution will 
keep even the virtuous and innocent awake with fear and
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trembling'[23]
The retributive theory would not then lay down necessary and 
sufficient conditions for the justification of punishment.
The discussion above shows that the goals of punishment, 
claimed by the different viewpoints, are based on certain 
theoretical assumptions. On the one hand, some theorists ask why 
we punish and attempt to find an ethical or moral basis to 
justify punishment. On the other hand, others take a utilitarian 
stand point and ask whether punishment is working. Is it 
efficient? Does it deter or rehabilitate?. In other words, 
whereas the retributivist regards "moral guilt" as a necessary 
and sufficient condition of criminal punishment, utilitarians 
have considered punishment a painful necessity, justified by its 
beneficial consequences.
C, A Compromise Theory:
It is evident from the argument in the last two sections 
that unless the pure retributive and utilitarian theories are 
amended, there is no scope for reconciling them. The pure 
retributive theory maintains that some form of moral desert is 
either a necessary or a sufficient condition of punishment. It 
does not, therefore, required good consequences from punishment. 
Kant said that 'even if a civil society were to dissolve itself 
by common agreement of all its members( for example, if the
64
people inhabiting an island decided to separate and disperse 
themselves around the world), the last murderer remaining in 
prison must first be executed, so that everyone will duly receive 
what his actions are worth and so that the blood guilt thereof 
will not be fixed on the people because they failed to insist on 
carrying out the punishment ; for if they fail to do so, they may 
be regarded as accomplices in this public violation of legal 
justice'[24]. The pure utilitarian theory view is that moral 
desert cannot be a necessary or sufficient condition for 
justifying punishment. The utilitarian holds that such conditions 
are met if good consequences are produced, even if an innocent 
person is involved. Accordingly, it seems that if we accept the 
comprehensive scope of the utilitarian theory and its exclusion 
of retributive reasons for punishment, any compromise between the 
theory and retributive theory will be precluded.
Many writers have been attempted to narrow the scope of 
these theories. So, it is found that a compromise between the two
theories is possible if the retributive theory admits that
punishment should only be imposed when it produces good 
consequences. The compromise theory should, therefore, regard 
retributive justifications for punishment as necessary but not 
sufficient. Accordingly the compromise theory overcomes most of 
the objections which have been raised against retributive and
utilitarian theories. It makes both conditions enter into the
justification of every case of punishment, each condition is
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necessary, and both of them are jointly sufficient for the 
justification of punishment. Punishment, as Hart argues, depends 
upon a number of different justifications
(deterrence,retribution, reform or any other). Hart considers 
that, despite the fact that the principles of justice are 
independent of and sometimes conflicting with utilitarianism, the 
requirement to use such principles in punishing people who have 
voluntarily committed crime does not avoid utilitarianism as 
general justifying aim of punishment. Hart says what we should 
look for are answers to number of different questions such as : 
what justifies the general practice of punishment? To whom may 
punishment be applied? How severely may we punish?[25].
These questions, according to Hart's approach, can be 
categorised as follows:
(i) The first question, the utilitarian one of reducing crime, 
is concerned with the general justifying aim of punishment.
(ii) The second and third questions, the retributive ones, are 
concerned with its distribution (liability and amount).
Hart distinguishes between justifying punishment in general, 
which allows us to ask why we should have these rules? what 
is the purpose of these rules?, and justifying punishment in 
particular which is concerned with the application of punishment 
in a particular crime.The general justifying aim of punishment 
in Hart's view is the utilitarian one of protecting society from
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the harm which may be caused by crime. Hart emphasises that the 
application of the general justifying aim must be restrained by 
the principles of justice which require us only to apply 
punishment to people who have voluntarily committed offences. So 
the principle of justice, according to Hart's approach, preclude 
punishment of those who have not voluntarily committed crimes. 
Accordingly, people who have committed a crime but have an excuse 
such as mental disorder have not to be punished. Hart means by 
his principles of justice to ensure that, in application of the 
general justifying aim of reducing crime, justice must not be 
sacrificed. He does not, however, regard the criteria emphasised 
by the principles of justice as absolute. So, he claims that it 
is possible in extreme situations that justice may have to be 
sacrificed. He says that '“in extreme cases many might still think 
it right to resort to those expedients but we should do so with 
the sense of sacrificing an important principle. We should be 
conscious of choosing the lesser of two evils, and this would be 
inexplicable if the principle sacrificed to utility were itself 
only a requirement of utility'[26].
Accordingly, in Hart's approach, the values of 
utilitarianism may conflict with principles of justice in extreme 
cases and, if application of justice may cause a disaster to 
result, the principle of justice may have to be sacrificed. So in 
such situations Hart's approach allows for the possibility of 
utilitarian considerations overruling the principles of justice.
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As a result, it may allow people who have not voluntarily 
committed crimes, such as mentally disordered persons, to be 
punished.Ten has adopted a similar approach (compromise theory) 
in his book Crime, Guilt and Responsibility. He says that
"punishing a parson is justified if and only if:(i) He is an 
offender who has voluntarily violated a legitimate law 
(retributive condition ), and (ii) punishing him is justified on 
utilitarian grounds (utilitarian condition)[27]. Ten means by 
"legitimate law" that a law falls within proper concern of the 
state.
Ten claims that it is unjust to punish innocent persons 
(persons who have an excuse which would normally exempt them from 
any punishment, such as mentally disordered people). Ten,
therefore, recognizes,as Hart does, two main independent values 
of punishment (justice and utility). These two values may 
conflict in extreme cases, so that there can be sacrifice of one 
value for a big gain in the other value. For example, we will be 
confronted with an exception to the retributive condition if the 
relatively minor punishment of an innocent person is the only way 
to prevent grave harm to other innocent persons as a result of 
increased crime. Accordingly, the retributive theory needs , as 
Ten has suggested, an amendment as follows 'punishing an
innocent person would be justified if and only if punishing him
inflicts much less suffering on him than the suffering that at 
least one other innocent person would have experienced as an
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additional victim of crime had there been no punishment'[283,
Although Hart has emphasises that the utility value may 
overrule the principle of justice in extreme cases, he claims at 
the same time that it is unfair to use the individual's liberty 
to the benefit of society. So the practice of punishment involves 
a compromise in which the pursuit of desirable general social 
aims is checked by the need to protect individuals from being 
used simply as a means to the fulfilment of these general social 
aims. As a result, even if punishing an innocent person would be 
justified due to the high probability of its avoiding much 
suffering for another innocent person, the value of individual 
liberty should be not forgotten. Thus, a balance between 
"liberty and utility" has to be made. With this approach it may 
be possible to avoid unjust restrictions on the individual's 
liberty. This point will be considered in more detail in chapter 
five where it is argued that this theory (compromise theory) may 
justify a limited protective sentence against particular innocent 
persons (mentally disordered people).
In order to understand theories of punishment properly, it 
is necessary to consider the idea of "responsibility" and the 
extent to which "responsibility" is an important feature of the 
theories of punishment. We have already explored the concept of 
responsibility in chapter one, when dealing with actus reus and 
mens rea.
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3. The Concept of Responsibility:
There are several uses of the word "responsibility" and so 
it is important to distinguish the various meanings and
consequences which arise from the use of the word "responsible" 
in the different circumstances in which it arises. The word 
"responsible" is difficult to define: as we shall see below, it
is ambiguous and different meanings can be distinguished.
Therefore it leaves a lot of arguments about its application. In 
the final analysis, it will be shown that there is no one 
preferable definition. As we shall see in chapters 3 and 4, the 
concept of "diminished responsibility" and insanity raise special 
problems in relation to "responsibility".
The section is limited to looking at criminal responsibility.
Criminal Responsibility:
The idea of criminal responsibility[29], interpreted in the 
narrowest sense, brings up such topics as the age for criminal 
responsibility, and insanity or mental illness. In other words, 
in its narrowest sense, criminal responsibility concerns the 
place in the criminal law of special groups whom we might wish to 
exclude from its normal application. We might also think of 
offences of strict liability where the offence in question is
defined purely in terms of external behaviour and does not
include the normal mental element of intention or mens rea.
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In a broader sense, "criminal responsibility" would cover 
certain aspects of the criminal law as it applies to normal 
adults and normal crimes, namely those which relate to 
considerations which might be put forward to excuse such persons 
who have behaved in a manner which would normally attract 
conviction and punishment. Hart, when looking at excuses suggests 
that the concept of responsibility in the criminal law context 
reflects the relationship between the institution of society and 
the perpetrator of an alleged crime. Responsibility can be 
properly understood in terms of a theory of "ascription".
Hart's notion of ascription of responsibility is one which 
is linked with the general ascriptions which are to be found in 
law. Hart suggests that the philosophical analysis of the concept 
of human action has been inadequate and confusing because of the 
nature of legal language. He goes on to say that statements in 
the form of "he did it" have been traditionally regarded as 
primarily descriptive but the principal function of such 
sentences is actually ascriptive. Because of this, legal concepts 
can be vague and this vagueness may be diminished by judicial 
interpretation. Thus, Hart examine the character of defeasible 
concepts in criminal law. He says, when examining crime, that it 
is possible to create a list of defences or exceptions with which 
different criminal charges may be met. Hart acknowledges that 'in 
the case of crime, e.g.,murder, the onus of proof may be on the
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prosecution to provide evidence that circumstances are not 
present which would, if present, defeat the accusation. Yet,
certain defenses or exceptions, such as mistake of fact, 
accident, coercion, duress, provocation, insanity and infancy.
Feinberg, in examining Hart's notion of defeasibility says 
that defeasibility is tied up with our system of litigation and 
rules of procedure[31]. As a result of this, various types of 
excuse and justification are parts of the available defences 
which can defeat legal claims and charges even when all the other 
conditions which are morally necessary for the success of the 
charge are present.From this preliminary analysis of 
responsibility, it is, therefore, possible to argue that 
responsibility is a defeasible concept. The consequence of this 
is clear, namely, that if the "defeating excuse" is accepted, 
then the imputation of fault is required to be withdrawn.
In the cases of duress, mistake and intoxication, for 
example, the law might take the view that the person is not 
guilty, or that the criminal acts should be punished less 
severely. Again taking a broader view we might think of
nonetheless, what is meant by the mental element in criminal
■iliability (mens rea) is only to be understood by considering
"i.
most of which have come to be admitted in most crimes, and in
Îsome cases exclude liability altogether, and in others merely
■ Y j"reduce" it'[30]. :'i
«
72
responsibility as covering justifications for actions which are 
normally criminal, for instance, the defences of necessity or 
superior orders.
It is worth stating briefly here the difference between 
"justification" and "excuse". Justification is the defence in the 
criminal law of showing that the act complained of was lawful and 
justifiable. Accordingly, in the act of homicide, for example, if 
the person admits that he committed the act but claimed that it 
was in self-defence, his act is justified because he had no "mens 
rea" and "actus reus" in the criminal law sense. On the other 
hand, an excuse is defence in the criminal law because the person 
had no "mens rea" when he committed the crime, although he 
actually performed the "actus reus". Accordingly, there is no 
crime, in the sense of criminal law, in the condition of 
"justification" (there is no mens rea and actus reus). Whereas 
there is partly a crime in the case of "excuse" (there is actus
reus but there is no mens rea), but because the person had no
mens rea when he committed the actus reus, he is not responsible
(for example, mentally disordered people).
Defences of both kinds, excuses or justifications, have in 
common that in these circumstances persons are not blameworthy or 
not fully blameworthy, and , therefore, are in some sense in the 
same position as young children or mentally handicapped, or 
seriously mentally ill people[32].
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This implies that "normal" criminals in normal circumstances 
are blameworthy, in that they are responsible for their wrongful 
actions. As noted in chapter one, this involves the assumption 
that in normal cases of crime and punishment .the requirement of a 
guilty mind or mens rea have been met, in that the person in some 
sense intended to do what he did. Mens rea can be thought of as 
the core of responsibility in the criminal law. A central idea of 
criminal responsibility is that a person is guilty of a crime 
only if he performed the prohibited act intentionally.
Wootton offered the well known argument that 'the idea of 
mens rea has got into the wrong place in the determination of 
criminal liability, and ought to be reconsidered in order to
decide the question of disposal'[33]. Wootton thinks that the
harm which is incurred is the same in all cases. Therefore, if a 
harm outlawed by the criminal law has happened, it should be the 
role of the criminal law to interfere, and to deal with the 
harmdoer, whether that harm was caused intentionally, 
negligently, accidentally or involuntarily.
Wootton says that the mental element as a requirement for a 
criminal act in relation to a particular person should be 
dropped. However, Wootton would make the "mental element"
important in determining the disposal for each accused. She says
that it is irrational to allow dangerous individuals to escape
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any punishment on the grounds that the harm they caused was not 
inflicted deliberately. According to Wootton's theory, "duress", 
"mistake", "mental illness" should be relevant only to the 
question of sentence.
Since the choice of sentence will depend upon whether the 
harm was caused deliberately, negligently or involuntarily, 
Wootton seems to accept that the issue of such mental states 
could and should be investigated. Her idea is not that mens rea 
should be removed completely, but that it has "got into the wrong 
place". This means that all excusing conditions would be taken 
into account after conviction, rather than before. Under her 
approach, as we have seen, a large number of people would be 
dealt with by the criminal courts who, under the present law, 
would not be the subject of criminal proceedings at all. In other 
words, the difference would be that any relevant excuse, for 
example, mental illness, would be considered after conviction 
rather than before. This approach will be explored in chapters 3 
and 4. Also, she argues that criminal legislation which adopts 
her view, and omits the "mental requirement" as a condition of 
responsibility, will work more effectively in preventing crime 
than the present system. She has supposed that if her approach 
were to be adopted, it would make people take greater care in 
their daily behaviour[34].
There are many objections to Wootton's theory. Some of these
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objections are philosophical and others practical. It seems that 
the most important of the philosophical objections are that she 
regards criminal conduct as consisting of physical acts, without 
any reference to mental elements. Ross says that 'there is a 
manifest difference between A's throwing a stone in the direction 
of B as part of a game, for B to catch it, and A's throwing it at 
a police officer during a demonstration in order to bring him 
down. But this difference cannot be described in purely objective 
physical terms. The distinction between the act itself and the 
attendant mental circumstances is an artificial and impossible 
abstraction...'[35].
Professor Malcolm has put forward a similar view when he 
says that 'rarely do we perceive other people's "actions" in 
purely physical terms. We perceive someone's speech as 
passionate, and his movements as threatening. We perceive people 
under mental descriptions (as impatient, sad, affectionate) and 
we respond accordingly. This form of perception is natural for 
us, but not perception under a purely physical 
description...'[36].
Also there are many practical objection to Wootton's theory:
(i) The first objection against Wootton's theory is the social 
stigma or label which is often placed on a criminal 
conviction. Under the modern law, the practical difference 
between acquittal and a conviction follow by an absolute
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discharge is the social stigma which attaches to a criminal 
conviction[37].
(ii) A second objection to Wootton's theory is that it would take 
too much power out of the hands of the jury who decide the 
issue of guilt, and give too much power to the judge, in his 
discretion on sentence. In P.P.P. for Northernireland v . 
Lynch. Lord Edmund-Davies has made this point, in which he 
was concerned to disapprove the view that the excuse of 
duress ought to be relevant in mitigation rather than in 
exculpation. He says that 'apart from the obloquy 
involved in the mere fact of conviction, in the nature of 
things there can be no assurance that even a completely 
convincing plea of duress will lead to an absolute 
acquittal'[38].
His claim is that the judge may not have enough information 
before him to decide the issue properly. It is should be 
Noted, though, that Wootton would put sentencing in the 
hands of an expert panel,
(iii)The third objection to Wootton's approach is that which 
denies that the criminal law would work more effectively. 
Ross has argued that the general preventive effect of 
criminal law '...depends in the first instance on the 
capacity of the system to strengthen and form popular moral 
attitudes of disapproval of criminal acts....This capacity 
depends, in turn, on popular recognition of the justice of 
punishment, and that in turn means that the punishment
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should be both directed at the guilty and reasonably related 
to the guilty, and this condition will certainly not be 
fulfilled in a legal system in which it is a matter of pure 
luck whether one will be prosecuted and possibly sentenced 
to one or other form of suffering or cure'[39].
(v) The fourth objection is that Wootton's view moves away from 
moral principle (justice) in convicting a man of a criminal 
offence before the consideration of fundamental issues such 
as whether he acted under mistake of fact or under duress, 
or as a result of mental illness, i.e. whether he is 
"responsible".
These criticisms of Wootton show how deeply the idea of 
criminal guilt is linked to the idea of blameworthiness. This 
supports the idea that punishment is in part an expression of 
condemnation, as suggested by Feinberg earlier[40]. With this in 
view, we must now look at the role of excuses in more detail.
Î
The criminal law and the practice of the courts in England 
and Scotland have adopted mens rea as a basis of responsibility. 
The best example in England is shown by the decision, by the 
House of Lords, in R v. Morgan in 1976, that a man is not guilty 
of rape if he honestly believed at the material time that the 
woman concerned had consented to intercourse. This decision is 
supported by the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1976[41]. Also,
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the Homicide Act 1957 speaks of "mental responsibility"[42].
For Scotland, the words of Lord Justice-Clerk Cooper in 
Duguid v. Fraser have already been quoted to the effect that 
'mens rea is an indispensable ingredient of a criminal or quasi­
criminal act; and I venture to think that it would be a
misfortune if the stringency of this requirement were 
relaxed'[43].
Also Lord Thomson says that 'murder is constructed by any 
wilful act causing the destruction of life, whether intended to 
kill or displaying such wicked recklessness of the consequences. 
Now all that means is this: in the first place, it is a wilful
act, not an accidental act...in this case it means a deliberate
stabbing with a knife'[44].
As we have seen in chapter one, the concept of mens rea has 
limitations and these limitations still apply, and this is more 
so when we try to explain "responsibility in terms of mens rea.
As stated at the beginning of this section, it is clear
there is no correct or preferred view of "responsibi1ity"-we have 
seen this with the theorists and judges. However, when we look at 
the modern approach to criminal responsibility, it helps to 
remove a few of the problems. The basis of this "new" approach to 
an understanding of criminal responsibility is to be found in
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Hart's idea of "capacity responsibility"[45]. Hart criticises the 
analysis of criminal responsibility supplied by previous legal 
theorists. Hart claims that an accused can be properly held 
criminally responsible only if his case does not fall under an 
established excuse. Consequently, the notion of criminal 
responsibility is assumed as a "negative" idea of responsibility,
i.e. a person who commits a physical act proscribed by law is 
guilty if and only if he was , for instance, not insane,not under 
duress, not ignorant of certain essential facts, not an infant, 
did not have an established justification for his act, and so on.
But this "negative" idea of responsibility leads us back to 
the traditional analysis of responsibility, because we must ask 
why are these excuses excuses? It is the case that there is 
something which leads to these excuses. Mens rea refers to those 
mental elements of conduct which are necessary for criminal 
conviction and punishment. Accordingly, to act with mens rea is 
to act without an excuse and vice versa. Mens rea lies at the 
centre of the law of excuses and the insanity plea. It is linked 
to the insanity defence through the so-called "conformity" 
principle. The "conformity principle" requires that an individual 
should not be held criminally responsible if he could not have 
conformed his conduct to the requirements of the law he is 
supposed to have broken. That is, the conformity principle is a 
recognition of conditions that make an individual unable to obey 
the law, not a recognition of, for example, reasons such as 
acting under duress[46]. This leads us on to the important topic
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of excuses and justifications for excuses.
a) The Retributivist Rationale of Excuses:
According to the retributivists view, the justification for 
legal excusing conditions is a demand of justice. The distinction 
between "moral guilt" and "moral innocence" should be legally 
recognised. Since moral guilt is a necessary condition of 
criminal responsibility, it means that these who are "morally 
innocent" must be excused from criminal responsibility[47]. 
Therefore, without looking at the social consequences, those who 
are "morally guilty" must be punished. To demonstrate how excuses 
protect those who should be considered morally innocent, the 
retributivists argue that the justification of the accepted legal 
excuses lies in the fact that each excuse protects the "morally 
innocent". Retributivists sometimes confuse the meaning of 
"moral" wrong with legal or criminal wrong. The result is a sconfusion about what should be the goals of criminal law. For 
example, Bradley claimed there is a "necessary connection" ,|| 
between punishment and moral guilt[48]. It is important that the 
retributivist distinguishes immoral actions which deserve 
punishment from those which do not. Kant does this. Starting from 
the fundamental idea that communities exist in order to secure
i"justice", this demands that "each citizen enjoys the fullest 
possible liberty, compatible with the same liberty for all"[49].
Kant claims that the primary function of criminal law is to 
provide this freedom. He argues that the criminal cannot be
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punished just because he is immoral, but only because he has 
broken a legal duty. This assumption depends upon the view that 
the law has to be obeyed because its is regulation of our 
behaviour is a necessary condition of civilized life. Mundle says 
that retributive theory allows the punishment of acts which are 
in themselves morally neutral and not just of those acts which 
are really morally wrong. Accordingly, obeying the law is a moral 
obligation. So, persons who breaks traffic rules commit a moral 
wrong[50]. Ten says that 'I shall, therefore, assume that it is 
improper for the state to punish conduct which is not harmful and 
is merely regarded as immoral by the majority in society, or by 
any other group"[51].
There is no universal agreement on what is to count as 
"moral guilt" or "moral blameworthiness" or "wickedness"[52]. 
These terms are used interchangeably. though the retributivists 
have differed in their ideas about "moral guilt", most agree that 
moral guilt involves "freedom of choice"[53].
According to the retributivists view, the basis of criminal 
responsibility must be the voluntary doing of a morally wrong act 
forbidden by penal law[54]. Therefore, excusing conditions are 
justified so that no-one shall be punished in the absence of the 
basic condition of "moral guilt". The general principle of 
criminal liability is to punish only those who have committed 
moral wrongs, proscribed by law intentionally or recklessly[55].
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This concept has been supported by Lord Justice Denning who 
explain: 'In order that an act should be punished, it must be
morally blameworthy, it must be a sin'[56]
Hall claims that the mental elements (mens rea) ought to be 
linked by the principle that they require 'the intentional or 
reckless doing of a morally wrong act’[57].
Hart has rejected Hall's notion in which he equates "mental 
guilt" with the "intentional or reckless doing of a morally wrong 
act"[58]. He argues that '...if this theory were merely a theory 
as to what the criminal law of a good society ought to be, it 
would not be possible to refute it, for it represents a moral 
preference;...but of course Professor Hall's doctrine does not 
fit any actual system. There are necessarily many actions (quite 
apart from the cases of "strict liability") that if voluntarily 
done are criminally punishable, although our moral code may be 
either silent as to their moral quality, or divided'[59].
Hart gives the example of offences as follows: 'Very many
offences are created by legislation designed to give effect to a 
particular economic scheme (for example, a state monopoly of road 
or rail transport), the utility or moral character of which may 
be genuinely in dispute. An offender against such legislation can 
hardly be said to be morally guilty or to have intentionally 
committed a moral wrong, still less "a sin", proscribed by
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law'[60].
Wasserstrom argues that 'Hart appears to require of Hall's 
analysis either that it be a theory about what a good system of 
criminal law would be like or that it be an accurate account of 
the characteristics of all of the actual cases of any existing 
system of criminal law. But this is an unreasonable disjunction. 
At the very least. Hart should be prepared to assess Hall's claim 
as neither a formal definition or analysis of the concept 
"criminal law" nor a proposal for a good system of criminal law. 
Instead, it should be possible to regard Hall’s assertion or one 
like it, as insisting merely that one of the important, central, 
or illuminating characteristics of existing systems of criminal 
law is this insistence on moral culpability...'[61].
According to the retributive theory, however, there are only 
three alternatives to considering criminal liability, that either 
criminal liability must be "strict" based on the outward 
behaviour of the accused, or that it must consider the "mental 
condition" of accused to find moral culpability only, or not to 
consider moral culpability at all[62].
It seems that Hart's analysis, which defends the moral basis 
for the legal principles of responsibility, is the best account 
of excuses in the light of the general purposes of criminal law. 
Hart distinguishes between two kinds of principles and he takes
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the moral view that a man ought to be punished for conduct of his
own which was done voluntarily. So it is immoral to punish those
who have not "voluntarily" committed a crime (for example, those
who commit a crime under duress). Professor Hart declares that
'...the principle (1) that it is unfair and unjust to punish 
those who have not "voluntarily" broken the law is a moral 
principle quite distinct from the assertion (2) that it is wrong 
to punish those who have not "voluntarily" committed a moral 
wrong proscribed by law’[63]. Also he adds that 'one necessary 
condition of the just application of punishment is normally 
expressed by saying that the agent "could have helped" doing what 
he did, and hence the need to inquire into the "inner facts" is 
dictated not by the moral principle that only the doing of an 
immoral act may be legally punished, but by the moral principle 
that no-one should be punished who could not help doing what he 
did...'[64].
This approach was taken by Lord Morris in Lynch when he 
stated '...the admissibility of a defence of duress on a charge 
or murder...any rational system of law should take fully into 
account the standards of honest and reasonable men. By those 
standards it is fair that actions and reactions may be 
tested....It is most undesirable that in the administration of 
our criminal law, cases should arise in which, if there is a 
prosecution leading to a conviction, a just conclusion will only 
be attained by an exercise thereafter of the prerogative of
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granting a pardon'[65].
b) The Utilitarian Rationale of Excuses:
According to Bentham, 'punishment is in itself an evil, 
justified by its consequences which promised to exclude a greater 
evil- the commission of crime'[66]. Bentham sets out a list of 
excusing conditions in which punishment should not be inflicted, 
these are when it is:
(i) groundless in the sense that either the harm done was 
outweighed by the good consequences of the act or the act 
hagainst which punishment was to be directed was harmless.
(ii) inefficacious in that the infliction of punishment cannot 
prevent any harm.
(iii)unprofitable when the infliction of punishment produces 
harm greater than the harm prevented by it.
(iv) needless in which the infliction of punishment is the most 
expensive way of preventing the harm done[67].
It is suggested, therefore, by Bentham that there are two 
main categories of excusing conditions which are relevant to 
punishment of an individual. The first category is where the 
threat of punishment can produce no effect nor prevent someone 
from committing a crime. Thus the insane may lack the mental 
ability to relate to the punishment and learn from it not to 
repeat the offence in the future.
i
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The second category is where the threat of punishment may 
not have had any effect because of the nature of the conduct 
itself - for example, accidental conduct[68].
Other writers have followed Bentham's view that the main 
justification for the established legal excuses of mistake, 
duress, infancy and insanity is because people whose acts result 
from these conditions are unable to respond to the threats of the 
law and that, therefore, punishing them cannot serve the 
deterrent aim of the law.
Williams argues that part that of Bentham's theory which 
relates to mental disorder contains excusing conditions, thus: 
'Although deterrence is not the sole object of the criminal 
process, it is assumed that a person convicted of crime belongs 
to a class of people who are capable of being deterred by the 
threat of punishment. For at least one class, the insane, this 
assumption does not altogether hold good, partly because it is 
thought to be unjust to punish those with intellectual insanity, 
a measure of example is given'[69].
In the case of Porter, Dixon.J. said that 'it is perfectly 
useless for the law to attempt, by threatening punishment, to 
deter people from committing crimes if their mental condition is 
such that they cannot be in the least influenced by the 
possibility or probability of subsequent punishment'[70].
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Glover writes that 'it is suggested that expressions of 
blame for something done are pointless where the event in 
question did not constitute an action or else where it was an 
unintentional action. It is said that blame is useless as a means 
of altering the behaviour of the person whose involuntary 
movement or unintentional act it was* [71].
In reality, though, even if the threat of punishment would 
be useless against offenders who had an excuse, this does not 
mean that the punishment of these offenders would not reduce 
crime by deterring potential offenders who might think that they 
could falsely one of the excuses and escape penalty[72]. Glover 
argues that the infliction of punishment in these cases might be 
beneficial, because it might encourage more care in the future 
from the person who was punished and from others who hear of the 
punishment. He states that '...blaming a man for unintentional 
acts may be useful, in that this may cause him to take more 
trouble to avoid accidents, mistakes or inadvertence next time. 
Another is that men do not always decide rationally, so that 
previous blame for what was unintentional may strengthen 
someone's resolve not to do that kind of thing 
intentionally...'[73].
Therefore, as Bentham mentioned, if insanity were an excuse, 
it might be true that the threat of punishment would not be
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useful in preventing the genuinely insane person from committing 
a prohibited act. At the same time, the punishment of an insane 
offender might be useful in deterring non-insane offenders from 
cheating courts or juries by pretending that they were 
insane[74]. Hart writes that 'the utilitarian rationale...seems 
to destroy the entire notion that in punishing we must be fair to 
the particular criminal in front of us and the purpose of 
excusing conditions is to protect him from society's claims ...we 
look on excusing conditions as something that protects the 
individual against the claim of the rest of society. Recognition 
of their excusing force may lead to a lower, not a higher level 
of efficacy of threats, yet-and this is the point- we would not 
regard that as sufficient ground for abandoning this protection 
of the individual, or if we did, it would be with the recognition 
that we had sacrificed one principle for another. Far more is at 
stake than the single principle of maintaining the laws at their 
most efficacious level'[75]
c) Hart's Rationale of Excuses:
Hart defends what he calls "the principles of justice" by 
restricting punishment to people who have voluntarily violated 
the law[76]. The need of excusing conditions, in Hart's view, is 
to emphasise 'the much more nearly universal ideas of fairness or 
justice and the value of individual liberty'[77].
Hart's argument rests on a "choosing system in which
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individuals can find out, in general terms at least, the costs 
they have to pay if they act in certain ways". Then he says that 
the law 'guides individual choice...by presenting them with 
reasons for exercising choice in the direction of obedience, but 
leaving them to choose'[78]. From such a model, it follows that 
individuals who cannot be said to have "chosen" to disobey the 
law should not be held responsible. Hart writes that 'the 
criminal law respects the claims of the individual...as a 
choosing being, and distributes its coercive sanctions in a way 
that reflects this respect for the individual. This surely is 
very central in the notion of justice...'[79].
The advantages of justice in the recognition of legal 
excusing conditions, as Hart claims, are: 'First, we maximise the
individual's power at any time, to predict the likelihood that 
the sanctions of the criminal law will be applied to him. 
Secondly, we introduce the individual's choice as one of the 
operative factors determining whether or not these sanctions 
shall be applied to him. He can weigh the cost to him of obeying 
the law and of sacrificing some satisfaction in order to obey 
against obtaining that satisfaction at the cost of paying the 
penalty. Thirdly, by adopting this system of attaching excusing 
conditions, we provide that, if the sanctions of the criminal law 
are applied, the pains of punishment will for each individual 
represent the price of some satisfaction obtained from breach of 
law'[80].
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The law will fail to reflect the distinction between 
deliberately causing harm and causing harm accidentally which is
of vast importance in the rest of social life. People will not
understand why someone who has caused harm accidentally would be
liable to punishment. The community will not respect the 1 aw
which was assumed to benefit it.
Hart's view is that if the removal of legal excuses reduces 
crime, then the main benefits may lie not so much in the increase 
in individual freedom, as in the avoidance of harm, like physical 
and mental suffering.
It is argued that it is unjust to hold individuals 
criminally responsible for their acts and omissions unless those 
acts and omissions are themselves voluntary or are the 
foreseeable consequences of other voluntary acts and omissions. 
Criminal law accepts this principle in general. For example, in 
the case of murder, the crown must prove that death was the 
result of a voluntary act of the accused. Lord Denning says that 
'the requirement that it should be a voluntary act is essential 
not only in a murder case, but also in every criminal case'[81]
As previously discussed the idea of excusing conditions does 
as not reflect just one theory. Hart's explanation of excuses is 
neither utilitarian nor is it compatible with a purely
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utilitarian theory. It was found that the utilitarian theory is 
inadequate to give an explanation of all of the excusing 
conditions.
Hart argues that the aim of a "choosing system" is to 
prevent future crimes and not, as the retributivist argues, to 
punish moral offenders or to pay back harm that offenders have 
done. Thus, whereas retributivists base their account of excuses, 
in terms of the general justifying purpose, on the retributive 
theory. Hart's rationale of legal excuses accepts utilitarianism 
as the general justifying purpose of punishment[82].
A retributivist would say that no person should be punished 
unless he is "morally guilty" or blameworthy for his conduct. 
Hart's notion is that unless an individual has the capacity and 
fair opportunity to avoid the punishment, it would be unfair to 
punish him for the benefit of society. By the retributive theory, 
therefore, those who commit an immoral act may be legally 
punished, whereas the "choosing system", which is adopted by 
Hart, requires that there must be social benefits in punishing, 
in addition to the requirement that no-one should be punished who 
could not help doing what he did.
It appears from what has been mentioned above that the 
essence of Hart's rationale is close to the retributive ideal. So 
it can be said that Hart's rationale is a version of a modified
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retributive theory. As already mentioned above. Hart's ideals of 
fairness or justice assert the value of individual liberty[83]. 
Accordingly, Hart's principle of justice will give an agent more 
freedom to use the excusing conditions for his benefit. Justice 
according to Hart’s approach, therefore, is wider than the 
justice which is adopted by the retributivist because the latter 
is restricted by "legal moral ism" in this matter. Hart's view, 
therefore, appears to be more convincing than the retributivist’s 
theory, particularly because it allows for the possibility of 
crimes which are not intrinsically morally wrong.
Having examined the theories of punishment, it is clear that 
while a modified retributivism is to be preferred, retributivism 
in its pure form must be rejected because it reduces any theory 
of punishment to simply amounting to the infliction of pain on 
the guilty.
Hart's idea of a modified retributive theory at least 
involves fairness and justice and places value on individual 
liberty. The position seems to be that Hart's modified theory at 
least is not restricted to the notion of imposing "morality". We 
have seen in chapter one that the definition of crime which is 
closely linked to morality is rejected by modern theorists and 
writers' who stress the significance of criminal procedure and 
the imposition of punishment as its defining features.
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Hart's theory is similar to the compromise theory adopted by 
Ten. His theory begins asking questions about justice; the 
answers to the questions forms his theory of punishment. In 
assesing one theory of punishment against another, it is argued 
that Hart's analysis or tests should be applied. Accordingly, we 
should ask what is the justification for the general practice of 
punishment? Then we should identify who should be punished and 
finally the degree of severity of the punishment. Hart's theory 
is less rigid than either the utilitarian model or retributive 
theory; it manages, or at least is a more realistic attempt, to 
equate punishment with the concept of justice and fairness. The 
view put forward by Hart, is also capable of keeping pace with the 
changes in a modern society, particularly when the categories of 
so-called excusing conditions are expanding. This will be seen in 
chapters 3 and 4.
What we can say, at this stage, is that the various theories 
of punishment do reflect different political and social climates 
and different governmental approaches. One of the tests of any 
theory of punishment is whether it allows "excusing conditions" 
and how the justification for excuses fits with the general 
theory of punishment. We have seen that to understand ideas about 
excusing conditions it is necessary to examine the notion of 
responsibility, and criminal responsibility in particular. The 
broad view is that excuses arise in circumstances where persons 
are said to be not blameworthy or not fully blameworthy for
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actions which are normally said to be criminal. Hart's conformity 
principle makes sense since the principle recognises that certain 
condtions affect individuals in such a way that they are unable 
to obey the law. Hart's analysis defends the moral basis for the 
legal principles of responsibility and his justification of 
excuses is the best in terms of the general purposes of criminal 
law. He is correct when he defends the principles of justice by 
limiting punishment to those who voluntarily break the law. The 
so-called "choosing system" suggested by Hart makes more sense of 
excusing conditions, and is more firmly grounded in the general 
justification of punishment. It is argued in this thesis that 
some persons with mental illness or mental handicaps lack the 
capacity to understand or ability to choose which are necessary 
to satisfy Hart’s requirements for the infliction of punishment, 
but that this has to be decided in each individual case. Where 
the lack of capacity of understanding or choice is the result of
a mental illness or mental handicap it may be legitimate to
detain the "offender", and to administer treatment, until either
(i) he is no longer ill in a way which makes him dangerous or
(ii) he is no longer dangerous or
(iii)he has been detained for a period which is proportional to 
the gravity of the harm done by his act, even if he is 
still dangerous.
In some (grave) cases, provided that prediction is accurate, 
grounds of public welfare or utility may override Hart's criteria
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of fairness. This is not compatible with a strict application of 
Hart's position, but it takes seriously the implications of his 
general justifying aim for punishment (and does, in my view, for 
treatment) in cases where the offender who lacks mens rea remains 
dangerous. In other words Hart's choice principle can apply to 
normal cases, but not to all cases. Nevertheless such is the 
seriousness of the injustice of detaining people who do not meet 
Hart's criteria, that we must look for ways of limiting the 
restriction of their liberty. This is why I suggest later that it 
is in the spirit of Hart's approach to limit any detention 
according to the mental condition of person who is acquitted or 
detained.
Hart himself notes the problem presented to his theory by 
mentally disordered persons in his discussion of Wootton's 
approach for the elimination of responsibility and puts the issue 
to one side without adequate discussion as to how his own 
proposals are compatible with his general principles. Hart says 
that Wootton makes a 'crude...dichotomy between "punishment" and 
"prevention"'[84]. Hart accepts the views of other critics of 
Wootton that she relies too heavily on the argument that the 
question whether a man could have acted differently is "in 
principle unanswerable", and that we do not usually have clear 
evidence to answer it. He suggest that Lady Wootton is arguing 
'that a man's responsibility or capacity to resist temptation is 
something buried in (his) consciousness, into which no human
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being can enter, known if at only to him and to God: it is not
something which other men may ever know; and since it is not 
possible to get inside another man’s skin, it is not something of 
which they can ever form even a reasonable estimate as a matter 
of probability'[85]. Although Hart concedes that Wootton may be 
correct in stating that 'the evidence put before courts on the 
question whether the accused lacked the capacity to conform to 
the law, or whether it was substantially impaired, at the best 
only shows the propensity of the accused to commit crimes of 
certain sorts'[86], he criticise Wootton's idea of eliminating 
mens rea for three reasons :
The first relates to individual freedom. Hart says that if we do 
not have mens rea for a conviction then there is more possibility 
of the state or officials interfering with our lives. Secondly, 
compulsory medical treatment might be regarded as an alternative 
form of social hygiene without paying attention to the question 
of responsibility. Hart’s third criticism is that if we remove 
"mens rea" from the criminal law then the position becomes 
unsatisfactory[87]. He says there are some socially harmful acts 
which should always be seen and treated as criminal, because they 
can only be identified by reference to intention or some other 
mental element. Hart gives the example of the idea of attempt to 
commit a crime. He says that 'it is obviously desirable that 
persons who attempt to kill or steal, even if they fail, should 
be brought before courts for punishment or treatment; yet what 
distinguishes an attempt which fails from an innocent activity is
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just the fact that it is a step taken with the intention of
bringing about some harmful consequence'[881.
He concludes that while his three criticisms are not
impossible to overcome, many people do not want to move towards a 
"Brave New World"[89].
His own position is. however, too cautious in giving so much 
weight to his requirement of the capacity to choose. This is 
noted by Lacey in her recent book State Punishment where she
argues that 'it seems implausible that we should always be 
willing to accept fairness as an absolute constraint upon the
pursuit of utility'[90]. Lacey considers that Hart fails to 
provide a principle for determining when fairness may be
overriden in unusual cases. In this thesis I suggest an approach 
which provides such principles, but keeps closely to the
fundamental importance of fairness or justice, as Hart analyses.
A major difficulty here, and this point is explored in the 
next chapters, is that predictions in relation to the behaviour 
of persons with mental disorder are no more accurate than those
for person who are normal. It cannot be assumed that because
someone is diagnosed as mentally ill we are able to predict his 
future conduct.
On the other hand, it could be argued that Hart’s
98
responsibility criteria do not apply to those who are being 
detained for "treatment" rather than punishment. The answer to 
this is that detention to prevent harm, even if it involves 
treatment, is undoubtedly a form of punishment. Such treatment 
meets the criteria set by Hart, stated at page(55) of this 
chapter, namely; pain or unpleasant consequences; because of an 
offence against (legal) rules, an actual or supposed offender; 
intentional administration by an authority/state. The person is
not being detained and "treated" simply for his own good. It 
would appear that, if mentally ill people often lack capacity and
choice, then they should not be processed by the criminal law
system. Yet if they are not to be ignored by the law there has to 
be some way of dealing with the consequences of their behaviour, 
and, whatever we call this mode of intervention, it raises issues 
similar to those involved in the philosophy of punishment.
It is clear from Hart's requirements for the infliction of 
punishment that mental disorder has to have an affect on an 
individual's capacity to understand or ability to choose.
Accordingly, the meaning of mental disorder in both medical
practice and criminal law has to be established. On the other
hand, despite the fact that there are difficulties in finding an
appropriate solution for the problem of correlating the
psychiatrist's and the lawyer's understandings of mental 
disorder. Hart's approach (choosing system) may offer some help 
with this problem. According to this system, it seems that there
9 8  A
is an independent duty for the psychiatrist from the duty of 
the lawyers to diagnose the mental disorder of the accused 
and discover the effect of this mental disorder on the 
accused's capacity or choice when he committed crime. This point 
is developed later in chapter three.
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CHARTER THREE
M E N T A L  D I S O R D E R  I N  M E D I C A L  P R A C T I C E  AND C R I M I N A L  LAW
1. Introductions
Mental disorder presents many problems regarding the issue 
of man's responsibility for his actions. As will be shown, the 
main problem which lies in the test of legal insanity is whether 
there is "mental illness" or "disease of the mind" or "mental 
disease" or "mental disorder". The common term "mental disorder" 
or its equivalent is a necessary criterion for deciding legal 
insanity or criminal responsibility, but it is not sufficient by 
itself. If the criterion of mental disorder is met, then it is 
necessary to ask questions about the effect of mental disorder on 
"capacity" or "choice" (capacity in this study is understood to 
be close to "knowledge capacity" or "understanding capacity" or 
"cognitive capacity", and similarly "choice" is related to 
"control" or "choosing").
The existence of mental disorder does not always exclude 
criminal responsibility because not every type of mental disorder 
affects the "reasoning power". It can be argued that criminal 
responsibility should be judged according to the impact of mental 
disorder on the "capacity" or "choice" of the individual. Namely, 
the individual is legally regarded as insane when the mental 
disorder causes impairment of "capacity" or "choice"[11.
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Mental disorder is undefined[2] and the lack of general 
agreement on one definition for mental disorder has made matters 
complicated. For example, sometimes the same person might be 
labelled as mentally disordered by one professional but not by 
another. This difference of opinion about definition is 
considered to be explained by the special problems posed for 
psychiatrists due to the relative lack of independent laboratory 
information upon which to base their diagnoses[3]. To demonstrate 
the problems of the subject, some psychiatrists have suggested 
that it may be misleading to talk of "mental disorder" at all[4].
The aim of this chapter is not to attempt a comprehensive 
analysis of the problem, but will concentrate mainly on the 
points which have an important bearing on the problems of the 
insanity defences and their consequences.
Special attention will be focused on the following points;
1. The meaning and development of the concept of mental disorder.
2. Mental disorder in the context of the criminal law.
3. The role of the psychiatrist.
4. The Iraqi Criminal Law attitude to mental disorder.
5. The medical concept of mental disorder.
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2. The Meaning and Development of The Concept of Mental
Disorder.
According to the English Mental Health Act 1983, "mental 
disorder" means 'mental illness, arrested or incomplete 
development of mind, psychopathic disorder and any other disorder 
or disability of mind'; and "mentally disordered" shall be so 
construed"[5].
The Mental Health (Scotland) Act 1984 states that "mental 
disorder" means 'mental illness or mental handicap however caused 
or manifested...'[6].
According to the above definitions, in practice "mental
illness" is usually applied to certain mental disorders excluding 
mental deficiency (mental handicap) and psychopathic disorder. 
So, is it true that mental handicap and psychopathic disorder are 
not properly regarded as "mental illnesses"?
It is submitted that "mentally ill" is distinct from 
"mentally handicapped" in many aspects (medical, legal, and 
administrative practice)[7]. Mental handicap is generally
exhibited from birth or from a few days after[81. So mental
handicap arises when a person's mind has not fully developed, and
he is incapable of looking after himself, learning and 
thinking[9]. Accordingly, it is considered that mental handicap 
can not be cured, but it can be improved by education, social
Ill
care and exercise[10]. However, mental illness, which includes 
"psychoses", "neuroses" and possibly "personality disorder", 
defined later, can usually occur at any stage of life. It may be 
argued that all kinds of mental illness may respond to treatment 
or therapy[11]. It appears that, because mental handicap can not 
be cured, it is not regarded as "mental illness".
Similarly, should psychopaths be considered "bad" or "ill"? 
There are many psychiatrists who would not consider psychopathy 
as mental illness, yet in actual fact it can sometimes be treated 
successfully: Whitehead says that part of the meaning of
"psychopathy" is "abnormality of the psyche"[12]. As a result, 
since mental illness includes all of psychological illness, we 
can regard "psychopathy" as "mental illness". Psychopathy is said 
to be due to the effect of childhood experience or to brain 
damage. It may be that an appropriate treatment can be 
administered and is even necessary for some psychopathic 
patients[13]. It has to be noted that knowledge of the causes
does not always give the knowledge to cure.
The English Mental Health Act 1959 defined "psychopathic 
disorders" as follows: '...a persistent disorder or disability of
mind (whether or not including subnormality of intelligence) 
which results in abnormally aggressive or seriously irresponsible 
conduct on the part of the patient and requires or is susceptible 
to medical treatment'[14].
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The Mental Health Act 1983 has omitted the sentence "and 
requires or is susceptible to medical treatment" from the 
definition of "psychopathic disorder"[15]. This may have been for 
the purposes of the Act. From the definition alone it looks as if 
psychopathy is a form of bad behaviour (e.g. seriously 
irresponsible, etc.) but since it is undesirable abnormal 
behaviour which can be treated it is properly regarded as a 
mental illness. The Butler Committee admitted this in that they 
did not deny that psychopathic patients need the appropriate 
treatment[16]. Thus, because the psychopathic patient needs the 
appropriate treatment, psychopathy is properly regarded as a 
"mental illness". Whereas since mentally handicapped patients 
need training, education and social care, this does not fall 
within the category of "mental illness".
Despite the fact that the Mental Health (Scotland) Act 1984 
does not use the word psychopath but refers to psychopaths in the 
definition of "mental disorder" in the same terms as the English 
Mental Health Act 1983, it can be taken that the term "mental 
disorder" includes "psychopathic disorder". In practice the 
Scottish Criminal Law does not deem "psychopathic disorder" as 
mental illness[17]. Since "psychopathic disorder", however, needs 
appropriate treatment, it can be regarded as falling within the 
category of mental illness.
II
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Mental illness is sometimes used as a synonym for mental 
disorder, but mental handicap can be distinguished from mental 
Illness, although it is regarded as falling within the category 
of "mental disorder" in law.
It is useful here to define the meaning of the term 
"appropriate treatment". "Appropriate treatment includes medical 
treatment, but medical treatment is only one aspect of many types
-
of appropriate treatments. Accordingly "appropriate treatment" 
includes any activity which helps the patient to full recovery.
So, there are many facilities that should be available, such as 
family doctors, special people to deal with patients , good 
hospital services and a suitable environment. These facilities 
should have some effect on the patient[18].
The Mental Health Scotland Act 1984 has a definition of 1I"medical treatment" in sec.125: '"medical treatment" includes
nursing, and also includes care and training under medical 
supervision'[19].
It must be noted, however, that many psychiatrists believe 
that there is no cure for psychopathy, but its effects may be 
controlled by custodial "care". It has to be asked whether this i
amounts to "medical" cure?
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The Development of The Concept of Mental Disorder:[20]
History shows that the concept of mental disorder is not 
static, and this is because our ideas change with increased 
knowledge and on what is accepted as mental illness. The concept 
is modified with the changing condition of life, and mental 
disorders now include not only those which have an organic or 
physical cause, but also the purely functional disorders.
Mental disorder has been recognised for many centuries, but 
only in recent years have attempts been made to study and 
understand the condition. Although references to mental disorder 
were made by the early Egyptians, the true history of psychiatry 
(the science which studies mental disorders) started with the 
Greeks, and was followed by the Romans. Until then mental 
disorder was regarded as due to supernatural influences or due to 
possession by the devil.
An early reference to the treatment of the insane is found 
in Plato's Republic: 'If any one is insane let him not be seen
openly in the city, but let the relatives of such person watch 
over him at home in the best manner they know of, and if they are 
negligent let them pay a fine'.
Hippocrates (460-375 BC) believed that the brain was the 
organ of the mind, and that madness arose from a disturbance of 
the brain. So he denied that there was anything occult or
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mysterious about the occurrence of a mental disorder. He thought 
disturbance of the brain was caused by an imbalance of the 
elements (fire, air, earth and water) and of the humours (blood, 
phlegm and bile).
A belief that mental disorder was due to demons and 
witchcraft was to be found in the Middle Ages. The treatment of 
mental disorder was left to priests and superstitious beliefs in 
witchcraft grew stronger.
In the early Islamic period several causes of madness were 
identified: congenital, passionate and bilious. People with these 
disorder were distinguished from a group called the "sane insane" 
which included defectives and those who only demonstrated 
disturbances of judgement and temperament.
Lunacy legislation in England started in 1320 during the 
reign of Edward II and the property of lunatics was vested in 
Crown. Bethlehem, which was founded in London in 1247, was the 
first hospital in Britain to care for the insane.
In France, Pinel emphasised clinical observation and
■
considered psychological factors among other factors in the study 
of mental disorders; Esquirol (1772-1840) emphasised the need to 
have statistics concerning patients. He was the first to define 
hallucinations and illusions, and his definition is still in use
i
I
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today.
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In 1845 Griesinger stated that "mental diseases are brain 
diseases", and so the causes of mental illness were identified 
with brain damage or injury.
The Clinical Approach:
Kahlbaum (1828-1899) was the first to recognise mental 
illness as a "disease". Emil Kreapelin (1856-1926) adopted this 
basis to build up his classification of the various forms of 
mental Illness. Kreapelin had set criteria which had to be 
fulfilled in order to establish a disease entity. These criteria 
include the causes of the disorder, symptoms, symptomatology, 
course, outcome and pathological findings. In the majority of 
cases, however, not all these criteria could be satisfied, so he 
was forced to consider purely psychological symptoms, clinical 
phenomena, the course and outcome of various illness. 
Nevertheless, he succeeded in differentiating manic depressive 
psychosis and paranoia.
Since Kreapelin demanded the above conditions be fulfilled 
in order to consider mental illness as a disease, there has been 
considerable effort to find the possible causes and to detect 
pathological changes in the brain. Studies of genetic and 
environmental factors have failed to find a single cause for most 
mental illnesses. Also, studies of the anatomy and biochemistry
117
of the brain have had very limited success in discovering the 
cause of mental illness, although they have helped in the field 
of treatment of mental illness. After a century, understanding of 
mental illness is mainly based on observing the behaviour of the 
patient. These factors have left the concept of mental illness as 
a disease entity exposed to very strong criticism from
sociologists, and lawyers.
Anti—Psychiatry Moves:
The last century and the first half of this century had many 
psychiatrists working on the problems of mental disorder and 
treatment. Yet, the concept of "disease" applied to the field of 
psychiatry is challenged. Attempts have been made to eliminate 
the concept altogether by declaring that a mental disease does 
not exist, that mental illnesses are "ideological constructs or 
political expedients". In place of the mental disease concept, it 
is argued that problems of timing, faulty learning,
maladaptation, communication disorders, social disturbances, and 
identity crises are responsible. These views reflect the distrust 
of psychiatric diagnosis and the lack of "physical evidence". 
Szasz says that 'disease means bodily disease. Gould's Medical 
Dictionary defines disease as a disturbance of function or 
structure of an organ or part of the body. The mind (whether it 
is) is not an organ or part of the body'[21]Hence it cannot be
diseased in the same sense as the body can[22].
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Most psychiatrists, however, still agree with the 
application of the disease concept to most conditions. In other 
conditions, specifically psychopathic personality, psychiatrists 
and psychologists adopt contradictory positions,
A good example which illustrates the above point is 
alcoholism. Several experts argue that it is a disease state, 
others believe that the concept may be applied to some forms of 
alcohol abuse but not to others. Others reject the notion of 
alcoholism as a disease altogether. Davies says that the 
contradictions are because of lack of a single definition of both 
alcoholism and of disease, as there are more than 30 definitions 
of alcoholism and at least three definitions of disease.
The conclusion is that although mental disorders have been 
known since the beginning of history, their aetiology, 
pathological changes, psychological behaviour and social levels 
remain difficult to understand. More research is required to 
treat these problems, but research needs to be based on firm 
foundations and a reliable system of classification. The purpose 
of diagnosis, as the psychiatrists point out, is treatment and 
research and not accountability. The American Psychiatric 
Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-III) 
attempts to provide clear descriptions of diagnostic categories 
in order to enable clinicians and investigatiors to diagnose, 
communicate about, study, and treat various mental disorders. The
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use, however, of this manual for non clinical purpose, such as 
determination of legal responsibility, competency or insanity or 
justification for third-party payments, must be critically 
examined in each instance within the appropriate institutional 
context[23].
The mental disorders with which we are concerned in criminal 
responsibility are distinct from those listed by DSM-III as will 
be demonstrated later.
3. Mental Disorder in The Context of Criminal Law:
The Royal Commission on Capital Punishment believed that 'it 
has for centuries been recognised that if a person was, at the 
time of his unlawful act, mentally so disordered that it would be 
unreasonable to impute guilt to him, he ought not to be held 
liable to conviction and punishment under the Criminal Law'[24].
The Royal Commission on Capital Punishment believed that it 
is not necessary to have a definition of insanity, because it was 
a moral question that can be decided by the jury's collective 
moral sense. Professor N. Walker asks; 'By what criterion could 
one tell whether this or that case "ought" to have included? 
Could the criterion be expressed in words, or was it ineffable? 
If in words, were they quite unsuitable for use in a judge's 
summing up?[25}.
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The McNaughten Rules, which contain the "official" English 
definition of insanity, set as the test of criminal
responsibility whether the accused 'was labouring under such a 
defect of reason from disease of the mind, as not to know the 
nature and quality of the act he was doing , or, if he did know 
it, that he did not know that what he was doing was wrong'. Many 
other jurisdictions have also adopted a legal test of criminal 
responsibility, such as that developed in the U.S. case of 
McDonald as a 'substantial disorder of thought or mood which 
significantly impairs judgement, behaviour, capacity to cope with 
the ordinary demands of life’ [26]. Such tests do not, however, 
provide us with an accurate definition of mental disorder.
Establishing specific rules, or requiring special types of 
proof, would narrow the experts' and jury's roles. For example, 
the suggestion of a legal definition would make the trial judge 
exclude evidence on certain mental disorders[27], thus removing 
the matter from the jury. Both the expert and jury are,therefore, 
denied any flexibility in determining what is mental disorder. To 
illustrate this point, it is worth considering further the 
McDonald definition of mental disorder quoted above. Lord Chief 
Justice Tinel states that 'our purpose now is to make it very 
clear that neither the court nor the jury is bound by ad hoc 
definitions or conclusions as to what experts state is a disease 
or defect. What psychiatrists may consider a "mental disease or 
defect" for clinical purpose, where their concern is treatment.
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may or may not be the same as mental disease or defect for the
jury's purpose in determining criminal responsibility.
Consequently, for that purpose the jury should be told that a 
mental disease or defect includes any abnormal condition of the 
mind which substantially impairs behaviour controls. Thus the 
jury would consider testimony concerning the developments,
adaptation, and functioning of these processes and controls'[27]. 
According to this definition, evidence of anxiety disorder or
personal disorder would be excluded since it is not an "abnormal 
condition of the mind which substantially affects mental or 
emotional processes and substantially impairs behaviour
controls". Therefore, it has been left to the court to offer
instructions to the jury on the basis of the definition. The same 
conclusion is equally applicable to the McNaughten definition of 
insanity.
It can be concluded from the above that it is difficult and 
not necessarily desirable to ask for a precise definition of
mental disorder in the context of legal "insanity", and it has
been left for the law - judge, and jury - to determine. This 
leads us to the question of the role of psychiatrists.
4. The Role of The Psychiatrists:
Whose responsibility is it to decide whether an accused 
person is mentally disordered? Is it the judge, jury, or experts?
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In the nineteenth century the function of medical witnesses 
became important in trials where there was evidence of mental 
disorder in the person concerned.However, we have access to very 
few accounts of the role of the medical witness in early criminal 
trials[28]. This can be attributed to the following factors:
I. Lack of sufficient advanced knowledge,
II. Neglect of the value of an expert's evidence.
III. Availability of insanity defences. In most cases no experts 
would have been needed. In other words, the defence of 
insanity was limited to a few cases where the condition of 
the accused, as being insane person, was very clear.
In McNaughten's case, four psychiatrists were called by the 
court to give testimony concerning the accused's state of mind. 
Only two of these psychiatrists had interviewed the accused and 
were summoned for the defence. The evidence of the other two 
psychiatrists was considered because of their reputation in the 
field of mental disorder, although neither of them had any 
contact at all with the accused. After the decision, there was a 
disagreement as to whether or not the evidence of these two 
psychiatrists should have been considered by the court. As a 
result the House of Lords asked the judges to answer several 
questions, one of which dealt with the problem of whether a 
psychiatrist who never saw the accused prior to the trial, but 
who was present during the whole trial and the examinations of 
all the witnesses, should be asked his opinion as to the state of
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the accused's mind. It was then established that such evidence 
was only to be allowed if it was concerned with the general issue 
of mental disorder and not with that particular case[29].
Lawyers can now look at whatever appears in the Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder (DSM-III)[30] and 
International Classification of Disease (ICD 9)[31] to formulate 
an exact definition of mental disorder. "DSM-III" and "ICD 9" 
include both organic and functional mental disorder. "DSM-III" 
extended the list of mental disorders to include: tobacco
dependence, compulsive gambling, obsessive driving, insatiable 
greed, and homosexuality. As has already been indicated, DSM has 
been prepared for psychiatric purposes and not legal ones. The 
purpose of diagnoses for the clinician is treatment and research, 
not accountability[32]. The test of criminal responsibility does 
not require the expert to make a specific diagnosis of disorder 
or even to determine whether the disorder is functional or 
organic. The test refers to a general criterion of mental 
disorder defect. Eysenck maintained that there is very little 
correlation between the diagnoses made of some patients by 
different psychiatrists[33]. The main purpose of criminal 
responsibility is to find out whether "capacity" or "choice" was 
lost or impaired by mental disorder (insanity) at the time the 
crime was committed[34]. We have already discussed the way 
lawyers and judges understand the concept of "responsibility" in 
crimes in the last chapter.
■s.
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There is a disagreement among psychiatrists and jurists in 
deciding the test of criminal responsibility in relation to 
mental disorder. While The Butler Committee[35] and the American 
Psychiatric Association believe that the test should be limited 
to severe mental disorder, the APA argue that insanity acquittals 
should be granted only for "impaired cognition" and not for
"impaired control". The APA suggested standard is that the
defendant be 'unable to appreciate wrongfulness of his conduct 
because of a severely abnormal mental condition that grossly and 
demonstrably impairs a person's perception or understanding of 
reality'[36].
It must be noted that the Butler committee and the American 
Bar Association's (APA) suggestion of limiting the test to severe 
mental disorder will exclude kleptomania, psychopathy, and 
exhibitionism, although these conditions affect an offender's 
"capacity" or "choice". The APA also state that the process of 
functional or organic impairment need not be a chronic or 
enduring one. The APA's Criminal Justice Mental Health Standard 
used the term "mental disease" or "defect" to label either
impairments of mind, whether permanent or temporary, or mental
handicap which affected the mental or emotional processes of the 
accused at the time of the alleged offence[37].
We must ask the question to what extent "legal" insanity can
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be equated with a recognised psychiatric definition? The law has 
the following possible approaches in reaching conclusions about 
sanity of the accused:
I. It could adopt guidelines in which every recognised 
condition amounts to legal insanity; or
match up with psychiatric diagnoses
Setting its own independent standards is an acceptable 
solution for the legal process. This has been made very clear in 
a recent Scottish case in which it has been confirmed that the
II. It could establish its own standards which may or may not
I
3
III. It could adopt a compromise position, which will be
.discussed below.
The court treats psychiatric evidence with suspicion 
because, apart from being speculative in many cases, psychiatry 
is a highly inexact discipline. The law, therefore, even though 
it uses outdated psychiatric terminology, i.e."insanity", is 
unhappy about accepting without question mental disease as a 
basis for the test of legal irresponsibility. Also the law is 
reluctant to accept legal decisions by others, i.e."doctors", 
because their evidence in this field is persuasive but cannot be 
definitive[38]. This can be supported by the case of H.M.A. v . 
Kidd, where it was said that '...you must have regard to the 
evidence which has been given by the medical witnesses, but the 
medical evidence by itself is not conclusive'[39].
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law will set its own standards. It is said in Brennan v. H.M.A.: 
'What is insanity, according to the law of Scotland, for the 
purpose of a special defence of insanity at the time? The 
question has nothing to do with any popular view of the meaning 
of the word insanity, nor indeed is it a question to be resolved 
upon medical opinion for the time being. It is, on the contrary, 
a question which has been resolved by the law itself as a matter 
of legal policy...'[40].
This clearly confirms the view that has been suggested and 
reinforces the point that judges dislike handing over decisions 
to the medical profession.
It seems, therefore, the court has no option but to take a 
compromise position. A verdict of insanity[41] is not just a 
judgement about mental disorder but whether that and other facts 
lead the judge or jury to excuse the accused from the action 
taken. No definite criteria can be adopted to separate the 
blameworthy from the non-blameworthy. If expert psychiatric 
testimony stands unrefuted, it should be accepted[42]. Even where 
such evidence is accepted the law insists, however, that it is 
not just concerned to discover whether or not the accused was 
mentally disordered but also whether his mental state was such as 
to make him legally non-responsible. It has been clearly stated 
that '...the question is not merely whether he was suffering 
from a defect of reason due to disease of mind but whether the
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defect was such as to render him not responsible for his 
action'[43].
Gordon has tried to establish a balance between the 
conflicting approaches of law and psychiatry. He realises that in 
the normal situation legal insanity is the result of mental
disease and that, therefore, brings it very close to medical
ideas concerning mental disorder[44]. Gordon argues that 'the 
doctor who says the accused committed the crime because he was
suffering from paranoia is no more answering a legal question
than is the doctor who says the deceased died from poison, or the 
handwriting expert who says a particular signature is forged; all 
these experts do is to give the law the facts to which the 
relevant legal principle is to be applied. And this is so whether 
that principle is about responsibility and insanity, or about the 
criminal nature of poisoning or forgery'[45].
This is due to a number of reasons:
a) Mental disorder constitutes only one aspect of legal
responsibility or non-responsibility. Thus the psychiatrist 
speaks only on part of what the court is attempting to 
establish.
b) Psychiatric evidence may be seen as an unreliable and
unsatisfactory basis for determination of questions relating 
to the culpability of the accused.
c) Courts may wish to exclude what are seen as excusing
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conditions.
d) Formai justice can only be achieved by the consistent 
application of rules. Reliance upon uncertainties of 
conflicting psychiatric evidence minimises the law's effort 
to achieve formal justice.
It appears that the diagnosis of the offender as "mentally 
disordered" does not immediately mean that he is non-responsible 
because it is erroneous to say that every person who is mentally 
disordered is unaccountable in law[46].
There are many cases of people who are mentally disordered 
but there is no association between their mental disorder and the 
crime committed. The mental disorder of the offender must affect 
his "capacity" or "choice" when he committed the crime in order 
to determine his responsibility by courts.
Psychiatric testimony is speculative when it is related to a 
time and a situation where the psychiatrist was not present, 
because he could not assess the extent of effect that the mental 
disorder had on the offender's capacity or choice at the time of 
the crime alleged. It is therefore left for the judge or jury to 
decide from available evidence. It is emphasized that '...the 
medical evidence by itself is not conclusive. In coming to your 
decision you are entitled, and in duty bound, to regard the whole 
evidence'[47].
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This is so for all mental disorder, including mental 
handicap, psychoses, neuroses, personality disorders[48], and 
physical illness with mental effects[49].
To sum up, it can be stated that while the psychiatrist may 
be an expert at assessing the existence of mental disorder, he is 
not an expert at assessing the accused's criminal responsibility. 
The duty of the psychiatrist is to diagnose the mental disorder 
of the offender and the duty of the court is to discover the 
effect of this mental disorder on the offender's capacity or 
choice at the time the alleged crime was committed or in bar of 
trial. Thus, it is not the place of psychiatrists to determine 
criminal responsibility but they may help the court to reach a 
conclusion where they recognise the existance of mental disorder 
and of physical illnesses which affect the brain.
5. Iraqi Criminal Law Attitudes
As yet, there is no Mental Health Code in Iraq. For legal 
purposes the Iraqi Penal Code, 1969, Article (60) states: 'A
person is not criminally responsible if he lost his "capacity" or 
"choice" at the time of committing the crime by reason of 
"insanity" or "mental disorder"...if the mental disorder only 
impairs "capacity" or "choice" it must be deemed as "mitigating 
factors"[50].
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There is no definition of the term ‘‘mental disorder" in the 
Iraqi Penal Code or any other Code in Iraq, but, from the 
practice of the courts, mental disorder includes psychoses, 
neuroses, personality disorders, mental handicap, and includes 
physical illness with mental symptoms[513.
The role of the psychiatrist in the Iraqi Criminal Law is 
illustrated in articles 230, 231, 232 of the Criminal Procedure 
Code, 1971[53]. According to these articles, the judge has 
absolute freedom to determine whether or not an accused needs to 
consult a psychiatrist about his mental state, even if the 
accused has applied to do so. The judge can accordingly decide 
that the accused was not responsible for an offence because he 
was insane at the time of the offence or he can stop proceedings 
by reason of the accused's insanity in bar of trial, without 
consulting psychiatrists. So the judge can depend purely upon his 
own satisfaction as to whether or not the accused is insane. He 
can reach this result from available evidence during the course 
of the trial or inquiry. In practice, we can find inconsistent 
decisions from the Iraqi Cassation Court in this field. The Iraqi 
Cassation Court has not settled on one clear direction to 
determine what is the role of psychiatrists in mental disorder 
cases. There are sharp differences between its decisions. 
Consequently, we can not offer a simple description of the system 
which is adopted by this court.
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In some cases the Court of Cassation has accepted decisions 
of the Magistrate's court, refusing the request of the accused to 
foe referred to a psychiatrist because he claims insanity at the 
time the crime was committed. A decision may also be taken in bar 
of trial for reasons of the court by virtue of Articles 230, 231, 
232, of the Iraqi Criminal Procedure Code. These give the court 
the right to come to a decision, to its satisfaction, about the 
accused's mental condition, derived from any evidence available 
rather than just from a psychiatrist's evidence[53],
In other cases the Iraqi Cassation Court has dismissed 
decisions in which Magistrate Courts decided on an accused's non­
responsibility by reason of his insanity at the time which he 
committed a crime, without consulting any psychiatrist. The Court 
of Cassation justified their decisions on the basis that the 
consultation with psychiatrists, in this matter, was very 
important for justice. So the Magistrate Courts could not make 
such a decision without consulting a psychiatrist[54].
The Iraqi Cassation Court, in some other cases, has gone 
further when it dismissed some decisions and asked the Magistrate 
Courts that they should ask the psychiatrist whether or not the 
accused was responsible for his act[55].
Despite the fact that the Iraqi Cassation Court is not 
settled in its decisions about the role of psychiatrists and
#132 Icourts in determining an offender's mental disorder at the time 
of crime or in the bar of trial, it seems that its attitudes in 
most of the cases are in conflict with articles 230, 231 and 232 
of Iraqi Criminal Procedure Code, 1971, where it states that the 
judge has freedom to consult psychiatrists[563.
'
However, as Gordon says, there is a connection between 
medical approaches to mental disorder and legal approaches to
iinsanity, because legal insanity is the consequence of mental 
disease [57], Therefore, an expert psychiatric testimony should be 
accepted as merely one aspect of legal responsibility or non­
responsibility. Thus the court has to make its decisions after 
adopting the psychiatric evidence as a part of what the court is 
attempting to establish. In consequence, co-operation between 
both sides (courts and psychiatrists) is very important to 
reaching a just verdict, although the role of psychiatrist should 
be restricted to the issue of the mental states of offenders at 
the time of the alleged offence or in bar of trial. The role of 
the court should be connected with the extent of the effect of
offender's mental disorder on his "capacity" or "choice" at the
time of the alleged offence. Similarly, the court may determine 
the extent of the effect of mental disorder on the accused's 
capacity in bar of trial.
The Iraqi Criminal Law and any other criminal laws have to 
separate clearly the duties of the psychiatrist and the court in
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this field, as already mentioned above. This attitude prevents 
both sides, courts and psychiatrists, from interfering in the 
other's discipline, and will create good co-operation between 
them to achieve justice and protection of society.
6. The medical concept of mental disorder:
There are several classifications which attempt to define
the medical concepts of mental disorder (mental illness and
mental handicap). The most important classifications are those in 
"ICD 9" and "DSM III"[58], and they contain a limited explanation 
of what mental disorder is. Trial judges or jurists who have an 
interest in criminal affairs have only a general idea about 
mental illness and mental handicap which have a bearing on 
crimes, i.e. mental illness which effect the capacity or choice 
of the sufferer[59].
It is beyond the scope of this section to deal with all
types of mental disorder. Accordingly, the discussion is 
restricted to those conditions which are significant in
circumstances where the individual sufferer comes into contact 
with the criminal law.
MENTAL HANDICAP:[60]
Mental handicap has been defined as a state of premature or 
arrested development of mind. There would appear to be variations 
in the words used to describe a person with a mental handicap. In
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England and Wales the official term used to be "mental 
subnormality"; in Scotland until recently the term used was 
"mental deficiency"; in U.S.A. "mental retardation" has been 
used.
All of these terms describe the same thing but they vary in 
respect of their assessment of the individual. It must be noted 
that one term may be acceptable in one area but it may be 
considered offensive in another.
At present the term "mental handicap" seems to be a more
acceptable label in the U.K. In 1983 England adopted "mental 
impairment " as its legal term whereas in Scotland in 1984 the 
term "mental handicap" was adopted. It must be stated from the 
beginning that mental handicap is a general term covering a wide 
range of disabilities and impairments and the categorisation of 
different levels of mental handicap varies.
In Scotland, nursing staff classify people with mental
handicap according to their degree of independence, i.e. how much
they can do for themselves. The terms are "high", "medium", and
"low" dependency.
1. High dependency - applies to individuals who have a severe 
degree of mental deficiency to the extent that they can not 
protect themselves against physical dangers and depend on 
other people for care and protection.
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2. Medium dependency - applies to individuals who have a medium
degree of mental deficiency. They require some care and
supervision.
3. Low dependency - applies to individuals who have a slight 
degree bt mental deficiency such that they require some 
supervision but because they can benefit from education and 
training they should be able to adapt to society.
To decide precisely what amounts to mental handicap, 
importance is given to people's intelligence quotient (IQ) 
scores. The main systems in use in the classification of degrees 
of mental handicap is the World Health Organisation (WHO) system. 
In this system the (IQ) scores are the main factor and the degree 
of handicap are as follows:
Mild retardation 50 - 70
Moderate retardation 35 - 50
Severe retardation 20 - 25
Profound retardation Less than 20
The English system, based on the classification of the 
Mental Health Act 1959, replaced by the Mental Health Act 1983, 
is divided into two levels, namely subnormality and severe
subnormality. Severe subnormality is defined as a ‘state of
arrested or incomplete development of mind which includes 
subnormality of intelligence and is of a nature or degree that 
the patient is incapable of living an independent life or
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guarding himself against serious exploitation or will be so 
incapable when of an age to do so'. Subnormality is defined as 'a 
state of arrested or incomplete development of mind (not 
amounting to severe subnormality) which includes subnormality of 
intelligence and is a matter of degree which requires or is 
susceptible to medical treatment or other special care or 
training of the patient'.
The British Psychological Society states severe subnormality
is under an (IQ) of 55 and the subnormal range as being between
an (IQ) score of 55 and 70.
Symptoms of mental handicap can be noticed among some of the
elderly who are incapable of controlling or directing their 
behaviour correctly. Within the norms of society, this can be 
labelled as senile dementia.
Mental handicap might be inherited by birth or might be 
inflicted upon the sufferer during birth or shortly after it 
because of accidental illness, as is the case when the foetus is 
infected by syphilis or lack of vitamins or when the pregnant 
mother smokes or drinks excessively.
Some attribute mental handicap to lack of nutrition. There 
would appear to be many causes for the condition of mental 
handicap and, to some extent, attempts have been made to measure
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the degree of mental handicap using intelligence tests. In some 
ways the condition can be assessed by recognising to what extent 
a person can adapt to the demands of everyday life in society.
As we shall see later, the courts do take a different 
attitude, in terms of disposal, towards someone who is considered 
mentally handicapped compared with someone who is said to be 
mentally ill. The fact that some mentally handicapped individuals 
cannot learn challenges the effectiveness of "punishment" and the 
usefulness of imprisonment.
As a general rule, there is some link between mental impairment 
and criminal behaviour. There are examples of mentally 
handicapped persons committing serious sexual offences. As a 
result of this, they may also commit murder, especially when the 
victim becomes frightened and resists. These kinds of offences 
may be committed by mentally handicapped people who are in medium 
or low dependency[61]. The following cases illustrates also the 
link between mental handicap and crime:
(A man in his late thirties, diagnosed as suffering from mental 
impairment. He had set fire to a storeroom containing highly 
flammable materials. The fire spread quickly to a building next 
door, where a number of people were working. He had a long 
history of fire - raising activities and making "hoax" telephone 
calls to the police and fire services. He also suffered from 
concurrent physical disabilities - a severe speech impediment and
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a limp - which greatly lowered his selfesteem. His main interest 
life was in raising fires and he was regarded as highly dangerous 
by the hospital authorities) [62] . It is said thai" when mental 
impairment is accompanied by severe physical disability or 
disfigurement, it present greater problems.
The another case is :
(A man age fifty, detained in a special hospital. He had suffered 
brain damage as a child, which had resulted in quite severe
mental impairment. From a very early age he had exhibited 
aggressive behaviour towards his own family and others - 
particularly towards children. His fire arising activities had 
started early in life and these had been interspersed with sexual 
offences and crimes of violence. He claimed that the sight of 
fire excited him sexually. His problems were compounded by the 
fact that in his early forties he had developed a concurrent 
psychotic illness, in which he heard voices telling him to set 
fires. The incident that brought him before the court on the
occasion that resulted in his admission to a special hospital was
an attempt to burn down a psychiatric hospital, to which he had
been admitted informally)[63].
MENTAL ILLNESSES:
As has already been indicated, it is not easy to provide a 
precise definition of mental illness. Hence to cover all cases of 
mental illnesses which have a direct relationship with crime, it
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is proposed to adopt the classifications which divide mental 
illness into three main categories[64]:
A - The Neuroses
B - The Psychoses
C - Personality Disorders
A — The Neuroses:
Neuroses are undesirable emotional conditions which are 
common and persistent. They are a group of abnormalities in which 
occur such psychological events as anxiety, irrational fears, 
compulsions, obsessions and physical complaints without organic 
basis.
Some victims of this illness suffer from intensive anxiety 
and worry over little things and are unable to decide about the 
slightest everyday problems. Neurotic symptoms appear often in 
late adolescence and early adult life. A neurotic person may just 
do in an exaggerated fashion things which most people do at some 
time or other quite normally. However, they usually behave in an 
abnormal and incomprehensible way. Neuroses are of emotional 
origin and are the outcome of the stress and unresolved conflict 
in the patient's life.
It has become clear from the above that neuroses are quite 
wide and common. It is,therefore, necessary to limit the 
discussion to neuroses which might have a direct or indirect
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relationship with crimes. These are:
(1) Conversion reactions and dissociative reactions (hysteria).
(2) Anxiety.
(3) Obsessional and compulsive reactions.
(4) Neurasthenia.
(5) Phobias.
(1) Conversion Reactions and Dissociative Reactions 
(Hysteria):[65]
Some psychiatrists believe that hysterical patients are in 
fact malingerers. Such a hypothesis is not true because such 
patients are actually unaware of the basis or meaning of their 
troubles.
The mild type of hysteria is called hysterical personality 
in which the sufferer tends to behave in a histrionic manner, use 
exaggerated language without restraint and describe any physical 
of psychiatric symptoms in extravagant terms. Other symptoms of 
mild hysteria include a quick reaction, headache, lack of sleep. 
These symptoms vary from one individual to another and can not be 
regarded as mental illness, because they can be cured through 
social education.
There are two types of hysteria:
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I. Conversion Reaction (hysterical spasm):
This type of hysteria may produce many kinds of symptoms. The
most common are muscular or sensory. The latter involve
disturbances of the physical system which may cause the victim to 
lose senses such as smell and sight. similarly, conversion
reaction can affect the muscular system of the victim, which may
lead to paralysis of the limbs or the body. The last case is 
quite common among soldiers under the stress of war in 
unconscious reaction to participating in the war and through fear 
of being in the front lines. Conversion reaction may appear soon 
after child birth, in which case it suggests that the patient is 
completely unwilling to face the responsibility of her child[66]. 
The sufferer may commit suicide. The following cases illustrate 
this mental illness:
(A manual labourer in his late forties was referred to an 
outpatient department with hysterical spasm of the right hand. 
This was removed within half an hour by forceful suggestion and 
persuasion. The same evening the man was brought back into the 
hospital in a police ambulance with his throat cut. He had 
committed suicide. Subsequent inquiry revealed that he had for 
some months been becoming increasingly depressed, retarded and 
anxious; that his efficiency at work, which demanded a modicum of 
manual skill, had decreased to a point at which he was in grave 
danger of losing his job, and that this had further oppressed and 
worried him, as he had a wife and family dependent upon him. The 
hysterical spasm had followed a trivial accident at work and
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represented the desperate temporary expedient of a simple man to 
stave off complete defeat and gain an honourable respite from the 
losing battle with a severe depression which he was endeavouring 
to fight alone and unaided)[67].
II- Dissociative Reactions:
The most common symptoms of this rather rare illness is a 
splitting apart, or dissociation, of the patients activities from 
his conscious awareness of them. It is of significant interest to 
lawyers because this illness might lead the sufferer to commit 
crimes. The dissociative reactions include the following types of 
hysteria :
a) Hysterical amnesia.
b) Hysterical depersonalization.
c) Multiple personality states.
d) Hysterical fugues.
e) Hysterical stupor.
f) Hysterical delirium.
These have been reported in some cases in the U.K. as shown 
below[68].
a) Hysterical Amnesia:
The sufferer is characterised by loss of memory as to who he 
is and for his entire previous life up to the time he is being 
examined. The patient may forget his name or his family name or 
his previous life although at the same time he is quite aware
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that he is missing something and is trying to find out what is 
missing. The sufferer may commit suicide. The following cases may 
clarify the nature of this mental illness and its link with 
suicide :
(A lady in her late fifties, in a state of considerable distress, 
was brought late at night to the casualty department of a large 
hospital. Her clothes were wringing wet up to her waist, and her 
handbag which had been found near her was empty. She had been 
discovered crawling along the ground on the banks of a nearby 
river.
On examination, apart from mild shock and exposure, she did 
not appear to be suffering from physical illness; but she was 
totally unable to remember who she was, where she had lived, or 
indeed any details of her personal life whatsoever. Nevertheless 
she knew that she had been brought to hospital, she knew the 
meaning of the uniforms of the police who had brought her, the 
nature of the ambulance service, and such everyday items of 
information as the use of a telephone, telephone directory, and 
so forth. She was admitted as an emergency, and the following 
day with little difficulty, by a simple technique of 
encouragement and free association the following story emerged.
She had been widowed for 18 months. Her husband, to whom she 
had been devoted, had been an engaging but somewhat irresponsible 
commercial artist, who had died prematurely and in debt, and she
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had to sell their house, which was mortgaged, in order to meet 
his obligations. She had no surviving relatives of her own and 
had obtained part-time work as a seamstress in lodgings to 
maintain her independence and self-respect. During the preceding 
winter she had become ill with pneumonia, and on discharge from 
hospital had to change her lodgings. She had subsequently became 
exceedingly depressed, and to her great shame had made a suicide 
attempt, taking some aspirin tablets, and attempting to cut her 
wrists. This had earned her a second hospital admission, and 
eviction from her second lodgings. Immediately prior to the 
incident which led to her admission to this hospital, she had 
sought out her husband's only known relatives with the intention 
of asking them if they could help her. However, although she had 
received a superficial welcome from them, they had not inquired 
and she had not been able to summon the determination to tell 
them of her present predicament, or indeed to imply how desperate 
had been her plight since her husband had died. She had bought a 
small bottle of gin and some more aspirin tablets and had gone to 
the river presumably with the intention of drowning herself when 
sufficiently fuddled to make this possible. But after the 
purchase of the gin and the tablets, she could remember nothing 
more. Circumstances suggested that she must have begun to wade 
into river, but found the whole thing beyond her, and had 
developed an hysterical amnesia as the last psychophysiological 
defence against total helplessness, hoplessness and despair)[69].
145
In case of Russel 1. 1946, a women accused of committing frauds 
over a period of 7 years claimed hysterical amnesia in respect of 
the whole period[71]. It is held that the fact that she suffered 
from this amnesia, even if established by sufficient evidence, 
affored no ground for her plea in bar[70].
b) Hysterical Depersonalisation:
The victim has a feeling that his personality and the world 
around him have changed drastically. He cannot specify what the 
change is and he does not feel that he has a different 
personality, but he feels that he is not the same person that he 
was and that his environment is strange and unreal. Feelings of 
depersonalisation may occur in a patient who may become 
schizophrenic. I have never found any case in which there is 
connection between this illness and crimes but when the patient 
becomes schizophrenic, this kind of link may be found.
c) Multiple Personality State:
The patient in this state develops two or more separate 
personalities. While his original personality is his usual day- 
to-day self, his second personality is a different one into which 
he slips from time to time and in which his behaviour is 
completely different from his previous personality. This kind of 
mental illness, mostly, does not occur independently. When this 
illness is associated with schizophrenia, for example, the 
patient may be dangerous to society. We will see later the
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connection between schizophrenia and crime.
d) Hysterical Fugues:
In this state the patient leaves his residence and travels 
long distances during which whole blocks of experience are 
missing from the mental life of the individual. The patient is 
usually seen after he has arrived in a city quite distant from 
the one he started in. This illness might be an unconscious 
flight from a painful interpersonal crisis in the patient's life. 
This mental illness generally does not appear independently. So, 
one cannot find an independent case for this illness in the 
criminal field.
e) Hysterical Stupor;
The patient in this state isolates himself from contact with 
people and may sit or lie quietly without paying attention to 
what surrounds him. Sometimes the patient is drowsy. He develops 
symptoms of occasional fluttering of eyelids or strange movements 
and posturing of the limbs and body from time to time. His 
capacity for perception of his environment is impaired. Thess 
states may last from a few minutes to several weeks or more, and 
they begin and end abruptly. This illness may be due to organic 
brain diseases or severe emotional disorder. There is no sign 
that there is a direct link between this illness and crimes. 
Mostly this illness does not occur independently but with other 
mental illness.
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•f) Hysterical Delirium:
The chief symptoms of this illness are changes in mood, 
changes in perception and disturbance of memory and impaired 
concentration. Some sufferers complain of impending disaster. 
Their fear may lead them to ask for relatives to be with them or 
for someone to hold their hand. They are fearful of being alone 
or in the dark. A delirium may be caused by high fever, 
inadequate oxygenation of the brain in pneumonia or congestive 
heart failure, prolonged alcoholic excess, head trauma, uraemia 
or many other disease processes. During my research I have never 
found any case which link this illness with criminal behaviour. 
Mostly this illness is associated with other mental illness. For 
example, it may occur with amnesia.
(2) Anxiety:
Anxiety is quite common and most people should have come 
across such a state. Psychiatrists, however, have to point out 
the differences in degree and quality that divide normal anxiety 
from abnormal anxiety. Anxiety, therefore, can be divided into 
two main categories:
I. Acute anxiety
II. Chronic anxiety
Both cases might appear in an individual and one of them 
might dominate the other. The chief symptoms of anxiety are those
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of fear in various degrees. The heart may beat faster than 
normal. Patients' mouths become dry and their hands may perspire, 
accompanied by a tight feeling in the chest or around the heart. 
The victim becomes anxious and afraid in the presence of an 
object or situation that does not normally provoke anxiety. 
Anxious patients can easily mistake their symptoms for those of
physical illness, especially when they occur without the patients
being conscious of any reason for anxiety. The condition is 
called anxiety neuroses. Patients might undergo fits of anxiety 
for some minutes or hours or days[71]. The following case may 
illustrate this mental illness:
(Mrs J.H., a housewife of 26 with a son of four and a baby 
daughter of 18 months, had begun to suspect that her husband
might be becoming interested in one of the girls at his work. He
was coming home late, was occasionally absent for hours at a time 
over weekends, ostensibly to pick up a little extra money by odd 
jobs, and displayed less tenderness to her during the past 18 
months than she had grown to expect. She developed symptoms of 
general anxiety and tension, which rapidly focused themselves 
upon an inability to go more than a few hundred yards from her 
house without becoming faint and fearing that she might fall dawn 
unconscious in the street.
Eventually she reached the stage at which she could no 
longer take the children out, do the shopping, or care of the 
house. She got a neighbour to ring her husband's place of
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employment, and to call the doctor. He returned precipitately 
from work to find her in bed, with a very high pulse rate, 
gasping for breath, and convinced that she was soon to die. Her 
distress led to her doctor's arranging for her admission to 
hospital, where she settled down)[721.
It is evident from what I have already said about this 
mental illness that this illness may drive some sufferer to 
commit serious crime. For example, in the case above the woman's 
anxiety might drive her to kill her husband or commit serious 
harm to him. Prins reports 'a man of forty -seven, who asked the 
female storekeeper at his place of work for an item. She failed 
to produce it and, furthermore, failed to treat him with the 
respect he considered was his due. He beat her about the head 
with a spanner and nearly killed her'[73]. The man was found 
suffering from "chronic anxiety".
(3) Obsessional and Compulsive Reactions:
In this illness the patient is either afflicted with 
persistent distressing ideas he cannot get rid of or become 
obsessed with repetitive performance of physical acts to relieve 
tension. Both cases might be present in the same patient[74]. 
This illness can be divided into two categories:
I- Obsessive Reactions:
In this state the patient will be obsessed or preoccupied with
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a persistent unpleasant thought and he wishes he could escape 
from it. For example, the patient will be preoccupied with the 
idea of killing one of his relatives or his family or he might be 
obsessed with the idea of drowning or burning. He might be 
obsessed as well with the idea that he has a disease such as 
cancer or is about to have a heart attack... etc. Common obsessive 
thoughts such as fear of dirt, of germs, or insects might cause 
the sufferers to visit a psychiatrist. Generally, this kind of 
illness may lead the sufferer to commit suicide.
II- Compulsive Reactions:
Sufferers of this type of neuroses feel a strong compulsive 
urge to perform repetitive actions. Although they are quite aware 
of the illogicality of their action, they can not get stop doing 
it. Typical example of compulsive reactions are repetitive 
washing of hands, repetitive hand gestures, repetitive assurances 
of locking the door, switching off the light or gas and many 
other similar acts.
Both cases might be present in one victim and one of them
might dominate the other. Perhaps the best known obsessional
ritual is that with many women who are obsessed with the idea
that their baby is abnormal or that the baby will die, or that
she may harm it. Many victims of this illness are afraid that the 
thought will lead to the impulse which in turn will lead to the 
action. Patients may try to control such obsessional thoughts. A
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mother, for instance, may collect and hide all sharp objects such 
as knives or scissors, because of a persistent obsession that she 
may harm the baby with such objects[75].
A distinction has to be made between obsessive and
compulsive reactions in which the sufferer admits the 
illogicality of his ideas and actions and does his best to get 
rid of them, and other neuroses such as kleptomania and 
pyromania, in which the patient does not try to prevent himself 
from doing them.
(4) Neurasthenia:
The chief symptoms of this neurosis are impaired
concentration, insomnia, fatigue, loss of appetite and disturbed 
attention. It seems that there is no case which links this mental 
illness with crimes.
(5) Reactive Depression:
A reactive depression is the result of abnormal circumstances 
of life. This depressive illness can be divided into two main 
categories :
I. Psychoneurotic Depressions
II. Psychotic Depressions
While psychoneurotic depression can be attributed to
psychological and social circumstances from which the patient is
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suffering, such as the death of a member of his family or an 
emotional rejection by a person on whom he is dependent or lack 
of economic livelihood, psychotic depression can be attributed to 
deeply rooted personality problems.
The patient with a psychoneurotic depression has a mild 
feeling of worthlessness, failure and guilt. He is a depressed 
person who develops a feeling of anxiety, fatigue, poor sleeping, 
a mild loss of appetite, and a slight weight loss[76]. This 
mental illness drives some sufferers to commit serious crime. The 
Guardian in 1984 reported that a woman had killed her four-year- 
old daughter shortly after the latter had witnessed her mother 
killing her seventeen-month-old baby brother by strangulation. It 
was found that she suffered from psychoneurotic depression from 
the birth of her son. In this case, the prosecution accepted a 
plea of diminished responsibility[77]. Prins says that ' I knew 
of one offender/patient who became severely depressed because his 
wife had left him; whilst in a state of great emotional upheaval, 
he set fire to the block of offices in which she had once 
worked’[78].
(6) Phobias:
A phobic person becomes anxious and afraid when he comes in 
contact with an object or situation that does not normally 
provoke anxiety for the normal person. Many psychiatrists feel 
that the phobia the patient develops often has a symbolic
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connection with the type of interpersonal stress that has caused 
it, for example, claustrophobia and agoraphobia[79]. I have not 
found any case which links this illness with crime.
B.The Psychoses:
There is no precise and comprehensive definition of the general 
term psychosis. The term is applied to identify those psychiatric 
states in which patients suffer from a disintegration of the 
structure of their mental life. This may be due to a profound 
withdrawal into a world of fantasy, with hallucinations and 
delusions. A severe disturbance of mood, which is a main symptom 
of psychotic disorder, causes the patient to view the world 
unrealistically. As we shall see later, most of these mental 
illnesses (psychoses) have a connection with criminal conduct.
Most psychiatrists classify psychoses into two main 
categories :
(1) Functional psychoses
(2) Organic psychoses
(1) Functional Psychoses:
Functional psychoses denotes the lack of clear evidence of 
organic cause or basis in the aetiology of the disease. Under 
this heading some illnesses which may have a relationship with 
crime are;
I. Schizophrenia
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II. Depressive Psychoses
III. Involutional Melancholia
IV. Manic Psychoses
V. Manic Depressive Psychoses
VI. Puerperal Psychoses
I- Schizophrenia:
Undoubtedly, schizophrenia is one of the most dangerous and of 
the greatest medical and psychological problems, because it lasts 
longer, has unknown causes, fewer recoveries, and is the most 
difficult for the patient, his relatives and his family to 
understand and handle.
There are various types of schizophrenia, and there is a 
common thread of psychological similarity among them as to the 
chief symptoms of this disease. These are: withdrawal from social 
contact, detachment from reality which may vary from mild to 
severe depending on the degree of the case; disturbed and 
dissociated thinking, muttering outbursts of meaningless, 
laughter, hallucination, delusions and disturbances of speech.
In most cases depressive or manic features are present in a 
schizophrenic illness[80]. The schizophrenic illness, as we shall 
see later, has a wide relationship with crimes. The most 
important cases are:
a) Paranoid Schizophrenia
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b) Catatonie Schizophrenia
c) Hebephrenic Schizophrenia
d) Simple Schizophrenia
a) Paranoid Schizophrenia:
The main symptom of this illness is the development of
persecutory delusions. The schizophrenic feels that people are 
talking about him or plotting against him. This might cause him 
to commit crimes as a weapon of self-defence. A good example of 
this case is the McNauqhten case in 1843. A patient of this sort 
may develop auditory hallucinations, hear voices from walls, 
ceiling, windows, which order him or warn him. He may develop 
hallucination of taste in which he tastes poisons or thinks 
someone has poisoned his food. It has to be added that such
illness may appear gradually or suddenly. Some psychiatrists 
believe that paranoid schizophrenia occurs most often between the 
ages of 30 and 35.It is obvious that paranoid schizophrenia plays 
an effective role in relation to violent crime. In addition to 
the McNauqhten case there are many other cases. For example the 
case of Peter Sutcliffe shows that Sutcliffe committed homicide 
and many other serious harms under "paranoid schizophrenia"[81]. 
Again, the patient may set fire to some house to get rid of the 
evil in it or because he has seen the image of God and heard him
directing him to set fire in the house.
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b) Catatonie Schizophrenia:
This illness usually occurs after the age of 25. The main 
symptoms of this illness are disturbances of physical movements. 
The patient may sit , crouch or keep standing for days in the 
same position, and may require spoon feeding or tubule feeding to 
maintain nutrition. When he gets over this episode, the patient 
will be very active, destructive and sometimes aggressive. 
Occasionally a person suffering from such kind of illness may 
commit aggressive violence[82].
c) Hebephrenic Schizophrenia:
The main characteristics of this illness is an exaggerated 
adolescent behaviour and a profound withdrawal from interpersonal 
relationship. Sufferers are prone to have giggling fits, and to 
wear inappropriate smiles. Sometimes, such patients become very 
depressed which may lead them to commit suicide. This kind of 
schizophrenia may deteriorate to serious kinds of schizophrenia 
(e.g. paranoid which is well-known for its connection with 
criminal behaviour.)
d) Simple Schizophrenia:
The mental illness is quite deceptive because it develops so 
slowly over a period of years that the patient's friends and 
family may not realise that he is psychiatrically ill until his 
mental state is very deteriorated. This mental illness involves a 
gradual withdrawal from society, with much preoccupation with
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oneself. The patient’s facial expression becomes vacant, and his 
eyes stare blankly and aimlessly when people talk with him, and 
he suffers from impaired concentration. Actually in my research I 
have never found any case which links this mental illness to 
crime unless it develops into paranoid schizophrenia.
II. Depressive Psychoses:
The symptoms of this illness include feelings of sadness, 
melancholy and despair. The patient develops a sense of misery 
and worthlessness. He views himself and the world around him as 
being absurd, worthless and inadequate. He develops a deep sense 
of guilt, and he believes that he is beyond moral redemption and 
that his personality without value. Prins says that those people 
'become so convinced of the utter hopelessness of their misery 
that death becomes a happy escape. Sometimes before committing 
suicide, they first kill their children or other members of the 
family... under the delusion of a future without hope and the 
inevitability of catastrophe overtaking their nearest and dearest 
as well as themselves, they decide to kill in order to spare 
their loved ones suffering'[83].
Thus this mental illness may drive the sufferer to kill his 
or her loved ones then kill himself or herself. In the case of 
Sharp, 1927, the accused became obsessed with the idea that the 
only way out of his poverty was to kill two of his children so as 
to relieve his wife of the burden of their support[84]. This
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State can progress to a state of depressive stupor in which the 
patient may spend the whole day sitting in a chair doing and 
saying nothing. Depressive stupor is the final stage of the 
condition called retarded depression. It differs from 
schizophrenic stupor in that the patient has a deeply depressed 
appearance. This outlook on life may lead the sufferer to commit 
suicide[85]. The case below illustrates how this illness drive 
the sufferer to commit suicide:
(This man came on the recommendation of his firm, as an 
alcoholic. He was a technical engineer in an oil company, 
responsible for a great deal of difficult and exacting work. He 
too was in the latter half of life, and had experienced 
considerable domestic stress, and labour troubles at his job, 
immediately before the development of his alcoholic tendencies. 
On examination he was morose, remorseful, wept easily, and 
confided that he felt unable to tackle his job, and no longer 
worthy of his employers confidence. His sleep, appetite, weight 
and bowels were characteristically affected. Moreover he was 
agitated, trembling, and had turned to alcohol as the only means 
available to him to damp down his increasing tension and 
despair)[86]. This man committed suicide later on under the 
pressure of his mental illness.
III. Involutional Melancholia:
Some psychiatrists believe that the main characteristics of 
this illness involve anxiousness, agitation, bizarre physical
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complaints, paranoid ideas and delusions. It commonly occurs in 
women between the ages of forty-five and sixty, who have had no 
previous history of mental illness. Most psychiatrists feel that 
the emotional adjustments of women at this time of life play an 
important role in formulating their depressions. At this age, 
women often cease to menstruate which in its turn causes various 
physical sensations, and the female menopause also has a 
significant psychological impact. I have, however, never found 
any case which recorded the relationship of this mental illness 
with criminal conduct.
IV. Manic Psychoses:
In contrast to depressive psychoses, sufferers from this 
illness are extremely elated, exuberant and very gay. Physically, 
the patient is overactive and he gives the impression that he is 
very fit. This person is very energetic, and feels that he has 
not time to pay attention to physical illness, and is famous for 
what is called "manic flight of ideas". Psychiatrists divide this 
psychoses into two main categories; acute manic psychosis and 
hypomania.
A sufferer from acute manic psychoses exhibits chaotic 
behaviour, great wishful thinking and wild outbursts of feelings 
and exhilaration. He might become an exhibitionist and practice 
sex-seduction. This illness may lead to reckless and dangerous 
behaviour. So the sufferer might commit crimes because of his
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mental state. The following case may illustrates this point:
(A twenty-three-year-old car salesman initially impressed his 
employer with his energy and enthusiasm. However, it was not long 
before his ideas and activities took on the grandiose and highly 
unrealistic qualities of the person suffering from hypomania. For 
example, he sent dramatic and exaggerated letters daily to a wide 
range of motor manufacturers. His social behaviour began to 
deteriorate rapidly; he lost weight through not eating (he never 
had time) and he rarely slept.(Both of these forms of behaviour 
are characteristic of the condition.) One night, in a fit of 
anger directed towards his ungrateful employer, he returned to 
the garage showrooms, smashed the windows and also caused
extensive damage to a number of cars. He was charged with
criminal damage and, when he appeared at the Crown Court , he was 
made the subject of a hospital order)[873.
The hypomanie patient is overactive, destructive and
jubilant. He is always busily occupied with big schemes and
expectations. He is extravagant with money...etc. and sexually
irresponsible[88].
V. Puerperal Psychosis:
This psychotic illness occurs normally in a woman at the time 
of childbirth or shortly after or around it. This shows that 
there is a strong relationship between this illness and pregnancy 
and birth. A difficulty with this illness is the fact that it
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might be accompanied by special problems such as a recurrence if 
the woman becomes pregnant again. A mother may kill her child 
because of severe depression, schizophrenia or other similar 
emotional reactions that are the result of this illness. 
Accordingly, this illness has a relationship with criminal 
conduct only when it is associated only with "depression or 
schizophrenia".
(2) Organic Psychosis:
The second main category is organic psychosis. The term 
"organic psychoses" is applied to situations where psychiatrists 
can discover evidence indicating that the abnormality is due to a 
structural defect or change in the bodily system of the patient. 
Such a defect causes abnormalities in the system of emotional 
functioning, thinking and behaviour. Organic psychoses are the 
result of Impairment - such things as interruption of the blood 
supply to the brain, senile deterioration of brain tissues, head 
trauma, toxic damage to brain tissues, and brain tumours. 
Psychiatrists divide this illness into two main categories:
I. Acute organic brain disorder
II. Chronic organic brain disorder
While the second type of illness is due to a defect in brain 
functioning which causes permanent problems in the patient's 
emotional state; the former is reversible, i.e. the patient could 
return to his previous standard of emotional functioning.
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What follows is a further discussion and elaboration of these two 
i1Inesses.
I. Acute Organic Brain Disorder:
The main symptoms of this illness can be summarised as 
follows: memory impairment, imbalanced judgement, poor control of 
emotions, hallucinations, delusions and poor intellectual 
functioning. It has to be indicated that it is not necessary that 
the patient has all these symptoms, he might have some of them. 
The severity of these symptoms depends on the strength of injury 
to the brain and on the nature of the patients personality. 
Therefore, this illness may be scarcely noticeable, or it may be 
so severe it causes disturbances in the sufferer's system of 
behaviour and emotions which lead him to commit some 
offences[89]. The main causes of acute organic brain disorders 
are :
a) Intoxication with drugs or poisons
b) Brain dysfunction due to alcoholism
c) Metabolic disorders such as uraemia, diabetes.
There are many other cases of this illness [See A.H.Chapman, 
pp271-291].
II. Chronic Organic Brain Disorder:
The basic symptoms of this illness which are permanent and 
irreversible, are the same as that of the acute organic brain
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disorders which have already been discussed[90]. This illness can 
be caused by various factors, the most important of which are: 
brain damage before or after birth, central nervous system 
syphilis, toxic substances or drugs, brain damage which is the 
outcome of chronic alcoholism, head trauma, brain damage 
associated with senile brain degeneration and cerebral 
arteriosclerosis. There are many other reasons for this type of 
illness[See A.H. Chapman, pp.295-366].
Organic psychosis have many aspects such as :
a) Pre-senile dementias or senility
b) General paresis
c) Alcoholic psychosis
d) Epilepsy
a) pre—senile Dementias or Senility:
While senile dementias attack people in extreme old age, pre- 
senile dementias occurs in a younger age group. Alzheimer's 
disease is a certain form of pre-senile dementia. It occurs 
mainly in people between the ages of 50-60, but may occur 
occasionally in younger individuals. These patients keep a good 
memory record of remote events,but fall short of recalling 
immediate memories. This can be attributed to the narrowing of 
the ability to perform mental activity in several fields at the 
same time.
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This illness causes permanent defects in the patient's 
emotional functioning, thinking and his interpersonal behaviour. 
Permanent changes occur in the patient's brain, behaviour and 
interpersonal relationships. This illness may be caused by head 
trauma, senile degeneration, arteriosclerosis and infections of 
the brain and other reasons. It seems that there is no connection 
between this illness and criminal behaviour.
b) General Paresis:
The mental illness is caused by the invasion of the central 
nervous system by the spirochaeta which causes the destruction of 
the tissue of the brain itself. The chief symptoms of this 
illness are: loss of judgement, intellectual deterioration,
memory disorder and loss of time relations. It is said that 'the 
sufferer may sometimes indulge in uncharacteristic violent 
behaviour'[91].
c) Alcoholic Psychosis:
It is submitted that psychotic drinkers become so because of 
some underlying factor, such as genetic predisposition, injury, 
infection or nutritional imbalance. It is believed that this 
psychopathelogical state is due to a direct effect of alcohol on 
the brain. Most alcoholic psychotics are between the ages of 30 
and 60 years and have been drinking to excess for 15 to 20 years. 
There are many cases which demonstrate the extent to which 
alcohol is a factor in crimes. Prins states that alcoholic
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psychoses 'may occasionally be very Important In relation to the 
exhibition of violent behaviour'[92]. The case below may declares 
the link between this illness and crime:
(A man fifty-six, strangled a young chambermaid. He had recently 
been released from his previous life sentence; this had been 
imposed for murdering an elderly widow. His defending counsel 
stated that the defendant was 'a different man when he had been 
drinking'. His second victim, aged twenty-three, is alleged to 
have taunted him following sexual intercourse, telling him he was 
an "old man". The accused is alleged to have said: "This upset 
me. I lost control and grabbed her by the throat")[93].
d) Epilepsy;
This is a clinical condition characterised by recurrent 
attacks of disturbance of consciousness, the form of attacks 
varying from generalised convulsions to momentary "blanks" in 
awareness.
The illness is the most apparent compared with all varieties 
of psychopathological patients. The patient suddenly falls in a 
convulsive seizure.
There are different types of this mental illness. The most 
severe form of epilepsy is called GRAND MAL. It is characterised 
by the sudden and complete loss of consciousness, the muscular 
convulsion, the coma after the attack and the slow return to
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consciousness as though someone has just woken up from a slumber.
The Petit Mai attack is more frequent than the previous 
attack and it is more common during adolescence.
The third type is called Jacksonian Seizure. It is 
characterised by a convulsion of some part of the body such as an 
arm or leg, without loss of consciousness during the attack, but 
there is a loss of control over the convulsing parts of the body.
Psychic Seizure is another type of epilepsy. The main 
symptoms of this illness are: disturbance of consciousness and 
there may be no memory of the attack. The patient speaks and acts 
as though he is conscious. There is relationship between epilepsy 
and crime; for example, in H .M .Adv. v . Cunniaham, the accused 
claimed that he was not guilty because he was suffering from 
epilepsy when he committed the crime[94]. The sufferer from this 
illness may commit serious crime (homicide) by setting fire to 
things. For example, Bruce Lee was said to be epileptic and he 
committed a number of serious crimes (fire and killing)[95].
c. Personality Disorder:
(1) Psychopathic Disorder:
This is the most disturbing and destructive personality and, 
as discussed at the beginning of the chapter, it is a matter of
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debate among psychiatrists to whether such a personality is a 
form of mental illness or not. This point is argued at the
beginning of the present chapter.
According to the Mental Health Act of 1983, psychopathic 
disorder is '...a persistent disorder or disability of mind
(whether or not including significant impairment of intelligence) 
which results in abnormally aggressive or seriously irresponsible 
conduct on the part of the person concerned’.
The main symptoms of the psychopathic personality are
maladjustment, unreliability, cheating and strong-headedness. A 
psychopathic person may be tactful in dealing with other people 
and getting whatever he wants from them. He might give the
impression that he feels deep regret and remorse for his deeds, 
and a true desire to improve his deviant behaviour and he might 
swear and give an oath that he will never go back to such 
behaviour, whenever he is trapped.
The maladjustment of the psychopath can be observed from an 
early age. The children are difficult to rear, head-strong and 
reluctant to accept training before school years. School reports 
show that such children are of normal intelligence but lack 
discipline and show a refusal to co-operate in classrooms. Their 
behaviour is both disturbing to the teachers and annoying to the 
class in general. Neither praise nor punishment would help in
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changing their behaviour. They do not really listen to advice or 
even change their attitudes even by the experience of unfortunate 
consequences resulting from their previous irresponsible acts. 
After leaving school, they are very unsettled in their practical 
life. They are easily irritated and liable to leave their jobs 
for trivial reasons.
Psychopaths are fond of extreme ventures, and may commit 
crimes quite openly even when it is obvious to them that they 
cannot get away with it. So there are many cases which show
crimes of psychopaths[96]. The cases of Makay are very helpful
for illustrating the aggressive nature of this kind of mental 
illness. Patrick Makay committed many serious crimes (murder) by 
reason of his psychopathic disorder. Clark and Penycate refer to
these cases in their book "Psychopath"[97]. In brief, on
8/7/1973, Makay stabbed Mnilk in the throat on a train leaving 
London Bridge station, on 20/7/1973, he killed Miss Hynes in her 
flat (she was savagely battered about the head with a piece of 
wood), on 12/1/1974, he killed Mrs Stephanie Britton in her house 
(she was brutally stabbed to death with her four year old 
grandson), on 13/6/1974, he attacked Mr.Frank Goodman in his shop 
with a piece of lead piping until he fell dead, on 23/12/1974, he 
attacked and killed Mrs Sarah Rodwell by a blunt instrument being 
used to beat her repeatedly on the head in her flat, and on 
9/2/1975, he attacked and killed Mrs Ivy Davies with an axe when 
she closed the cafe and returned to her house in nearby Holland
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Road[98].
The murder Makay said that 'I feel terrible about what 
happened all the more because I do not knew why or what made me 
do it. I find it all a confusing matter. You see, I am scared of 
myself. At times I often try to wonder why, but it's just plain 
hell ' [99] .
Although it is quite difficult to classify psychopathic 
personality into precise and distinct categories, there are 
certain general similarities among psychopathic types, such as :
I. The inadequate psychopath, who cannot deal with the 
slightest day to day problems and who can not adjust to his 
own environment.
II. The aggressive psychopaths, who are liable to become 
dangerous and aggressive on the slightest provocation, which 
in its turn might give them pleasure.
III. The hysterical psychopaths, who have fits of hysterical 
illness and who always likes to be in the centre of 
attention.
IV. The creative psychopaths, who may produce works of genuine 
art and achieve fame in some creative fields of life, 
though they, otherwise, behave in a remarkably antisocial 
and careless way.
This mental disorder may lead the sufferers to be alcoholics
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or drug addicts, and sexual deviants.
(2) Sexual Deviants:
Though it is extremely difficult to set up fixed rules which 
determine normal or abnormal sexual relationships, the following 
are general rules which can be regarded as a criterion for 
deciding abnormal sexual behaviour:
I. If an individual feels guilty when he commits a certain type 
of sexual behaviour.
II. If he endangers himself or the person with whom he has a 
sexual relationship.
III. If such sexual behaviour is incompatible social 
convention.
There are sexual deviations which cause considerable public 
anxiety such as paedophilia (sexual activity with children). The 
paedophile seeks a child or young adolescent as a sex object. 
Incest is taboo and illegal though it occurs quite often. In many 
instances the incestuous adult has anti-social personality 
disorders or a schizoid personality structure[100]. The cases 
below illustrate certain kinds of sexual deviance:
(An unhappy young married woman of 32 came to the outpatient 
clinic with her husband, requesting a private interview. In the 
course of it she explained that the real object of the interview 
was to obtain advice about, and if possible for, her husband. He 
had developed an increasingly overwhelming desire to masturbate
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in front of a mirror, wearing a woman's plastic raincoat, but 
otherwise naked. He was still capable of occasional intercourse 
with his wife, but only if she also, otherwise naked, would wear
the raincoat at the time. He had bought a number of these
raincoats,ostensibly for his wife, but had became in all other 
ways extremely mean about clothes for her. Without a plastic 
raincoat, he was impotent, and incapable even of masturbation. 
Wearing one , or having persuaded his wife to wear one, premature 
ejaculation was frequent, even when intercourse was attempted.
Remonstration by his wife had been countered by her husband's
threatening to leave her, and 'Hang around cinema queues on rainy 
nights-I'd soon pick up a girl in the right sort of coat...'. As 
it was, he found such queues almost irresistible. His wife feared 
that he might expose himself to suitably clad women, a fear which 
had led to her continued but miserable acquiescence in the 
domestic indulgence of her husband’s fetishism.
She had predicted, quite correctly, that her husband himself 
would make no complaint at all, either about himself or the 
sexual aspects of their married life. Moreover she coupled her 
appeal for help for him with an earnest entreaty that while 
everything and anything possible should be done to cure, correct, 
change, or alter his way of life, nothing whatever should be said 
which might lead him to suppose that she herself had mentioned 
it)[101] .
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Accordingly people who are suffering from such kind of 
sexual deviance may commit serious violence against people who do 
not accept their practices. The case of Michael Telling below 
shows the dangerous behaviour of some people who have become
sexually deviant:
(Telling shot his wife after she had allegedly taunted him beyond 
endurance with details concerning her sexual exploits with 
members of both sexes. After killing her, he moved her body 
around the house for a week or so, calling in occasionally to 
kiss and talk to the corpse as it lay on a camp-bed. He then 
placed the body in a half-built sauna in the house. Five month
later he decided to take the body to Devon. Having tried
unsuccessfully to bury the body (the ground being too hard for 
digging because of the prolonged drought), he dumped it in some 
bracken overlooking the River Exe. He cut off the head and took 
it with him. It was subsequently found in the boot of his car. 
Two psychiatrists found him suffering from sexual
deviation)[102].
In fact, sexual offences constitute a small proportion of 
all crimes. The table below shows the number of offenders found 
guilty for sexual crimes during 1988 in England and Wales[103]: 
Buggery 857
Indecent assault on a male 2,075
Indecency between males 1,299
Rape 2,055
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Indecent assault on a female 9,357
Unlawful sexual intercourse with a girl under 13 249
Unlawful sexual intercourse with a girl under 16 2,341
Incest 466
Procuration, abduction, bigamy 420
Gross indecency with a child 794
Total 19,913
(3) Addictions:
An individual can be described as alcoholic, smoker and drug 
addict, when he gets used to such substances and he cannot give 
up the habit of using them. It is difficult to establish a clear 
cut distinction between physical and psychological addiction, as 
Whitehead confirmed that '...to draw sharp borders between 
physical and psychological addiction is mistaken, for the 
information available is confusing and does not entirely support 
a differentiation'[104].
Those who are addicted to tobacco find it rather difficult 
to get rid of it or give it up regardless of their awareness of 
the ill affects of their habits on their health. It is well 
established now that excessive smoking plays an important role in 
the cause of lung cancer, heart disease and different chest 
aiIments.
Although moderate drinking of alcohol is not so bad.
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excessive drinking can be dangerous to the individual himself and 
to society. It comes within the category of the organic psychoses 
related to addiction to drugs, such as the opiates, heroin, 
morphine, barbiturates, amphetamines and hashish. Users are often 
regarded as outcasts: and they may get involved in crimes to
secure their drugs.
Addicts are more likely to commit crimes because addiction 
encourages the psychopathic person to commit crime[105]. In the 
case of v . Majewski (1977) the accused became involved in a 
fracas in a pub, in the course of which he assaulted the landlord 
and another customer because he had been drinking heavily on the 
day in question[106].
This chapter has demonstrated the difficulties with the 
application of medical psychiatric concepts to legal processes. 
Psychiatric ideas are complex and there is considerable conflict 
among the experts. This explains the difficulties encountered 
by lawyers when they are required to consider such concepts. The 
role of the psychiatrists in the present legal process is not 
properly defined and the extent to which judges ought to rely on 
psychiatric and medical evidence and experts is not properly 
understood.
Hart's approach may resolve the problems which exist in the 
current legal process. According to this approach the role of
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the expert witness has to be regarded as a part of what the 
lawyers are attempting to establish. In other words, the role of 
psychiatrist should be limited to explaining the nature of any 
mental disorder, while the role of the lawyers is to find out the 
effect of this mental disorder on the accused's capacity or 
choice. So there is no role for experts in determining criminal 
responsibility as such.
Since there is no necessary association between mental 
disorder and dangerousness[1073, the role of psychiatrists should 
be limited to diagnosing the mental disorder affecting an 
individual. On the other hand the role of lawyer will be 
concerned with predicting his dangerousness on the basis of 
matters such as the gravity of the crime, the antecedents of the 
patient and many other circumstances, although the difficulties 
of making such predictions are considerable. This point will be 
developed later in chapter 5.
It is clear that the function or role of psychiatrists is 
quite distinct from that of lawyers, when the question of 
responsibility is considered in the context of crime. This aspect 
will be fully developed in the next chapter when insanity as a 
defence, insanity in bar of trial, diminished responsibility and 
irresistible impulse are considered in detail. The present 
chapter has outlined, in general terms, the types of psychiatric 
conditions which may have a bearing on crime.
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It is clear that, while the psychiatric concepts outlined 
are subject to dispute among psychiatric experts, they do reflect 
the extent to which psychiatrists have attempted to explain 
behaviour which involves the sufferer in conflict with criminal 
law. Although the concept of "mental disorder" is not a fixed 
one, we shall see in the next chapters to what extent there is a 
difference between the idea of "medical" insanity and "legal" 
insanity, and the effect of such a finding on an accused, in 
terms of sentencing and disposal.
We have seen in this chapter that the concept of "mental 
disorder" is not clear and escapes precise formulation. More 
significantly, however, statutory definitions are limited to 
descriptions of what amounts to "mental disorder", i.e. its 
ingredients and not a precise meaning. This survey of mental 
handicap and mental illness illustrates the very wide range of 
conditions which are classified as mental disorders or mental 
diseases. Apart from the psychopath, whose condition is defined 
partly in terms of anti-social behaviour, few mental disorders 
have any significant correlation with criminal acts. However, 
mental illness and handicap can affect a person's ability to 
understand and control his conduct, so that, when a mentally 
disordered person does commit the actus reus of a crime, the 
question whether or not he had the requisite mens rea for the 
offence has to be considered. However, given the different mental 
disorders, and the range of severity within these disorders each
\ié A
case has to be considered Individually. Certainly, it cannot be 
maintained that mental disorder as such makes it impossible to 
affect a person's conduct by the threat and deployment of 
sanctions. In consequence we cannot assume that utilitarian 
reasons for criminal process do not apply to such persons as well 
as to others who might be deterred by seeing them punished. Nor 
we can assume that the presence of a mental disorder means that a 
person is not capable of offences although this may be the case 
for some individuals and some acts.
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FOOTNOTES
CHAPTER THREE
The classic test of criminal responsibility, the McNaughten 
test, is limited to instances in which the accused 'was 
labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of 
mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he 
was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not know he 
wadoing what was wrong' (1843) 8 Eng. Rep. 718. In some 
cases, an "irresistible impulse" test has supplemented the 
McNaughten rule. The irresistible impulse doctrine is
applicable only to the class of cases where the accused is
able to understand the nature and consequences of his act 
and knows it is wrong, but his mind has become so impaired 
by disease that he is totally deprived of his mental power 
to control or retain his act. Lord Strachan in H.M.Adv. v. 
Kidd 1960 J.C. 62 at p.70 defined the question of insanity 
as follows: '...in order to excuse a person from
responsibility for his acts on the grounds of insanity, 
there must have been an alienation of reason in relation to 
the act committed. There must have been some mental defect 
to use a broad neutral word, a mental defect by which his 
reason was overpowered and he was thereby rendered incapable
of exerting his reason to control his conduct and
eactions'. This seems to represent a totally causal 
approach on the part of Scots Law and to equate relatively
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closely to the kind of irresistible impulse test.
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CHARTER FOUR
BEiaXftJL P.I8.aBBi.R & m  QE m im \ n BEgPPMSlPHrlTY
1. Introduction:
The mentally disordered accused or offender creates many 
problems for the criminal law. In fact the issue of mental 
disorder may be raised at different stages in the criminal 
process[1]. This chapter does not attempt to explore all the 
procedural stages where the issue of mental disorder or insanity 
arises. It is restricted to the areas of insanity as a defence, 
insanity in bar of trial, diminished responsibility, and 
irresistible impulse. The various procedural problems will be 
dealt with in the next chapter which examines sentencing.
Firstly, a mentally disordered accused may be deemed insane 
and therefore unfit to stand trial (i.e. insanity in bar of 
trial).
Secondly, when an offender has been convicted the court may 
impose a sentence which has little to do with penology, but much 
to do with medical treatment - for example, a hospital order.This 
point will be explained in detail in chapter 5 below[2],
Thirdly, a mentally disordered accused may plead insanity as 
a defence to a criminal charge (not guilty by reason of
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insanity). There may also be a plea of "diminished 
responsibility" which operates in a mitigatory fashion.
In this chapter, the main issue is the effect of mental 
disorder on criminal responsibility. Accordingly, the chapter 
outlines the present law in relation to the following:
1. Insanity as a special defence.
2. Insanity in bar of trial.
3. Diminished responsibility.
4. Irresistible impulse.
The position adopted in the Iraqi Penal Code is also referred to.
2. Insanity As A Special Defence:
The criminal law is concerned with the notion of 
responsibility in answering a practical question such as "is X 
responsible for bringing about the circumstances which are 
considered legally harmful?" To answer this question requires an 
inquiry about the state of mind of X. Once this is done, the 
question of responsibility is then considered according to 
certain principles and beliefs in the criminal law. Ascription of 
responsibility has the effect of making X liable to be punished 
for bringing about the harmful situation. The principles and 
beliefs are widely understood and widely held as Professor Hart 
has claimed that '...a primary vindication of the principle of 
responsibility could rest on the simple idea that unless a man
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has capacity and a fair opportunity or chance to adjust his 
behaviour to the law its penalties ought not to be applied to 
him'[3].
In chapter 2 above, we discussed in detail the principle of 
responsibility in criminal law and the nature of excuses[4]. In 
chapter two we argued that the core idea in criminal 
responsibility was that the individual should only be said to be 
guilty of a crime if the act performed was done intentionally. It 
was also recognised that within a theory of punishment, excuses 
relevant to punishment require to be accommodated since certain 
conditions, not necessarily mentally related, may affect the 
individual in such a way as to prevent him from obeying the law. 
This stemmed from Hart's idea of fairness and general justice. We 
saw that Hart argued the basis for excuses on the idea of a 
"choosing system". The key to the choosing system is that the
individual's choice is one of the operative factors which will
determine whether or not sanctions should apply.
It is now necessary to consider the ways in which the 
mentally disordered individual is deemed to be responsible and, 
therefore, the extent to which the law treats the insane
individual as belonging to one of the classes of conditions which
fall within the excusing categories. We saw in chapter three that 
this is likely to vary with the type of disorder and its 
severity.
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The major practical difference between "insanity in bar of 
trial" an "insanity as a defence" are that the accused in the 
latter situation is accepting that he did commit the act but is 
arguing that because of his "insanity" at the time of the offence 
he did not have the necessary mens rea to make his behaviour 
criminal. In the former position, the question of insanity arises 
as to the fitness of the accused to plead at a trial, i.e. at a 
stage subsequent to the alleged crime[5].
It has been argued by Hart,as has been already illustrated 
in chapter 2, that punishment of the insane may support the 
general deterrence function of the law[6]. Since the existence of 
categories of excuses weakens the effect of general deterrence, 
it is therefore further weakened by the defence of insanity. The 
defence is kept because the demands of deterrence have given way 
to the ideas of fairness and justice - the simplest reason being 
that it is unfair to punish the insane man, because he did not 
knowingly choose to break the law[7].
Expressions of the insanity defence in the Scottish and 
English jurisdictions mention either the accused's lack of 
"capacity" (knowledge or understanding or cognition) or his lack 
of "choice" (control or free-will) in relation to his behaviour 
or both. Thus, for example, knowledge or cognitive tests of 
insanity are directed to show that a person lacked mens rea in
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cases where this lack of mens rea is provable and explainable on 
the basis of mental disorder, or some pathological condition 
which affected the person’s reason[83.
Choosing or control tests are directed to showing that
although a person had mens rea in the sense that he knew what he
was doing, he was unable to exercise this knowledge to control 
his behaviour; he could not help acting as he did. Therefore it 
is argued that a "free will" is a crucial pre-condition of 
responsibility - this type of insanity will also produce an 
acquittal[9].
If the accused is found fit to plead, he may raise the 
defence of insanity at the time when he committed the crime.
The McNaughten Rules are adopted by English law as the test
for establishing legal non-responsibility[10]. In McNaughten's 
case, McNaughten was suffering from Paranoid Delusion[11] and was 
acquitted on the grounds of insanity (see the analysis of the 
psychiatric classifications in chapter 3 and in particular the 
well known example of paranoid schizophrenia at p.156 and 157 
above). The McNaughten Rules were set out by the judges in answer 
to questions considered by the House of Lords. They have now been 
accepted and acted on by the English courts, and they represent 
the law[12].
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The central idea of the Rules is found in the answer to 
questions two and three [13]; ' ... .to establish a defence on the
ground of insanity it must be clearly proved that, at the time of 
committing the acts, the party accused was labouring under such a 
defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the
nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did know
it, that he did not know that he was doing what was wrong'.
Accordingly, there are two lines of defence open to an 
accused person:
I. If he did not know the nature and quality of his act by 
reason of a disease of the mind, he has to be acquitted.
II. He must be acquitted, even if he did know the nature and 
quality of his act, when he did not know it was "wrong".
It is clear that the Rules rely on a cognitive approach to 
non-responsibi1ity.
As illustrated in chapter 3, disease of the mind need not be 
a disease of the brain only, but it could mean a functional 
disorder of the brain or a mental illness in the psychiatric 
sense or physical illness, for example, arteriosclerosis[14], a 
tumour on the brain[15], diabetes. All physical diseases may 
amount in law to a disease of mind, if they produce the relevant
malfunctions[16]. It must be that the disease of the mind has
given rise to a defect of reason. The powers of reasoning must be
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weakened, A simple failure to use powers of reasoning is not 
within the Rules[17].
The term "nature and quality of his act" refers to the
physical nature and quality of the act and not to its moral or
legal quality[18]. Clarifications of this are given by learned 
writers: 'A kills B under an insane delusion that he is breaking
a jar'(191; and; 'The madman who cut a woman's throat under the 
idea that he was cutting a loaf of bread'[20].
It has to be observed that a man who was under such
delusions as these, because he had no mens rea, cannot be 
convicted of murder[21],
The McNaughten Rules can be given a narrow or broad
interpretation. Situations of delusions, in which the accused
thinks he is doing something harmless, while he does something
harmful, would be regarded as narrowest interprétât ion[22] . It is 
clear such a person does not "know the nature and quality of the 
act he was doing". The test of insanity would be far too narrow, 
however, if situations of delusions were the only type covered by 
the McNaughten Case[231 . Despite the fact that McNaughten
appreciated his act was one of killing, there is a broader sense
where he did not understand "the nature and quality" of his act. 
His act may be considered as one of self-defence because of his 
delusion. What is substantial here is that the delusion was a
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sign of his paranoia which disabled him. McNaughten did not have 
the capacity to distinguish between those situations where there 
was no option not to kill in self-defence, and other conditions 
where evasive actions to save life might have been taken[24].
The McNaughten Rules should therefore be given a broader 
interpretation, because, as some critics argue, there are serious 
types of mental disorder which involve non-capacity in a weaker 
sense.
An accused might understand that he was doing a wrongful act 
but yet he lacked choice, that is to say, he lack the ability to 
control his conduct in conformity with the law[25]. These types
of mentally disordered people, it is often said, suffer from an
"irresistible impulse" to commit certain criminal acts. This
point will examined later in this chapter[26]. The Royal
Commission on Capital Punishment recommended that either,
i) the rules should be extended to include cases where the 
accused is labouring (as a result of disease of the mind) 
under emotional disorder which makes him capable of 
preventing himself from committing an act, even though he
is aware that it is wrong and is capable of appreciating its 
nature, or
ii) the rules should be entirely abrogated and the jury given 
total discretion to determine whether he was so insane as 
not to be responsible for his actions[27].
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The test of knowledge of right and wrong which is adopted by 
the McNaughten Rules is rejected by a number of cases in 
Scotland. According to Lord Justice-Clerk Moncreiff in State v. 
Pike (1869), the Scottish position is that '...neither delusion 
nor knowledge of right and wrong, nor design or cunning in 
planning and executing the killing and escaping or avoiding 
detection, nor ability to recognise acquaintances, or to labour 
or transact business or manage affairs, is, as a matter of law, a 
test of mental illness; but...all symptoms and all tests of 
mental disease are purely matters of fact, to be determined by 
the jury... whether the defendant had a mental disease, and 
whether the killing of his wife was a product of such disease, 
are questions of fact for the jury'[28].
" i l l
"1
Lord Moncrieff also, in Archibald Miller, gave the following 
direction: '...it is entirely imperfect and inaccurate to say
that if a man has a conception intellectually of moral or legal 
obligations, he is of sound mind. Better knowledge of the 
phenomena of lunacy has corrected some loose and inaccurate 
language which lawyers used to apply in such cases. A man may be 
entirely insane, and yet may know well enough that an act which 
he does is forbidden by law... It is not a question of knowledge, 
but of soundness of mind. If the man has not a sane mind to apply 
his knowledge, the mere intellectual apprehension of an 
injunction or prohibition may stimulate his unsound mind to do an
J:
I
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act simply because it is forbidden... If a man a sane 
appreciation of right and wrong he is certainly responsible; but 
he may form and understand the idea of right and wrong and yet be 
hopelessly insane. You may discard these attempts at definition 
altogether. They only mislead'[29]
We can again find the rejection of the rules in H.M.A. v. 
Kidd. where Lord Strachan gave the following direction to the 
jury; 'At one time following English law, it was held in Scotland 
that if an accused did not know the nature and quality of the act 
committed, or if he did know it but did not know he was doing 
wrong, it was held that he was insane. That was the test, but 
that test has not been followed in Scotland in the most recent
cases. Knowledge of the nature and quality of the act, and
knowledge he is doing wrong, may no doubt be an element, indeed 
are an element, in deciding whether a man is sane or insane, but 
they do not, in my view, afford a complete or perfect test of 
sanity. A man may know very well what he is doing, and may know
that it is wrong, and nonetheless be insane. It may be that some
lunatics do an act just because they know it is wrong. I direct 
you, therefore, that you should dispose of this question in 
accordance with the direction which I have given, which briefly 
are, that there must be alienation of reason in regard to the act 
committed,... the question is one for you to decide -whether the 
accused was at the time of sound or unsound mind'[30].
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It seems, therefore, that Scots law on the test of insanity 
as a defence is flexible and unsettled[31].
In the 1870s Lord Moncreiff adopted in many cases the 
criterion of the causal approach and he emphasised that the 
problem was one of medical fact and also that a man should have a
sane knowledge in order to deem him responsible[32].
In the case of Thos. Barr Lord Moncrieff said that 'a man is
said to be of unsound mind when his mind is diseased, so that, in
some at least of the ordinary relations of life, he is incapable, 
by reason of disease, of controlling his conduct and actions... 
The question is, was this man's mind diseased- was he the victim 
of unsound thoughts, thought which was the product of the working 
of an unsound mind?... If...the prisoner was acting under a 
conclusion that was not only unsound in the sense of not being 
well founded, but that it was a conclusion he had formed because 
his mind was insane, that, no doubt, ...would amount to evidence 
of insanity'[33].
According to Lord Moncreiff's view (the causal approach), 
the insane person is not responsible if he committed an act which 
is a product of his insanity. The approach in the case of Thos. 
Barr was adopted In New Hampshire[34]. It is suggested, in some 
unreported cases, that the influence of the McNaughten Rules was 
still strong in Scot's law[35]. Lord Keith said that '...the
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McNaughten Rules would be considered, but my impression is that 
the law is perhaps developing and is rather more flexible in that 
matter than it used to be, and that more regard would probably be 
paid to the actual evidence that was led by specialists on 
insanity in each particular case'[36],
Some Scottish cases show that at least some judges accepted 
that there was no legal test of insanity in Scots Law[37]. But 
the general statement of the law in a criminal case in Scotland 
is that in H.M.Adv. v. Kidd, by Lord Strachan[38]. On the defence 
of insanity. Lord Strachan gave the following directions to the 
jury; '... in order to excuse a person from responsibility for 
his acts on the ground of insanity, there must have been an 
alienation of the reason in relation to the act committed. There 
must have been some mental defect, to use a broad neutral word, a 
mental defect by which his reason was overpowered, and he was 
thereby rendered incapable of exerting his reason was alienated 
in relation to the act committed, he was not responsible for that 
act, even although otherwise he may have been apparently quite 
rational'[39].
Indeed Lord Strachan considered in his direction to the jury 
in relation to the question of unsound mind that 'the question 
really is this, whether at the time of the offences charged the 
accused was of unsound mind. I do not think you should resolve 
this matter by inquiring into all the technical terms and ideas
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that the medical witnesses have put before you. Treat it broadly, 
and treat the question as being whether the accused was of sound 
or unsound mind. The question is primarily one of fact' [39] .
This approach was followed by the Second Division in the 
civil case of Breen v. Breen[40], and has since been followed in 
a number of unreported cases[41]. In spite of the fact that it is 
said that this approach can be taken to represent the law in 
Scotland[42], it seems that the tests for insanity under Scottish 
law are still vague. The approach in H.M.Adv. v. Kidd represents 
a causal approach. To succeed in a defence of insanity, according 
to the causal approach, it is necessary to show that the criminal 
conduct was caused by mental disorder: 'the mere co-existence of
mental illness and criminal conduct is insufficient'[43]. Even 
accused persons who suffer from severe mental disorder may at 
times behave in the same manner as they would have done had they 
not been suffering from mental disorder.
If the answer to "why did he do it?" is "because he was 
mentally disordered", then it means that he was not responsible. 
Since serious mental disorder may affect a person's entire 
personality this will usually be the answer when an insane man 
commits a crime. However not in every circumstance will it mean 
that he did not mean to do it.
The causal approach has many advantages: the main advantage
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is that it allows the law to distinguish those who do not need 
punishment but medical treatment in order to stop a repetition of 
their offences from those who are liable to punishment because 
they commit offences while they have choice.
A further advantage of the causal approach is that it is 
flexible, and is reasonable because it lets the medical experts 
give their decision on the matter. The extent to which
psychiatric opinion is treated with suspicion , by lawyers has 
already been discussed in the previous chapter, and, indeed, in
H.M.Adv . V .  Kidd the extent of reliance upon medical evidence was 
clearly stated, i.e. that medical evidence was not conclusive on 
the question of legal non-responsibi1ity[441.
It appears that the approach in H.M.Adv. v. Kidd is wider
than the English test in the McNaughten Rules.
It has been suggested that Lord Strachan's view in Kidd 
concentrates on the idea of "sane understanding" which had been 
adopted by Lord Moncreiff[45]. Accordingly, if somebody knows the 
nature and quality of his act and its unlawfulness, but he has 
not "a sane understanding of the circumstances of his act", he 
will be non-responsible.
Gordon says that this is '...consistent with the more 
general requirements of "sane understanding" of which the Faculty
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is useless without a sane mind to apply one's knowledge'[46].
If whether or not an insane person is convicted depends more on 
which judge or jury happened to try him rather than on any 
accepted legal principle, it means that we will face conflict 
within the law applied in similar cases. It is clear that this 
situation does not serve justice because an insane person who is 
given a sentence by one court may be excused by another. For 
example, irresistible impulse is unacceptable in the McNaughten 
Rules, while it is acceptable according to Lord Strachan's view 
in H.M.Adv. v . Kidd.
Accordingly, the best approach would be to adopt a test of 
insanity akin to Lord Strachan‘s direction. The American Law 
Institute's proposed Model Penal Code's formulation of the test 
appears to be appropriate in this regard. Section 4.0(1) of the 
proposed official Draft provides that 'a person is not 
responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct 
as a result of mental disease...he lack substantial capacity 
either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform 
his conduct to the requirement of the law'[47].
The test which is summarised in the code involves a 
combination of "capacity" and "choice". Namely, an insanity
3
of Advocates spoke in their evidence to the Royal Commission and 
with Lord Moncreiff's view that mere "intellectual apprehension"
:
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defence is acceptable when an accused does not understand the 
criminality of the act or if he understands that, has no ability 
to control his conduct according to the requirement of the 
law[48].
As a result, it is obvious from my analysis that the causal 
approach is more acceptable than any other approach in this 
defence. The main reason, as I have already stated , is that it 
is flexible when it lets the experts and court cooperate to 
determine responsibility of an accused. It also makes 
distinctions between insane people who are responsible for their 
acts because there was no link between their crimes and their 
illness and others who are not responsible,because there was a 
connection between their illness and their "crime". Another an 
important reason is that this approach makes a quite clear 
distinction between persons who need treatment and others who 
require punishment.
We will see in the next chapter that the present procedure 
applied to insane people who are found not guilty by reason of 
insanity serves a purely utilitarian aim, so it is unjust.
Insanity as a defence in Iraqi Criminal Law is provided in 
Article (60) of Iraqi Penal Code, which states that 'a person is 
not criminally responsible if he lost his "capacity" or "choice" 
at the time of committing the crime by reason of "insanity" or
2 0 8
mental disorder"...'[49].
We can infer from the definition above that the test of
insanity in Iraqi Law is quite similar to the American model
penal code and the Scottish test in the H.M.Adv. v. Kidd. 
Accordingly, it seems that the Iraqi Law has adopted a causal 
approach and "sane understanding" in the test of insanity. When 
the definition specifies, '...if he lost his "capacity" or
"choice" at the time of committing the crime by reason of
"insanity" or "mental disorder"...’, it emphasises that the
criminal conduct had to be caused by mental disorder. Also the 
Iraqi Penal Code provides: '...if he lost his "capacity" or
"choice"...'. Accordingly, Iraqi Law admits that somebody could 
have capacity "knowledge" if he knows his act to be "wrong", but 
still be non-responsible because he lost his choice or"control". 
His knowledge or understanding in this situation is not "sane 
understanding" because his control is lost by reason of his
mental disorder.
It is clear that there is conflict between this definition 
and those provided in articles 230, 231, 232 of the Criminal
Procedure Code[50]. Whereas the insanity test according to Iraqi 
Penal Code deems the role of the medical experts to be important 
in making decisions[51], the Criminal Procedure Code deems that 
the judge has absolute freedom to determine whether or not an 
accused needs to consult a psychiatrist about his mental state.
209
even if the accused applied on his own behalf[52], Thus, 
according to the Criminal Procedure Code, the judge can depend 
only upon his own satisfaction as to whether or not the accused 
is insane, while in the Penal Code the role of the medical 
experts is very important in establishing the mental state of the 
accused[53].
As already stated above the Iraqi Cassation Court has not 
settled on one clear direction to determine what is the role of 
psychiatrists in a mental disorder case[54]. It has also not
settled on one clear direction in determining insanity, despite 
the fact that the insanity test which is provided in article (60)
of Penal Code is very clear.
In some cases it has decided, that, if an accused is merely 
suffering from mental disorder, that is enough for non- 
responsibi 1 ity [55] . In other cases, the Cassation Court has 
adopted the test of insanity referred to in the penal code. For 
example, the court decided that one accused was not responsible 
when he killed his wife by reason of his mental disorder at the 
time of committing the crime[56],
Further although the court has, in some cases, adopted the
insanity test provided by the Iraqi Penal Code, it has not spelt 
out the details of the test clearly. The court should at least 
declare the kind and nature of mental disorder which the accused
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had, the effect of mental disorder on his conduct, for example, 
which elements of his personality was affected (capacity or 
choice), and state the causal link between the accused's mental 
disorder and his crime. The Iraqi Cassation Court ought to apply 
the Penal Code in which a clear direction to the "insanity test" 
is provided and is sensible and acceptable. If the court does not 
apply the law in any case, its decisions may be unjust in the 
context of the "insanity defence".
3. Insanity in Bar of Trials
The plea of insanity in bar of trial is considered here 
because of its close association with the defence of insanity.
There are things to be decided by courts when the plea of 
insanity raised - the accused's fitness to plead, whether he 
committed the act charged, whether he was insane at the time. If 
the courts determine the first in the negative, they cannot 
proceed to deal with the other two{57]. In H.M.Adv. v. WiIson. 
Lord Wark directed the jury by saying that '...you must be 
satisfied that the accused was fit to plead, and that is the
first question which you have to consider. If you arrive at the
conclusion upon that question that he is not fit to plead, in a 
sense which I shall explain immediately, then you need not do 
anything in the case - you will simply find that he is not fit to 
plead, and that is an end of your duty. On the other hand, if you
think he is fit to plead, then you have to go on to consider the
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merits of case'[58].
The main aim of this defence, as Gordon says, is to provide
a fair trial. He states that 'the principle behind the plea in
bar is that every one is entitled to a fair trial, and that the
exercise of that right presupposes that the accused is capable of
instructing counsel and of understanding the proceedings'[59].
What should be obvious from this is that fairness is the
central question: the criteria relate to ability to understand 
procedure and instruct counsel. In England, the question of 
fitness to pleaed is considered by the jury[60], while in
Scotland, normally, the plea will be dealt with by the judge at 
the first stage of the proceedings, although it is possible for
him to leave the question to the jury[61], If the case was
brought under solemn procedure and the plea is successful then
the judge must order the detention of the accused in a state
hospital unless there are exceptional circumstances, in which
case detention can be in another specified hospital. The order
will be without restriction of duration and the effect of
detention is that the accused is detained in hospital until
released by the Secretary of State. Where the procedure is
summary, a hospital order with or without restriction can be 
made[62]. If the court, in the latter case, does not impose a
restriction order on the accused's discharge, it may release him
without reference to the Secretary of State.
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The criteria of insanity in bar of trial used in England are
very similar to those used in Scotland. They are as follows:
I. Ability to understand the proceedings at the trial and to 
make a proper defence.
II. Ability to challenge a juror.
III. Ability to understand the substance of the evidence.
The definition does not always restrict the assessment of 
fitness to plead to mental disorder but allows other factors 
relating to capacity to understand, for example,being dumb and 
deaf. However, most successful pleas on insanity in bar of trial 
have arisen in cases where there was substantial evidence of 
mental handicap. It is interesting to note that the courts, 
nonetheless, often require an element of mental disorder before 
accepting the plea[63].
In H .M .Adv. v. Wi1 son. the accused was charged with robbery 
and murder. The evidence which was available was that he suffered 
from a state of feeble-mindedness, and considerable difficulty 
was encountered in communicating with him. In addition to this, 
he was almost completely deaf and dumb. The accused's counsel 
contended that he was fit to be tried. In charging the jury Lord
Wark gave the following directions on the issue of fitness: ‘Now
what exactly is meant by saying that a man is unfit to plead? The
ordinary and common case, of course, is the case of a man who
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suffers from insanity, that is to say, from mental alienation of 
some kind which prevents him from giving the instructions which a 
sane man would give for his defence, or from following evidence 
as a sane man would follow it, and inspiring his counsel as the 
case goes along upon any point that arises. Now, no medical man 
says, and no medical man has ever said, that this accused is 
insane in that sense. His reason is not alienated, but he may be 
insane for the purposes of the section of the Lunacy Act to which 
counsel referred, although his reason is not alienated, if his 
condition be such that he is unable either from mental defect or 
physical defect, or a combination of these, to tell his counsel 
what his defence is and instruct him so that he can appear and 
defend him; or if, again, his condition of mind and body is such 
that he does not understand the proceedings which are going on 
intelligibly follow what it is all about'[64].
In Russe 11 v. H .M .Adv. the accused was charged with a series 
of frauds extending over a period of more that three years. The
accused, at the first diet, lodged a plea in bar of trial that
she was suffering from hysterical amnesia and was on that account 
unable to plead to the libel or give instructions for defence. 
The judge at her trial held a preliminary inquiry into the issue 
of her fitness to plead. He repelled the plea because she was
mentally normal at the time of the trial. The judge made his
decision without hearing evidence from medical witnesses to the 
effect that she had no recollection of events from the period
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during which the frauds were allegedly committed. The accused was 
convicted and appealed on the grounds that the judge misdirected 
himself in refusing to support the plea in bar of trial. Lord 
Justice Clerk Cooper in this case said that 'the onus is always 
on the accused to justify a plea in bar of trial, and to do so 
not to the satisfaction of expert witnesses but to the 
satisfaction of the court'[65]. He continued that 'the court has 
balanced against each other two major considerations, (1) 
fairness to the panel, who should not be tried if and so long as 
he is not a fit object for trial, and (2) the public interest 
which requires that persons brought before a criminal court by a 
public prosecutor should not be permitted to purchase complete 
immunity from investigation into the charge by the simple 
expedient of proving the existence at the diet of trial of some 
mental or physical incapacity or handicap. When fairness to the 
accused requires that the trial should not then and there 
proceed, the public interest equally requires that the accused 
should not there and then be virtually acquitted untried'[65].
Russel 1's case was followed by the English Court of Criminal 
Appeal in the case of R_^  v . Podola [66] . The question of amnesia 
in relation to a defence of insanity at the time was fully 
discussed in H .M .Adv. v . Kidd. In that case Lord Strachan 
directed the jury that amnesia, if established on the evidence, 
was an important element to be considered in deciding whether the 
accused was sane or insane at the time of the defence, and could
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have the effect of lessening the burden on the accused in 
establishing his special defence of insanity. The case of
H .M .Adv. V . Brown[67] helps us to understand the position adopted 
by the court with the plea of insanity in bar 6f trial. In this 
case the accused was charged with the murder of a woman who had 
eaten a piece of shortbread containing poison which the accused 
had sent to the deceased's employer for his consumption. The 
Procurator Fiscal produced, at the first diet before the sheriff, 
a certificate signed by two doctors certifying that the accused 
was not fit to plead to the indictment because of unsound mind. 
At the second diet after the Sheriff reserved the matter for the 
High Court, the Procurator Fiscal informed the court that the 
accused's mental condition had not changed. The counsel for the 
accused objected to the intervention, stating that his client had 
instructed him and wished to be tried. Lord Justice-General 
Dunedin said that 'it seems to me quite clear from the decided 
cases that from a very early period the court considered it 
always competent, if they thought it expedient, to make an 
inquiry into the state of a prisoner's sanity with the view of 
seeing whether the prisoner should be allowed to plead, which, of 
course, is the first step to be taken in order to his being put 
on trial... It is not a rule binding on the court to order an 
investigation where a prisoner's sanity is put in question. It is 
a question of expediency...the court...must always decide in each 
particular case, and upon the circumstances of that particular 
case, as to the expediency of going on with a preliminary
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investigation...'[68].
Lord Dunedin gave the following directions to the jury: 'If
you come to the conclusion that the ravages of the disease are 
such that it cannot be said that this man is in the same 
condition that a sane man would be, and that he is not able to 
tell fully about his actions, then you are bound to state that he 
is insane, and not proceed to the other portion of the case. 
The first question you must answer is, is the prisoner now 
insane? If you answer that question in the affirmative, you must 
not, whatever you think, proceed to any of the other 
questions'[68].
The requirements, therefore, are not specifically related to 
mental disorder as medically defined (an accused is unfit if he 
cannot understand the nature and course of trial, conduct his 
defence and instruct his counsel), so why should treatment 
(medical) be the logical outcome? Gordon says that a 'person who 
is found insane and unfit to plead is dealt with in the same way 
as a person acquitted on the grounds of insanity'[69]. In other 
words, the only disposal available on a plea in bar is an order 
for detention in a mental hospital. The accused may, of course, 
come to trial later.
It is clear that the present procedure for dealing with the 
defence of "insanity in bar of trial" is a radical solution and
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may lead to injustice because an accused person will find himself 
under detention in a mental hospital for an indefinite duration, 
possibly of the rest of his life, despite the fact that there is 
not enough evidence to prove either that he committed the crime 
or that he was dangerous to himself and others. It was said by 
the Thomson Committee that '...we find it difficult to endorse as 
satisfactory the present procedure which can result in an accused 
person being sent to a mental hospital by a criminal court 
without proof that he committed the act which is the subject of 
the charge’[70]. So, why should such incapacities (mental 
illness, mental handicap... and so on) have to preclude trials? If 
there is any care for rights and humanity, it must give those 
persons who are presently regarded as "insane in bar of trial" a 
fair opportunity to secure an acquittal and thus avoid such 
detention.
The questions which arise from the case of H .M .Adv. v . Brown 
are: Is it any advantage to the accused to dispense with a 
preliminary inquiry into his fitness to plead if, after the 
evidence has been led, the jury must decide this issue before 
considering the rest of the evidence? What should the jury do if 
they consider that the accused is unfit to plead but that on the 
evidence he has a good defence? [71]. What if we could prove an 
accused's guilt beyond all reasonable doubt despite his 
disordered lack of knowledge or understanding (for example, when 
we have an admission from an accused before he become insane or
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there is enough evidence available in the case). Accordingly, why 
should he not be tried and convicted? It is said that, in order 
to make an accurate verdict more appropriate, the trial should be 
subject to certain qualifications[72]. So, there is a concern 
with the accused's capacity to understand the procedure of trial 
because the court regards the accused as a rational person who 
can defend himself. The court presupposes that, if the accused is 
insane, he can not understand and participate in the procedure of 
the trial. It is emphasised that the verdict may still be 
accurate, but the trial becomes a travesty. If the accused can 
not understand what is the indictment against him or what is 
required of him there is no benefit in or reason for trying 
him[731.
There are, however, some accused persons who may understand 
all of the proceedings of the trial without accepting them, they 
may refuse the sentence which is issued against them, they may 
reject the court's authority and what the law requires, they may 
not answer any question or deny any indictment against them, and 
they may intend to make their trial a travesty, and all of these 
do not make them unfit to be tried and convicted. So what is the 
difference between such accused persons and others who are found 
insane in bar of trial? Even if there is some unfairness in the 
procedure of trying an insane accused, it does not justify us in 
ignoring the criterion of justice which requires to us to 
determine whether an accused is responsible or non-responsible,
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in order to avoid an unjust detention for an indefinite duration. 
In other words, if there is limited unfairness in the trial 
procedure against an insane accused, it does not generally affect 
the trial result (conviction and sentencing) because the court
has to take into account all of the evidence and circumstances
when it makes its decision. Namely, can it be proved beyond
reasonable doubt that an accused is guilty of offence with which 
he is charged?
As a result, the great injustice which results from the 
detention of an insane accused for indefinite duration in mental 
hospital should be removed even if at the expense of a limited 
unfairness in the trial procedure of an insane accused.
It is worthwhile here considering some suggestions which 
have been made as to how such unfairness might be avoided. It is
said that an accused insane in bar of trial could be acquitted 
and discharged, if the matter of fitness to plead might be 
postponed until after the substantive issue of guilt or innocence 
has been determined[74]. This solution is obviously odd, because 
how the court can determine the issue of fitness to plead after 
the conviction?
Another solution is that which is laid down by section (4) 
of the English Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act, 1964, which 
provides that a judge may postpone the issue of fitness to plead
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until the end of the prosecution's case:- If the judge finds out
that there is no evidence or no case to answer against an
accused, he orders his acquittal and release. Otherwise, an 
accused who has a case to answer should still he liable to such a 
restrictive detention simply because he is not in a fit condition 
to answer the case against him. Actually, this solution is a 
partial solution to the dilemma because those insane persons who 
are found unfit to plead might be in a worse condition than other 
persons who were found guilty and sentenced. In other words, the 
fate of someone found unfit to plead may thus often seem worse 
than the fate of someone who is punished for an offence of which 
he or she has been convicted. The offender in the latter case
will serve a prison sentence of limited duration, while the
accused in the former case may be kept in detention for the rest 
of his life.
In my view, accordingly, the most appropriate solution is to 
abolish the defence of insanity in bar of trial. This solution 
will give the accused an opportunity to raise the more obvious 
substantive defences which may lead to his acquittal and it is 
more helpful for the courts because the trial will be held while 
witnesses are available and their memories still accurate[75].
As a result, if this defence is abolished, the consequences 
of full trial of an insane accused will be that he is found "not- 
responsible", or "responsible". In the former case, either the
accused may be found not guilty because there is no case to 
answer or evidence against him, so that he should be released, or 
he may be found not guilty by reason of insanity when it is held 
that he committed the act but was at the time so disordered as 
not to be responsible for it. In this case , according to the 
present law and practice, the insane accused must be detained for 
an indefinite duration. We shall see, however, in the next 
chapter how these people might otherwise be dealt with. On the 
other hand, when the court finds out that an insane accused is 
guilty, it should sentence him. We shall consider the methods of 
proceeding against these insane offenders in the next chapter as 
well.
The attitude to insanity in bar of trial in the Iraqi 
Criminal Law is similar to that in Britain. Articles 230 and 231 
of the Iraqi Criminal Procedure Code[76] state what the judge 
should do when he finds an accused insane in bar of trial. 
Article 230 provides: 'When it appears during the court
proceeding or investigation that the accused is unable to defend 
himself due to his mental disorder or to test his mental state to 
determine his criminal responsibility, the judge of investigation 
and the court may halt the proceedings and the accused should be 
detained in hospital, if he is accused of a crime in which he 
cannot be released by bail. In other crimes, he may be placed in 
a private or governmental health institution according to request 
from his legal representative and on his own account or his
relatives secured by a personal guarantee. An official medical 
committee should examine him and submit a testimony on his state 
of health'
Article 231 provides: 'If it is concluded from the report of
the committee mentioned in Article (230) that the accused is 
unable to defend himself, court proceedings may be postponed 
until he be in a position to defend himself and be placed in 
custody on a governmental health institution if he is accused of 
a crime for which he cannot be released on bail. In other crimes, 
he may be handed over to one of his family secured with a 
personal guarantee which commits the latter to examine and cure 
him either inside or outside Iraq'.
4- Diminished Responsibility:
Diminished responsibility had been part of the common law of 
Scotland for many years before its introduction into English law. 
The case of Dinqwal1[77] is recognised as the real origin of 
modern Scots Law on this subject. A major change was introduced 
by a decision made in this case in which the accused was an 
alcoholic who stabbed his wife after a quarrel because she had 
hidden his money and his liquor. He was kind to her when he was 
sober; he had suffered from occasional attacks of delirium 
tremens; he was sober at the time of the killing but claimed that 
he remembered nothing about it. In suggesting to the jury that 
they might bring in a verdict of culpable homicide rather than
one of murder. Lord Deas mentioned the accused's mental condition 
as one among a number of mitigating factors; he states '...if 
weakness of mind could be an element in any case in the question 
between murder and culpable homicide, it seemed difficult to 
exclude that element here... The state of mind of a 
prisoner...might be an extenuating circumstance, although not 
such as to warrant an acquittal on the ground of insanity'[78].
Lord Deas dealt with diminished responsibility in a number 
cases after Dinqwal1, for example John McLean[79], Andrew 
Granger[80], and Thos. Ferguson[81]. Accordingly, Lord Deas is 
regarded as the founder of the doctrine in its modern form.
The most important case on diminished responsibility after 
Dinqwal1, and the one which seems to be responsible for the term 
itself, is H .M .Adv, v. Savage[82]. The direction on the law which 
was given there by Lord Justice Clark Alness has been adopted as 
the basis of the modern law. Lord Alness told the jury that 
‘...there may be such a state of mind of a person, short of 
actual insanity, as may reduce the quality of his act from murder 
to culpable homicide... Formerly there were only two classes of 
prisoner - those who were completely responsible and those who 
were completely irresponsible. Our law has now come to recognise 
in murder cases a third class ...'[83]
Lord Guthrie had earlier explained the meaning of diminished
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responsibility in legal terms. He said : ‘The man's mind must
have been affected to such an extent at the date of the crime 
that his responsibility for crime is diminished from full 
responsibility to partial responsibility '[84]. This is of course 
not very helpful since all it seems to do is say that where 
responsibility is less than full then it will be partial . It 
acknowledges that the mind should be affected but tells us
nothing about how that effect should be created - does this 
include those who are affected by external factors or merely 
those whose mind is affected by internal disease processes, for 
example ?(see chapter 3).This definition was further examined by 
Lord Alness in Savage. For there to be diminished responsibility, 
he said: '...there must be an aberration or weakness of mind;
that there must be some form of mental unsoundness; that there 
must be a state of mind which is bordering on, though not 
amounting to, insanity; that there must be a mind so affected 
that responsibility - in other words the prisoner in question 
must be only partially accountable for his actions ... there must 
be some form of mental disease'[85].
So, the Savage definition above is the authoritative basis 
of the modern law. It was accepted by a full Bench of the High
Court in Carraher v. H.M.Adv.[861. Lord Justice-Clerk in
Carraher, said that ‘our law does recognise, and it is a 
comparatively recent introduction into our law, that, if a man 
suffers from infirmity or aberration of mind or impairment of
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intellect to such an extent as not to be fully accountable for 
his actions, the result is to reduce the quality of the evidence 
in a case like this, which, if you think so, would be otherwise 
murder, to reduce it to culpable homicide'[87]. Here we have a 
statement that disease of some kind must be present but what is 
"mental disease"? Is it, for example, a disease of the body which 
affects the brain, or of the type which demonstrates itself in 
behaviour changes and is categorised by psychiatry?. In Carraher 
V . H .M . Adv. above and in H .M . Adv. v. Braithwaite, Lord Cooper 
commented on diminished responsibility and referred to 'some 
infirmity or aberration of mind or impairment of intellect to
such an extent as not to be fully accountable for his 
actions'[88]. He then went on to explain that the defence is not 
identical to irresistible impulse or of uncontrollable temper, 
saying that if short temper were to reduce the charge then 'the
world would be a very convenient place for criminals and a very
dangerous place for other people if that were the law'[89].
Therefore, under Scots law, it would seem that for a man's 
responsibility to be diminished in legal terms, he must show
evidence of a disease of the mind "bordering on, but not
amounting to" insanity.
The plea of diminished responsibility was introduced into 
English law by section 2 of the Homicide Act 1957, which
provides ;
'(1) Where a person kills or is a party to the killing of
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another, he shall not be convicted of murder if he was
suffering from such subnormality of mind (whether arising 
from a condition of arrested or retarded development of mind 
any inherent causes or induced by disease or injury) as 
substantially impaired his mental responsibility for his 
acts and omissions in doing or being a party to the killing.
(2) A person who but for this section would be liable,
whether as principal or as accessory, to be convicted of 
murder shall be liable instead to be convicted of
manslaughter...'[90].
It appears that the effect of a successful defence of 
diminished responsibility will reduce the offence to one of 
manslaughter[91]. Diminished responsibility covers all the 
grounds which the McNaughten Rules cover, as well as going beyond 
them.
Therefore, a person may be aware of the nature and quality 
of his act and understand that it is wrong according to law and 
yet be unable to prevent himself from doing it. As such, this 
person does not border on insanity within the McNaughten Rules, 
but he can rely on the defence of diminished responsibility[92]. 
In consequence, diminished responsibility has been pleaded with 
success in cases where there was no chance of a defence of
insanity succeeding [93]. Williams has claimed that s.2 of the
1957 Act placed psychiatrists in a position of having to testify
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in terms which go beyond their professional competence [94]. The
English defence requires evidence of two factors:
I. Abnormality of mind. "Abnormality of mind" has been widely 
understood as a state of mind so different from that of 
ordinary human beings that a reasonable man would term it 
abnormal [95]. This term can clearly cover disordered
ÎI
1
personalities including psychopathy [96].
II. Resulting substantial impairment of mental responsibility. 
It is submitted by Wootton that "mental responsibility" is 
an unfortunate term and is obscurely worded [97].
Clyne states: 'Frankly, I cannot pretend to offer any
meaning for the proposition that, when A committed a certain 
action, he was "mentally responsible"; still less would 1 presume 
to give any meaning to the related proposition that his "mental 
responsibility" was diminished...'[98].
Williams points out that responsibility is a legal and 
ethical term, not something which is a clinical fact [99]. There
are several difficulties, and they centre on the meaning of the 
words'... substantially impaired his mental responsibility...'.
1
Opinions differ concerning the meaning of the word 
"responsibility" in this particular context, together with the 
word "mental". It seems clear that the section cannot be 
referring to substantial impairment of legal responsibility, in
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the sense of liability to conviction, since legal responsibility 
is something which is ascribed by one individual to another, and 
hence cannot meaningfully be described as "mental"[100]. A 
further possibility is that the word "responsibility" here refers 
to the meaning of the word where we, in a tone of praise, call 
someone a "responsible person". We, mean by this that he is a 
person who realises his duties and obligations, and is perceptive 
to the duties and obligations, of others. Before he acts, he 
considers the effect that such actions may have on others, and he 
will be prepared to modify his actions if they might cause 
unnecessary harm. Fortunately, there is a well known judicial 
statement on the problem to help us. The leading case on the 
interpretation of the section is Byrne, and in that case Lord 
Parker explained that 'the expression "mental responsibility for 
his acts" points to a consideration of the extent to which the 
accused's mind is answerable for his physical acts which must 
include a consideration of the extent of his ability to exercise 
will-power to control his physical acts'[101].
In the end we may wish to agree with Clyne, who gives up the 
idea of ascertaining a true meaning of the section, and suggests 
that what section 2 requires of a jury is that they ask 
themselves whether the accused's '...mental responsibility was 
diminished to such a degree to that English law ought to find him 
not guilty of murder, though it should find him guilty of 
manslaughter'[102]. Clyne arrives at the view, therefore, that
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the jury ought to return a verdict of manslaughter If, having 
regard to the accused's mental state, they think that they 
should[103].
The implications of the English definition would seem to be 
different from the Scottish situation. In England, diminished 
responsibility is now interpreted more favourably to the accused 
than in Scotland[104]. In Scotland it would appear that an 
element of disease is essential to the plea, whereas in England 
the plea may succeed where the reduction of responsibility is 
caused by external factors which have affected the mind. This 
seems to relate more closely to a common sense approach to the 
whole question of responsibility since most people would 
recognise that not all situations where mitigation is desirable 
relate to mental disorder in the sense of some disease process. 
Such characteristics seem to be more in line with the insanity 
defence, and indeed concentration on the existence of disease 
must make the differentiation between diminished responsibility 
and insanity for legal purposes rather difficult. Moreover, the 
English definition would seem at first sight to be able to cover 
those who are addicted to drugs or alcohol which will 
substantially impair mental responsibility but which may not be 
classified as a disease of the mindllOS]. This possibility was 
accepted in the case of R. v. Fenton (1975) although Fenton was 
not successful in establishing this[106].
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It should be noted that diminished responsibility does not 
protect the accused from conviction. It is restricted to reducing 
the charge from murder to culpable homicide (in Scotland) and to 
manslaughter (in England)[107].
The doctrine of diminished responsibility has been 
criticised by some writers. Gordon says that 'any discussion of 
diminished responsibility is likely to be bedeviled at the outset 
by the inaccuracy of the term itself, which suggests wrongly that 
diminished responsibility affects responsibility in the sense of 
guilt, and not merely sentence. This fundamental error crept 
gradually into Scot's law between 1867 and 1923 and seems now to 
have been taken over by English law' [108].
It is said that diminished responsibility developed as a 
"doctrine" in the context of murder because the only way of 
giving effect to mental abnormality short of insanity in murder 
cases was by acquitting the accused of murder and convicting him 
of culpable homicide. Its position in that context is like the 
position of provocation. In both cases the persons are 
responsible and liable to conviction, but in both cases there are 
mitigating circumstances[109]. The particular circumstances of 
the case mean that, even although there is an intention to kill, 
that intention arises from the particular circumstances and 
deprives the crime of the degree of gravity necessary for murder. 
In fact, it is virtually a kind of murder in the second degree.
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Essentially it operates as mitigating the gravity of an offence 
and opening the possibility of more flexible sentencing.
The effect of diminished responsibility on sentence had to 
be "justified", to be "rationalised" and "to be given some 
conceptual basis in the law of murder" because of the fixed 
penalty for murder[110]. The debate is often moved to the 
arguments for and against fixed penalties. Williams said that 
'except in cases of murder the judge has a discretion in 
sentencing that enables him to deal sensibly with the mentally 
disordered. For murder...the government... decided instead to 
extend the discretion of the judge by allowing a defence of 
"diminished responsibility"[111].
The idea behind the plea of diminished responsibility is to 
identify a state of mind which could provide some explanation or 
excuse for behaviour, but which was not actually insanity. In 
recognition of this, the nature of the crime committed could be 
changed by identifying a modified mens rea, and reflecting this 
in the punishment imposed. Lord Deas said in the case of John 
McLean that ',..without being insane in the legal sense...a 
prisoner may yet labour under that degree of weakness of 
intellect, or mental Infirmity, which may make it both right and 
legal to take that state of mind into account, not only in 
awarding the punishment, but...even in considering within what 
category of offences the crime shall be held fall'[112].
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This approach has been criticised. On one hand it is said, 
if a man is incapable of forming the criminal intention to commit 
one crime, how can he be capable of forming the criminal 
intention to commit another?[113]. On the other hand, if this is 
the idea behind the plea, then by developing a consistent
approach to the criteria used to establish the existence of 
diminished responsibility, the state of mind of the accused could 
be taken into account in every case[114]. Gordon suggests a 
further difficulty which would arise if diminished responsibility 
were to be extended beyond homicide. He claims that diminished 
responsibility only operates in relation to offences which were 
interrelated in the same way as murder and voluntary culpable 
homicide; that to say that they both had the same actus reus, or 
that the actus reus of the lesser offence was necessarily
included in the actus reus of the more serious offence[115]. It 
might never be acceptable in criminal law for diminished 
responsibility to operate to reduce one crime to another, where 
those crimes were totally different in nature.
Accordingly, this powerful objection to the plea of 
diminished responsibility explains why diminished responsibility 
has not operated in all offences other than homicide. It has been
suggested that it could do so sometimes. MacDonald thinks that it
is possible to operate it in assault[116]. Lord Keith considered 
that it could operate beyond the scope of homicide[117], and
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Professor Edwards has suggested that it might operate to reduce, 
for example, rape to indecent assault[118].
With the limited number of existing offences the opportunity 
to reduce offences by diminished responsibility is restricted. It 
is impossible in all cases to reduce the offence to the lower 
category. An example of this is the case of theft, where the only 
other alternative is to reduce the sentence. It seems that 
diminished responsibility can only operate where there exists a 
suitable lesser offence with which the accused may be convicted. 
However, the law has developed the plea exclusively in the case 
of murder.
It appears from what has been said above that diminished 
responsibility is considered as something affecting the question 
of guilt rather than punishment. Gordon, however, would suggest 
that the plea is really only logical if one considers it as a 
form of diminished punishability rather than diminished 
responsibility[119].
The Butler Committee emphasised that the mandatory life 
sentence for murder should be abolished[120], but should be used 
where there were no mitigating factors. That is to say, when the 
judge finds some mitigating factors, for example, mental 
weakness, he can reduce the sentence. According to this view 
judges will have a wide discretion as to sentence in murder
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cases.
Article (60) of the Iraqi Penal Code provides that '...if 
the mental disorder only impairs "capacity" or "choice" it must 
be deemed as "mitigating factors"[121]. According to Iraqi law, 
the impairment of "capacity" or "choice" by reason of mental 
disorder is considered as a factor of "diminished punishability" 
and not "diminished responsibility". The judge, therefore, has to 
apply these mitigating factors when they are proved. As long as, 
according to Iraqi law, the category of the offence does not 
change, there is "diminished punishability" and not "diminished 
responsibi1ity".
Diminished responsibility is a confused area of law and it 
might be better to have it as a mitigating circumstance but this 
means that the insanity defence must take into account the 
ability to control conduct.
5. Irresistible Impulse:
In spite of the fact that "irresistible impulse" was 
recognised before the case of McNaughten[122], it is clear that 
the McNaughten case allow for defects of knowledge, but not for 
defects of the emotions or the will. Until 1957 the defence was 
rejected in England. The suggestion that a man who acted under an 
impulse which he could not control was not criminally responsible 
was said to be 'a fantastic theory...which if it were to become
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part of our criminal law, would be merely subversive'[123]. It is 
argued that there is difficulty in distinguishing between an
impulse which proves irresistible by reason of normal motives of
greed, jealousy and revenge; and so, such an excuse has not to be 
allowed[124].
Accordingly, it is almost impossible for a court to tell 
genuine cases from false ones. The possibility of defendants 
shamming irresistible impulse as a way of escaping the penalties 
of the law was a real possibility as Stephen declared that 'there 
may have been many instances of irresistible impulse of this 
kind, but I fear that is a disposition to confound with 
unresisted impulse...'[124].
Thus, it appears that the main difficulty in accepting a 
control test is one of proof. Before it can be accepted it must 
be shown that A's ability for self control has been so seriously 
reduced as to make his condition comparable to that of someone 
acting under superior external force. It has to be shown not just
that he did not resist his desire to kill or rape or steal or
forge, but that he could not have done so : and indeed that he and 
his like cannot do otherwise to resist their impulses by threat 
of punishment[126], Reference is made to chapter 3 where various 
types of psychiatric conditions which may affect the person's 
ability to control his behaviour are discussed. Good examples are 
those who are suffering from personality disorder (psychopathic
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disorder, sexual deviants, addict ions ... etc., kleptomania and 
pyromania).
Lord Chief-Justice Parker accepted that such difficulties 
still remained. He said that 'in a case where abnormality of mind 
is one which affects the accused's self control, the step between 
"he did not resist his impulse" and "he could not resist his 
impulse" is, as the evidence in this case shows, one which is 
incapable of scientific proof. A fortiori: 'there is no
scientific measurement of the degree of difficulty which an 
abnormal person finds in controlling his impulses. These 
problems, which in the present state of medical knowledge are 
scientifically insoluble, the jury can only approach in a broad 
common-sense way'[127].
Wootton claims that no "empirical validation" or "objective 
criterion" is available to check whether a court's assessment of 
the truth of an accused's claim of irresistible impulse was 
correct or not[128]. This is true, but the objection is not 
limited to irresistible impulse. As Ross puts it: 'In many cases
irresponsibility cannot be established with scientific 
objectivity, in the way that one can point to the occurrence of 
cancer. But this should cause no anxiety in the moral philosopher 
or the jurist. For each must know that this is far from being a 
peculiarity of the concept of responsibility, and indeed is, on 
the contrary, the normal condition for the moral and juridical
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judgement and treatment of men'[1293.
The Royal Commission favoured the addition of a clause, 
suggested by the British Medical Association, that there should 
be a defence of insanity when a person has no ability to control
himself from committing an act that he understands to be wrong.
Further, it is more desirable to abandon any test such as the 
McNaughten Rules and leave it to the jury to decide whether the 
accused, when he committed the offence, was mentally disordered 
or not, in order to determine his responsibility accordingly 
[130]. In fact, though, this guidance does not offer very clear 
assistance to the jury in reaching a suitable decision. 
Accordingly, as Gordon has said, the existence and strength of 
any insanity impulse should be a question of medical fact [131].
It is obvious from Article [60] of the Iraqi penal code which 
provides that '... if he lost his "capacity" or "choice"..." 
[1313 that any person who loses only his choice (control) by 
reason of mental disorder, is deemed not responsible when he 
commits a crime. There are some cases adopted by the Iraqi
Cassation Court in this direction [132].
From the examination of the courts' attitudes towards cases 
involving insanity as a defence, insanity in bar of trial,
diminished responsibility and irresistible impulse, it appears 
that the law is unclear about the legal definitions of insanity
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in terms of what is meant by them. In addition, the courts are 
trying to apply notions of common sense justice by considering 
questions of mental disorder at all stages of the criminal 
process, especially disposal, but the concepts in the criminal 
law lead to decisions which seem to be illogical. There is 
illogicality and also a paradox in a situation where a man may be 
found "not guilty by reason of insanity" yet can be ordered to be 
detained without limit of time in a special or state hospital 
under conditions which may appear to him and his family to be 
hardly different from those of imprisonment.
Other mentally disordered persons may be kept in hospital, 
ostensibly in their "best interests", for periods of time far 
beyond those for which their acts would normally be punished by 
fixed sentences of imprisonment.
It seems that the mentally disordered offender is being 
doubly "punished" both for his mental disorder and for what he 
has done which has been deemed an offence or crime.
There is a conflict between what the Iraqi court applies in 
deciding issues of insanity. The judges require satisfaction to 
their own standards and thereby ignore the provision in the Penal 
Code, namely that insanity is a matter of advice from medical 
experts, i.e. the causal approach. There is no doubt that there 
are conflicting areas in the various theories of punishment, and
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this is certainly reflected in the difficulties that are to be 
found in cases of insanity, insanity in bar of trial, diminished 
responsibility and irresistible impulse. The various psychiatric 
definitions and classifications considered in chapter 3 appear at 
times to be either ignored by the judges or at times readily 
adopted without any consistent basis.
At this stage, it is safe to conclude that the law is really 
in a muddle and refuses to deal with the inconsistencies. 
According to Hart's approach (choosing system), individuals 
should not be punished when they have committed crimes 
involuntarily. Hart argues that in such cases treatment is being 
used as substitute for punishment. So, in order to avoid the 
injustice involved in the present procedure. Hart's view seems to 
be that treatment should, be separated from punishment. 
Accordingly Hart's approach might cut through the muddle and 
inconsistencies for the law. The sentencing process may well show 
a more enlightened thinking. The next chapter looks at the 
sentencing process in relation to such mental conditions and the 
special defences.
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CHAF-TE:R FIVE
THE SENTENCING PROCESS AND MENTAL DISORDER
1. Introduction:
The previous chapters have dealt with a study of the legal 
rules and theories of responsibility and punishment in relation 
to offenders or accused persons who are mentally disordered. 
However, the reality of the effects of these rules and concepts 
have not been dealt with. Accordingly, this chapter will study 
the sentencing processes which are currently in operation in 
relation to such offenders or accused persons. It will cover the 
scope of the types of sentences that will be imposed and the 
powers of the courts, and their limitations, to vary such 
sentences. The Mental Health (Scotland) Act 1984 and Criminal 
Procedure (Scotland) Act 1975[1] have secured the powers of the 
courts when dealing with mentally disordered people. The question 
of an accused person's mental condition, in criminal procedure, 
is important for several reasons:
a) People who were insane at the time of committing crimes
cannot be convicted of, or sentenced for, them.
b) People who are insane in bar of trial cannot be tried upon
a criminal charge.
c) People who become mentally disordered after being convicted
may be dealt with by a hospital or guardianship order...etc.
instead of being sentenced in the normal way.
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d) People who become mentally disordered after being sentenced
can be dealt with under a "transfer direction".
In this Chapter attention will be focused on the following 
points :
1. Mentally disordered offenders in relation to criminal 
procedure»
2. Insanity and criminal procedure.
3. The Iraqi Criminal Law and sentencing process.
4. Dangerous mentally disordered people.
2. Mentally Disordered Offenders In Relation to Criminal 
Procedure:
Before any specific psychiatric orders can be made by a 
court under the Mental Health (Scotland) Act 1984 and the 
Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1975 (the Mental Health Act 
1983 includes similar provisions), the court must take into 
account many factors, for example:
I. An offender has to be convicted by the court of a crime
other than "murder". That is to say, the sentence for the
crime must not be fixed by law.
II. Medical evidence must be taken by the court. This evidence,
written or oral, must be provided by two medical
practitioners. One of them has to be approved by an Area 
Health Authority as having special experience in the 
diagnosis or treatment of mental disorders.
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III. The court has to be satisfied that the offender has a mental 
disorder of a nature or degree which warrants detention in 
hospital, other than for probation orders.
IV. The court must choose an order which is appropriate for the
offender according to all the circumstances, including the
nature of the offence and the character of the offender.
There are five specific psychiatric orders, as well as the
possibility that the offender who is sent to prison may later be 
transferred to hospital. Each is examined in turn according to 
the above Act. An assessment of the implications of the law and 
of the policy of the courts when they are dealing with 
dangerously mentally disordered offenders is made[2].
a) Probation Orders:
The present law and procedure on probation orders are set 
out in sections 184, 185, 384, 385 of the Criminal Procedure
(Scotland) Act 1975[3]. Probation orders may be made in court for 
any offence other than one with fixed penalty (i.e.murder). There 
is no power to order probation without conviction. In terms of 
these provisions, the court may impose a probation order with a 
condition requiring the offender to submit to treatment for his 
mental condition when it is satisfied, on the evidence of an 
approved registered medical practitioner, that the mental 
condition of an offender is such as requires and as may be 
susceptible to treatment, but is not such as to justify his
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detention in a hospital . Such orders may be from six months to 
three years. The time has to be specified in the probation order 
and it must be one of the following kinds;
'a. Treatment as a resident patient in a hospital within the
meaning of the 1984 (Scotland) Act other than a state 
hospital ;
b. treatment as a non-resident patient at such institution or 
place as many be specified in the order; or
c . treatment by or under the direction of such registered 
medical practitioner as may be specified in the order'[41.
The obligation of the supervising officer responsible for 
the probationer is to carry out the supervision to such extent 
only as may be necessary for the purpose of the discharge or
amendment of the order. According to the probationer's consent, 
the medical practitioner may make arrangements for him to be
treated in another institution or place not specified in the
order. The medical practitioner, in these circumstances, has to 
inform the supervising officer in writing. The medical
practitioner should also inform the supervising officer of his 
opinions as follows:
'a. the treatments should be continued beyond the period 
specified in the order; or
b . that the probationer needs different treatment; or
c. that the probationer is not susceptible to treatment; or
d. that the probationer does not require further treatment'[5].
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If the court receives evidence from an approved registered 
medical practitioner, if the offender consents, and if the court 
is satisfied that the offender's mental condition requires and is 
susceptible to warrant his detention following a hospital order, 
the court may add a restriction involving submission to medical 
treatment for the whole or part of the probation period.
While the probation order may be relevant in many cases 
where neither the offence nor the mental disorder is so grave to 
involve a hospital order, decisions of the English Court of 
Appeal indicate that it may also be used in cases which might 
otherwise justify an imprisonment, for example, wounding with
intent[6], and arson with intent to endanger life[7]. These
offences warant a sentence of three years imprsonment. Probation 
orders must have the consent of the convicted person, so that 
medical treatment is in effect voluntary, although it is a 
condition of probation. It appears that this order allows a
flexible combination of medical care and supervision. 
Accordingly, this order can be changed according to the patient's 
condition. So the probation order may be changed to a
guardianship order or a hospital order when it is found out that 
this order is not appropriate for the patient or the patient does 
not consent to cooperation with the medical authorities[8]. The 
Thomson Committee suggested that greater use should be made of 
this order[9].
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b) Hospital Orders:
Sections 175 (1) and 376 (1) of the Criminal Procedure
(Scotland) Act 1975[10], provide that where a person is 
convicted in court of an offence the sentence for which is not 
fixed by law, i.e. murder, the court may in certain circumstances 
issue a hospital order, namely, if the court finds that the 
hospital order is the most suitable method of disposing of the 
case. The court, before making such an order, must be satisfied 
on the written or oral evidence of two doctors, one of whom must 
be a practitioner approved by a Health Board as having special 
experience in the diagnosis or treatment of mental disorders[11], 
The grounds for making a hospital order are that offender is 
suffering from mental disorder, i.e. mental illness or mental 
handicap, of a nature or degree which makes it appropriate for 
him to be detained for medical treatment in a hospital. It must 
also be shown that it is necessary for his health or safety or 
for the protection of others that he should receive such 
treatment and that it cannot be provided unless he is detained 
under part V of the Mental Health (Scotland) Act 1984, i.e. 
unless he is compulsorily detained. In the case of minor 
disorders (mental impairment and psychopathic disorder), the 
person must satisfy the "treatability condition"[12]. Namely, if 
the person suffers from a persistent mental disorder shown only 
by abnormally aggressive or seriously irresponsible conduct, he 
may be detained in such a case if medical treatment is likely to 
improve or prevent a deterioration of his condition. Therefore,
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the court must find, it likely that treatment will make some 
change in the offender's mental condition either in the sense 
that the condition can be cured or remedied or that it can be 
prevented from becoming worse. Where the person suffers a mental 
handicap, he may be detained only where the handicap amounts to 
mental impairment and medical treatment in hospital is likely to 
improve or prevent a deterioration of his condition. It should be 
noted, though, that "mental impairment" has a technical legal 
definition relating to irresponsible conduct and not just to 
mental handicap, as explained later. Where it amounts to severe 
mental impairment, however, the requirement that the treatment is 
likely to improve or prevent deterioration does not apply[13], 
since there is no treatability test in respect of an offender 
suffering from mental illness or severe mental impairment. Unless 
the responsible medical officer states that the offender's 
condition is treatable or that he is unlikely to be able to care 
for himself, to obtain the care he needs or to guard against 
serious exploitation if he is discharged, such a patient will be 
discharged at the end of a period of detention (for example, 
after six months from the making of the order).
A hospital order cannot be made unless the court is first 
satisfied that the hospital is available for his admission within 
28 days of making the order[14]. Judges have expressed 
considerable disquiet at the difficulties of finding a hospital 
bed for the mentally disordered[15]. In Harding, Lawton J. warned
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people who refused admissions to secure units when he said that 
'anyone who obstructed the execution of a hospital order or 
procured others to obstruction might be guilty of contempt of 
court'[16]. At any rate, since the hospital order is made after 
the making of satisfactory arrangements for the offender’s 
admission to hospital, failure to make a bed available can not 
obstruct the execution of the order.
The effects of an ordinary hospital order under section 175 
or 376 of the 1975 Act are almost similar to treatment under the 
civil provisions of the Mental Health (Scotland) Act 1984[17]. 
All the rules relating to the duration and renewal of detention, 
reclassification, leave of absence, absconding and discharge by 
the authorities are the same. There are only two significant 
differences: first, the nearest relative of a hospital order
patient cannot order his discharge and second, the patient does 
not have the right to apply to a court within six months 
following the hospital order being made[18]. The first occasion 
on which either the hospital order patient or his nearest 
relative can apply to a court is between six and 12 months of the 
making of the order.
In principle, the court should determine whether punishment 
or treatment is relevant and make its choice accordingly. In R_^
V. Gummel1 (1966) [19], it was decided that an offender who 
deserved punishment could be sent to prison, even though he
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qualified for a hospital order and a suitable bed was available. 
Once it has been decided that treatment is relevant, the court 
can then consider whether a restriction order should be added to 
the hospital order. The restriction order is considered in detail 
later in this chapter.
Of course, as I have argued, some treatments are in effect 
punishments from the point of view of the offender, so that the 
choice is not as clear as might appear. In reality, a life 
sentence is not literally for life and is normally shorter than 
an hospital order with restriction order.
c) Guardianship Orders:
Like hospital orders, guardianship orders may be made for 
the same offences and with the same medical evidence. The 
guardianship order is made by the court after the court is 
satisfied from the evidence of a Mental Health Officer that 
guardianship is approprate and in the interest of the offender's 
welfare[20]. All circumstances, such as the nature of the 
offence, the character and antecedents of the offender and the 
other available methods of dealing with him, have to be taken 
into account when the court determines on the guardianship order. 
"Mental handicap" is restricted to impairments which are 
associated with seriously irresponsible conduct. Mentally 
handicapped offenders do not usually benefit from hospital 
treatment, but could be advantaged by prolonged guidance in the
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community.
The guardianship order is basically like the hospital order 
in duration, procedure for renewal, power, and rights of 
application to a tribunal[21]. However, the effect is quite 
different. In respect of the comparison with the probation order 
provisions there is an important difference between the effects 
of the two orders. Under a probation order the offender can be 
brought back to court when he does not co-operate with the 
medical authorities, while under a guardianship order there is no 
sanction such as this. The appropriate effects of these orders 
are considered later in this chapter and in the last chapter. 
Guardianship orders, however, involve certain obligations and 
disabilities which are not found in probation orders. While the 
offender accepts the probation order on a voluntary basis, the 
guardianship order is imposed compulsorily. The guardianship 
order may not be made unless the guardian is willing to receive 
the accused. The guardian has three powers over the patient. He 
may decide when and where the patient should go for treatment, 
occupation, education and training, and where the patient should 
live and he may permit any named doctor, social worker or any 
other person to see the patient. The mentally disordered offender 
is placed in the guardianship either of the local services 
authority or of some other individual approved by them[22].
It appears that few orders have been made in recent years.
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despite the fact that the guardianship order, in some 
circumstances, as is shown later, is more effective than a 
probation order (for example, the guardianship order can be used 
where the offender does not consent).
The Butler Committee recommended greater use of guardianship 
orders. They stated that 'it is our view that guardianship orders 
offer a useful form of control of some mentally disordered 
offenders who do not require hospital treatment; as we said, they 
are particulary suited to the needs of subnormal offenders 
including those inadequate offenders who require help in managing 
their affairs'[24].
d) Interim Hospital Orders:
With an ordinary hospital order the court has only one 
opportunity to make a hospital order or to pass an ordinary 
sentence on a convicted person. If the court makes a mistake in 
its decision, there is no means of returning the person to the 
court for a more suitable disposal. For example, if a court makes 
a hospital order on the basis of the medical reports before it, 
and, after the offender's arrival in hospital, it turns out that 
he had never been mentally disordered, he has to be discharged 
and freed from punishment, even if the alternative would have 
been a long period of detention. Parliament has now provided for 
an interim hospital order in the case of offenders whose disorder 
is so grave as to justify their detention in mental hospital[25].
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When the court has actually convicted the accsed of an 
offence which would qualify for a full hospital order, an interim 
hospital order is also available. In the first instance, 
therefore, the court may make an interim hospital order. The 
court, thus, transfers the offender to a mental hospital for such 
purposes as the court may specify[26].
There must be medical evidence from two doctors, of whom one 
must be employed in the hospital to which the accused is to be 
sent. They must state that the offender is suffering from mental 
illness, psychopathic disorder, severe mental impairment or 
mental impairment. There must be a place available for the 
offender within 28 days of the order, and the court may give such 
directions as it thinks fit for the conveyance of the offender to 
and his detention in a place of safety awaiting his admission to 
the hospital[27].
An interim order will last in the first instance for a 
duration of not more than twelve weeks. The court may renew the 
order for not more than twenty-eight days at a time up to a 
maximum of six months on the written or oral evidence of the 
responsible medical officer[28].
The court retains power of disposal for the crime in 
question, once an interim order is at an end. It may make a
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hospital order, if the evidence is available, or the court may 
choose to impose a penalty, if the evidence is not available[291.
e) Restriction Orders:
In certain circumstances a court is entitled to add to a 
hospital order special restrictions on the offender's discharge. 
The restriction is either without limit of time or for such 
duration as may be specified in the order[30]. The restriction 
order will be made after the medical practitioner gives such 
evidence orally[31]. The court must be satisfied that the 
restriction order is necessary to protect the public from serious 
harm. When the court imposes the restriction order, it has to 
look at the nature of the crime, the antecedents of the offender, 
and the risk of his committing further offences if set free[32].
The aim of restriction orders is essentially protective. The 
justification for making the restriction order, therefore, 
depends on the degree of risk of serious harm to others. 
Restriction orders should not be made when the offender may 
commit crimes, but, according to the medical reports, these 
crimes would not amount to "serious harm". On the other hand, 
what degree of risk of serious harm from further offending should 
the court require, if there is little doubt from the nature of 
the present offence and of the antecedents of the offender that 
he is capable of causing serious harm? The matter will be more 
important when the medical reports indicate that the offender may
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commit serious crime if not put in secure conditions. There is 
plenty of evidence that the prediction of dangerousness is 
uncertain and can be mistaken (this point is developed later). 
This helps to explain the view, considered earlier, that many 
lawyers and judges take of cases involving psychiatric reports.
Lord Parker determined in the leading English case of 
Gardiner[331 that the restriction order should be imposed in 
"case of crimes of violence and of the more serious sexual 
offences". This opinion corresponds with both the 1984 Act and 
the 1983 Act, as long as minor offences do not recur. It has been 
re-examined in some other decisions during the last few years. 
The Court of Appeal in Toland[34] upheld the restriction order 
imposed on a young burglar who had twice absconded from a local 
mental hospital.It is true that the case is not in the same 
category as the case of a violent sexual offender to which Lord 
Parker referred. This justification does not lead to the 
conclusion that the offender presents a risk of serious harm. 
There are many other cases in which the court has stated that it 
is appropriate to impose a restriction order in relation to 
convictions for modest offences, such as obtaining by 
deception[353, damaging two window panes[36], or stealing a 
purse[37]. Lord Justice Musti11 in Regina v. Birch said that ‘the 
seriousness of the offence must not be equated with the 
probability that restriction order would be made; a minor offence 
by a man who was mentally disordered and dangerous might properly
It is clear that the purpose of the inclusion of the words 
"serious harm" into both the 1984 and the 1983 Act was to narrow 
the types of offence for which the restriction order is 
justifiable. It is generally agreed that "serious harm" should be 
limited to serious crimes of violence and grave sexual offences, 
together with other offences of a similar level (including 
serious cases of possessing weapons, serious forms of arson, 
aggravated burglary and burglary with intent to rape or injure). 
To be more precise it is suggested that the "serious harm" 
required by a restriction order should parallel the judicial 
approach to life imprisonment. For some the predicted offence
Î
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leave him subject to a restriction'[38]. Amongst the most obvious 
was Nigel Smith who was a "petty fraudster" with no history of 5violence or even mental disorder, who found himself not only in a
mental hospital, but also under a restriction order of unlimited 
duration[39]. The Butler Committee was critical of this 
direction. Its Report stated that 'evidence given to us by The 
Home Office has indicated the probability that these orders are 
imposed in numbers of cases where their severity is not 
appropriate... .There is no indication of the seriousness of the 
offences from which the public is intended to be protected by the 
restriction order provisions, and some courts have evidently 
imposed restrictions on, for example, the petty recidivist 
because of the virtual certainty that he will persist in similar 
offences in the future'[40].
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should be of the kind which justifies a sentence of more than 
seven years imprisonment. Others suggest that the threshold for 
restriction orders should be five years imprisonment. It is 
argued, here, however that since the restriction order involves a 
deprivation of liberty, it should be limited to really serious 
cases. In Regina v. Birch Lord Justice Mustill said that 'a 
restriction order should not be imposed merely to mark the 
gravity of the offence which was an element in the assessment of 
risk, nor as a means of punishment. The question in this case was 
whether in the light of the statutory factors, namely the nature 
of the offence, the defendant's antecedents and the risk of 
further offences, the restriction order was necessary for the 
protection of the public from serious harm', This point is 
developed later.
Part V of the 1984 Act does not apply to patients who are 
under a restriction order. Such patients are not subject to the 
same provisions for the duration, renewal and expiration of the 
detention as patients detained civilly. The Secretary of State is 
entitled to expire the detention of patients and to move them 
from one hospital to another. When a limited restriction order 
expires, but the hospital order remains in force, the patient is 
treated as if he had been admitted to hospital as an ordinary 
patient on the day the restriction order expired'[42].
In present times, the power of the Home Secretary or
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Secretary of State for Scotland to discharge patients subject to 
restriction orders is not exclusive. In Scotland, for example, 
the patients have the right to appeal to the Sheriff Court 
against the imposition of the restriction order. The appeal may 
be made at any time during the second six months of detention,
and in any subsequent duration of 12 months. The Sheriff Court or
the Secretary of State may discharge the offender conditionally 
or absolutely[43].
At any time. The Secretary of State can recall a patient who
is conditionally dlscharged[44]. The powers of the Secretary of
state to discharge and recall patients or to lift a restriction 
order are unaffected by these appeal provisions[45]. The European 
Court of Human Rights in X. v. United Kingdom emphasised that 
patients must not be recalled unless a ground of detention 
exists[46]. Hoggett said that ‘in any event, the case must now be 
referred to a tribunal, which would have to discharge, if the 
grounds were not there'[47].
It is argued that the restriction order is not a therapeutic 
disposal. Rather, it is punishment equal to a sentence of life 
imprisonment, because the restriction order for the patient may 
take a much longer time than is justified by his mental 
condition[46]. Accordingly, it is suggested that the restrictions 
should not last longer than a duration in balance with the 
acuteness of the crime for which they were imposed at least[48].
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The situation with offenders who are transferred from prison to 
hospital supports this idea. When their imprisonment would have 
ended, their restriction orders have to end. It does not matter 
what is their mental condition.
f) Transfer Directions:
The transfer from prison is called in the 1984 Act "Transfer 
Direction"[49]. The power to transfer offenders from prison is in 
the hands of the Secretary of State. To exercise his power, he 
must have reports from two doctors, one of them approved. The 
prisoner must be suffering from either mental illness, 
psychopathic disorder, severe mental Impairment or mental 
impairment. As for an ordinary hospital order, the other 
conditions are also the same. The transfer from prison and the
hospital order have the same effect, but the prisoner in the
former may be subjected to restriction of discharge by the
Secretary of State. Within one month, the patient can appeal to 
the Sheriff to revoke his transfer to a hospital. If successful, 
he will be sent to any prison or other institution in which he 
might have been detained before his transfer was ordered.
Ordinary restrictions are placed when the sentence is still 
not at an end. Therefore, when the sentence expires, the 
restrictions have to cease. In this situation, the patient is 
entitled to be discharged unless an ordinary hospital order is
necessary for him. As the restriction order, the transfer
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direction has the same effect. The transfer order is subject to 
an appeal. Therefore, it may be appealed to the Sheriff within 
the first six months. The Sheriff Court has the power to advise 
that a prisoner is fit for discharge and he is no longer a 
suitable case for treatment. Accordingly, the Secretary of State 
has the power to choose one of three things:
I. Unless the patient has ended his sentence and he is ready 
for discharge, the Secretary of State can leave the patient 
in hospital for the time being,
II. The Secretary of State can send the prisoner back to a 
prison to complete his sentence,
III. The Secretary of State can discharge the patient under
supervision or licence.
3. Insanity and Criminal Procedure:
The question of how to deal with people who are found by the
court to be insane at the time of the crime but who are sane at
the time of disposal, is an issue which gives rise to a great
deal of controversy. Such people, according to present procedure, 
have to be committed to a hospital by the court, although 
acquitted by a jury, and remain there until the Home Secretary or 
the Secretary of State for Scotland authorises their
discharge[50]. In contrast, people will be acquitted and released
when they succeed in an ordinary defence of lack of mens rea.
The criteria to be applied by the jury in Scotland in
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reaching a special verdict are laid down by Lord Strachan in 
H .M .Adv■ V .  Kidd[51]. A person who has been acquitted by a jury 
after an insanity defence was successful, is ordered by the court 
to be detained in the state hospital, or, if there are special 
reason why conditions of special security are not required, in 
some other specified hospital. This has the same effect as a 
hospital order with a restriction on discharge without limit of 
time[52]. The person will remain in hospital until released by 
order of the Secretary of State for Scotland or appeal to the 
Sheriff[53].
In summary procedure in the Sheriff Court, when a person is 
acquitted on the grounds of insanity, he is detained in a mental 
hospital but in this situation the restriction or discharge is 
within the discretion of the court. Under summary procedure, 
alternatively, the person may be placed under the care of the 
local authority as guardian or some other person approved by the 
authority instead of be detained in a mental hospital [54].
In terms of legal advice, between a lawyer and client, a 
defence lawyer would advise a client not to enter an insanity 
plea unless the nature of the charge is very serious or 
stigmatising[55]. It is submitted that a prison term under a 
guilty plea, or for a psychiatric probation order or hospital 
order[56] is from the accused's point of view preferable to 
automatic long term detention in some unit for the criminally
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insane[57].
It is said that the dangerousness of people who plead 
insanity who have perpetrated violence has already been 
demonstrated, and it may be assumed that the dangerousness 
continues, for some time later. The basis of this assumption is 
that past behaviour is the best indicator of future behaviour. 
Moreover, an acquittal by reason of insanity is a finding that 
the defendant suffered from a mental disorder at the time of the 
defence, but what about the state of mind of the defendant at the 
time of acquittal? The verdict refers to the time of the act, but 
it presumes that the mental disorder continues up to the time of 
commitment[58]. Clearly it is the protection of the public that 
is given priority. Ten states that '...it is also important that 
mentally ill offenders who acted without mens rea should not be 
automatically released in the same way that other offenders who 
are excused are released. A mentally ill offender lacking mens 
rea may cause serious harm to others if he is immediately 
released without medical examination. Mental illness should 
therefore be a distinct excuse different from other excuses'[59].
Psychiatrists content with the present procedure have, 
nonetheless, recognised the problems that these cases cause. In 
general, the present practice of sending a person who has 
committed a crime to a mental hospital even if he is sane at the 
time of sentence is favoured by the psychiatrists. This view is
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justified by the need to keep such people under observation and 
treatment for a time in case they are suffering from a recurring 
illness, for example epilepsy or certain types of depression. 
Therefore, in such cases, as it would appear, sending a sane 
person to a mental hospital is not so i1 logical[60].
The compulsory nature of the order after special verdicts 
has often been criticised as unnecessary. There is an assumption 
that those who go to trial and raise the special defence are sane 
at least at the time of their trial. Therefore, there is the 
inevitable problem that the accused who is pleading that he was 
insane at the time of the offence is at the time of his trial by 
the definition sane or he would have been dealt with by the plea 
in bar, although, as we have seen, the criteria for insanity as a 
defence are not identical to those for in bar of trial. Given the 
remote possibility that the accused has recovered by the time of 
his trial, and has in the interest of justice raised the question 
of his sanity at the time of the offence, the inevitable outcome 
of a successful special defence is compulsory hospital treatment. 
The now sane offender is in the position of having to plead not 
guilty and accept possible indefinite detention for medical 
treatment, which, under the terms of the 1984 Mental Health 
(Scotland) Act, can be instituted without his consent in some 
cases. Of course, it is unlikely that an accused person will have 
made a spontaneous recovery and this type of situation will 
probably arise infrequently. Nonetheless, it could happen[61].
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As mentioned earlier, in chapter 3, there is a difference 
between "medically insane" and "legally insane"[62]. Therefore, 
according to the concept "legally insane", some physical 
illnesses are regarded as "mental disorder" when they affect the 
brain, for example, diabetes. Accordingly, no mental hospital 
would admit a diabetic merely because he had a low blood sugar 
reaction and it might be felt to be "an affront to common sense" 
to regard such a person as insane[63]. Again it is clearly the 
protection of the public that is the prime consideration in 
practice.
On the other hand, if a person who is not guilty of crime 
poses a danger, not because of mental disorder, but because of 
his personality, then he has to be returned to society and only 
arrested if he commits criminal act[64]. It must be noted that 
the danger posed by people who are acquitted by reason of 
insanity is small in comparison to the many hazards in our daily 
lives - guns, cars, etc. In general, the rate of recidivism among 
those discharged from prison is more than double that of people 
acquitted by reason of insanity. Hoggett said that 'mental 
disorder as such is not the criterion. There are plenty of sane 
people who are dangerous and plenty of insane people who are not. 
If we are going to deprive people of either proportionality or 
the normal principles of guilt and innocence in order to protect 
society against serious risk, we should be concentrating on the
278
accurate identification and discovery of that risk and on nothing 
else' [65] .
Therefore, it is unjustifiable to transfer to a mental 
hospital someone who is sane and requires no treatment. Further, 
if he is not a danger to the community at large, the committal, 
as well as being unfair to the person, serves no useful purpose. 
It is said that the practice of compulsory treatment, however, 
would seem to link the plea more closely with the old terminology 
of guilty but insane[66].
Thus, while accepting that a hospital disposal may remain 
the most common and most appropriate sentence, the Thomson 
Committee recommended that hospitalisation should be a 
discretionary sentence rather than a mandatory one. In their 
view, the solution would be for the accused to be sent to a 
mental hospital (not necessarily the state hospital) for 
observation and treatment if this is deemed necessary. If it 
appears to the judge from psychiatric evidence that he is not 
suffering from any mental disorder and that the condition which 
obtained at the time of the offence is not likely to recur, he 
should go free[67].
4. The Iraqi Criminal Law and Sentencing Process:
As is stated in chapter 4, the Iraqi Criminal Law adopts the 
test of "insanity as a defence". This is clear from Article (231)
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of the Iraqi Code of Criminal Procedure and the practice that the 
courts have of postponing a trial when they find the accused 
insane in bar of trial until he recovers[68]. Accordingly the 
accused has to be sane to entitle the courts to continue a trial. 
Article (232) of the Iraqi Code of Criminal Procedure provides 
that 'if it can be concluded from the report of the Medical 
Committee that the accused does not have criminal responsibility 
because he was suffering from mental disorder during the time the 
crime was committed, the judge of investigation or the court may 
decide that the accused is non-responsible by reason of his 
mental disorder, and the court or the judge of investigation may 
make their decision to hand him over to one of his relatives with 
a personal guarantee that he should be looked after, or they may 
make any other adequate decision'.
Accordingly, the court, when finding an accused not 
responsible by reason of insanity, must commit him to one of his 
relatives to treat and look after him. His relatives, however, 
have to give a financial guarantee that he will not commit any 
crime. If his relatives fail to do that, the court applies 
Article (105) of the Iraqi Penal Code[69] which provides that any 
dangerous offender found mentally disordered has to be detained 
in a mental hospital for an unlimited duration and after this , 
the court has full power to discharge him according to a medical 
report. Although this Article applies only to offenders who were 
convicted, in practice the courts apply it to the insanity
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acquittée because there is no other way to deal with the non- 
responsible criminally accused who are refused assistance and 
help by their relatives.
At first sight, it seems that the Iraqi Law provides a good 
solution when it commits the insanity acquittée to his relative 
but, in reality, this procedure is improper. As already stated in 
chapter 3, there is no Mental Health system in Iraq to arrange 
how to deal with mentally disordered people in general and with 
mentally disordered offenders in particular. So, for example, 
there is no rule followed by the courts when they find the 
insanity acquittée does not need to have any treatment or care 
because he has recovered at the time of disposal, there is no 
clear direction in the law to deal with the insanity acquittée 
who is found to need treatment and care in order to protect the 
society from his dangerousness when his relatives abstain from 
looking after him, and there is no Mental Health Code to assist 
mentally disordered people as a general group, unlike the Mental 
Health system in Britain. The definition of dangerousness is 
provided by Article (105) of the Iraqi Penal Code[70] in which 
the mentally disordered offenders can be recognised as dangerous 
from the nature of their crimes and from their antecedents.
Article (105) provides that any dangerous offender found to 
be mentally disordered must be detained in a mental hospital for 
an unlimited duration and after six months the court has full
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power to discharge him. The court makes the decision about 
discharge on the basic of medical reports. This principle also 
applies to mentally disordered people,if, after they have 
completed their sentence, they have been found still dangerous 
by reason of their being mentally disordered. Accused persons who 
are discovered by the court to be responsible, because they had 
mens rea when they committed the crime[71], must be convicted and 
punished. If, however, they are suffering from impairment or a 
limited mental disorder at the time where they committed the 
crime, they have to be given a reduced sentence according to the 
notion of "diminished punishability"[72]. Those mentally 
disordered offenders are directly sent to prison after they are 
convicted and sentenced. It is clear that "impairment" here has a 
different meaning from the Scottish and English Acts.
Since, there are no legal procedures to deal with such 
prisoners, the prison adminstration has full power to deal with 
them according to their mental condition. So, sometimes, some 
mentally disordered prisoners are sent to the mental hospital 
for treatment under high restriction security. On other occasions 
the prison adminstration seeks to have them 'cured" in prison or 
alternatively denies them treatment. This type of arbitrary 
procedure has serious implications for an individual's liberty.
We will see later what are the appropriate procedures to be 
followed in order that justice be maintained as much as possible.
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It is obvious that the Iraqi law is better than British law in 
relation to the powers of the courts to release the patients 
after they recover from their mental disorder. But there are many 
difficulties in the practice in Iraq when we deal with the 
mentally disordered persons (non-responsible and responsible), 
because there is no mental health code nor enough rules in 
criminal law to deal with them. So, it may be that real 
injustice arises in practice. Thus, there must be some 
legislation dealing with the disposal of mentally disordered 
persons in order to protect human and civil rights. The arguments 
and recommendations later will illustrate what kind of procedures 
are more suitable.
5- Dangerous Mentally Disordered people;
Questions about dangerous mentally disordered persons (both 
responsible and non-responsible) arise in criminal procedure for 
several reasons
a- Mentally disordered persons who are not guilty by reason of 
insanity (non-responsible) may be detained in mental 
hospital for indefinite duration (compulsory treatment). 
b- Mentally disordered people who are found unfit to plead are
subjected to similar procedure to (a) above, 
c- Mentally disordered people who are convicted may be dealt
with by restriction order or life imprisonment rather than
sentenced in the normal way like any other ordinary
offender.
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d- Mentally disordered persons who are sentenced or in prison 
may be dealt with by "Transfer Direction" with or without a 
restriction order[73].
In order to reach an appropriate procedure in criminal law 
to deal with the dangerous mentally disordered, it seems to me 
that it is worth while dividing these people into two groups.The 
first group are "non-responsible mentally disordered persons 
(Mentally disordered individuals who are found not guilty by 
reason of insanity and, if the plea is retained, those found 
insane in bar of trial) and the second group are those 
responsible mentally disordered offenders (mentally disordered 
offenders who are found guilty or sentenced or in prison).
Since we are talking here about the sentencing process in 
respect of mentally disordered persons, it is worth finding out 
the distinction between "Detention" in general and "Detention" in 
the particular sense. In general "Detention" means any compulsory 
procedure which leads to the deprivation of liberty. Accordingly, 
it can be a remand in jail for reason of investigation, prison, 
hospital order...etc. On the other hand compulsory treatment has 
two aspects. One of them has the same effect as "prevention" 
since it can include treatment in order to prevent the patient's 
condition deteriorating (e.g. medicines, psychotherapy, electric 
therapy... etc) . Another aspect of compulsory treatment is more 
like punishment because it takes the form of detention (e.g.
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psychiatric orders, custodial care... etc.). The second aspect of 
compulsory treatment is more important in this study. It is, as 
has already been seen, used in law and practice and in some 
theories as a substitute for punishment. I will try to suggest
some means of separating punishment from treatment. In general
mentally disordered persons should not be detained ( subjected to 
compulsory treatment in the second sense ) unless they have a 
serious mental disorder which may result in serious harm to the
public. So, if such detention is permitted then this must involve
both clear proof of dangerousness and some limit on its duration 
that takes into account the interests of the detained/treated 
person.
It is obvious from the argument in chapter four about the 
defence of insanity in bar of trial that it can be unjust to keep 
this kind of defence. This is because mentally disordered people 
under this kind of defence may be detained in a mental hospital 
for a long time, although they may be innocent or may serve 
longer than the normal duration of punishment for their crime. So 
the trial should carry on even if the accused is suffering from 
mental disorder[74]. In this case we can resolve the problems 
with this sort of mentally disordered person. Namely, the result 
will be either these persons are found responsible or not 
responsible. It is clear from the present procedure (in law and 
practice) that there is a conflict. On the one hand, how can it 
be justifiable that, when the court acquits somebody by reason of
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being "non-responsible", it detains him for an unlimited duration 
in a mental hospital, while on the other hand an offender who 
deserves "diminished punishability" by reason of his limited 
mental disorder is sentenced by the court to life imprisonment or 
indefinite restriction order.
From the jurisprudential argument below, a suitable solution 
for this dilemma might be as follows: 
a- Non- responsible mentally disordered people ;
It is argued in chapters one and two that mens rea is at the 
centre of the idea of criminal responsibility. So since the 
mentally disordered person lacks mens rea ( he lacks knowledge 
or control over some particular aspect of his conduct) at the 
time he committed the crime, he must be non responsible[75]. 
Thus, if people can justly be held responsible for crime, they 
will be punished for what they have done. Equally people who lack 
mens rea can not be held responsible. Therefore it is improper to 
punish them. According to Hart's approach, as we have already 
seen in chapter two and as considered further later, such people 
are not responsible because they have not any choice and fair 
opportunity to avoid crime[76].
It is explained in this chapter and chapter four that people 
who are non-responsible by reasons of their insanity have at 
present in serious cases to be transferred to mental hospital 
under restriction order (compulsory treatment) automatically. It
success-who cares whether this is called punishment or not?'[77]. 
The question must be asked, therefore, as to whether such 
procedures can be justified
It is said that past behaviour is the best indicator of 
future behaviour. In other words, the behaviour of mentally 
disordered persons who have committed serious crime has already 
been proved[78]. So, it is obvious that the aim of the compulsory 
treatment is basically protective of the public (protective 
sentencing).
It is often assumed that mentally disordered persons are 
more dangerous than other offenders[79]. In reality, however, 
there is no necessary association between mental disorder and 
dangerousness[80]. There are many sane people who are dangerous 
and many insane people are not. Thus, the use of the criterion
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is obvious that compulsory treatment in this sense equals i;
'punishment. It is said that any therapeutic programmes against 
the will of a person are mostly regarded as a punishment. Sleffel 
says that 'to be taken without consent from my home and friends;
to lose my liberty ; to undergo all those assaults on my
personality which modern psychotherapy knows how to deliver; to 
be re-made after some pattern of normality hatched in a Viennese 
laboratory to which I never professed allegiance; to know that 
this process will never end until either my captors have II'succeeded or I grow wise enough to cheat them with apparent r,I 
li 
-
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that dangerous behaviour In a mentally disordered person is more 
probable and more predictable than in the case of an ordinary 
offender is problematic as a guiding principle. It might be that 
there is a link between mental disorder and dangerousness but not 
inevitably . Bean says that 'there are three possibilities; first 
that a patient may be dangerous and mentally disordered yet, when 
cured of his disorder, he may nonetheless remain dangerous. 
Second, the patient may remain mentally disordered but,over time, 
cease to be dangerous. Third, the patient may continue to be 
mentally disordered and continue to be dangerous or, conversely, 
cease to be mentally disordered and likewise cease to be 
dangerous'[81].
It is noted that accidents with cars and guns, for example, 
play a large part in our daily lives by comparison to the danger 
posed by people who are acquitted by reason of insanity . In 
general, it is said that the rate of recidivism among those 
discharged from prison is more than double that of people 
acquitted by reason of insanity[82]. For legal purposes, it is 
undoubtedly very hard to define and identify dangerous offenders 
sufficiently. The objections of critics relate to the concept of 
dangerousness itself and to the idea that human behaviour is 
predictable. Kozol and et al. say that 'it is impossible to 
divide people sharply into the dangerous and the safe...there is 
no test for dangerousness; there are no clear-cut criteria'[83]. 
Professor N. Morris states that ' since we cannot make reliable
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predictions of dangerous behaviour, considerations of justice 
forbid us to confine people against their wishes in the name of 
public safety for longer periods than we can justify on other 
grounds'[84].
It is said that innocent people will be deprived unjustly of 
their liberty, since predictive judgments are inherently 
questionable. So the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt 
that preventive measures are necessary cannot be met[85]. This is 
so in the nature of the case. The predictive judgment depends 
mainly on the soundness and reliability of an assessment of a 
person's disposition to inflict harm. Thus, it cannot depend on 
our being certain that the person will commit some specific 
crime. "Proof beyond reasonable doubt" relates to our degree of 
certainty that someone committed such a crime in the past. It 
cannot be applied to some unascertained offence in the future. 
Accordingly, what level of probability that non-responsible 
mental disordered person will cause serious harm should be 
required?.
There are two kinds of mistake which may be made in the 
course of deciding whether or not a non-responsible mentally 
disordered person should be considered dangerous. First, he may 
be detained for a long duration, although, in reality, if he was 
discharged would commit no further crimes. Secondly, he may be 
discharged and cause serious harm. Professor N. Morris states
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that there are two false positive predictions for every one 
correct positive prediction. It follows that there are two false 
predictions that a non-responsible mentally disordered person 
will commit a serious harm if he were discharged for every one 
correct prediction[86]. Similary, it is accepted by the Floud 
Report that the false positive rate for predictions of serious 
harm is at least 50 per cent[87].
Walker says that ‘we have not succeeded in providing 
criteria which would ensure that a prediction of future violence 
would be right more often than it would be wrong. With the 
present criteria, it would more often be wrong'[88]. Accordingly, 
there is no justification for detention (compulsory treatment) 
when we know that many-and perhaps most-of such predictions are 
false. It is clearly unjust to detain "false positives" in order 
to restrain "correct positives". Accordingly, protective 
sentencing requires a moral and not merely an empirical 
justification. As Floud and Young argue ' if it is rational to 
decide the morality of punishing people for the harmful 
consequences of their past behaviour with reference to their 
intentions and motives and state of mind and circumstances, it 
cannot be irrational to take these considerations into account 
when deciding on the morality of preventing them from causing 
harm by their behaviour in the future[89].
Thus protective sentencing raises the problem of justice.
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Hart emphasises that if detention (compulsory treatment) is used 
as a substitution for the punishment which the non-responsible 
mentally disordered person would otherwise receive, it contains 
the idea of society's moral disapproval and resentment which is a 
feature of punishment[90].
Some critics have said that we place in quarantine people 
who are known to be carrying diseases, such as typhoid and 
smallpox. Such patients have been detained in hospital by 
Justices of the Peace until they have recovered from their 
infections diseases according to section 38 of Public Health 
(Control of Disease) Act 1984[90A]. How does this differ morally 
from restraining a non- responsible mentally disordered person 
who is dangerous in order to secure the protection of society? It 
is said that carriers of disease are dangerous to others and we 
do not hesitate to place restrictions on their freedom of action. 
It is said that public health is not more important than public 
safety. What then differentiates the protective sentencing of 
non- responsible mentally disordered persons from the 
quarantining of disease carriers and makes it morally 
questionable?[91].
Even if we submit that the quarantining of disease carriers 
Is not morally wrong, as those critics say, it is not very 
difficult to reply their questions. As stated above, the maximum 
proportion of "correct positive" to "false positive" in the
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situation of non-responsible mentally disordered persons who will 
commit serious harm is at most 50%, while the likelihood may be 
up to 100% of patients who are carrying diseases affecting public 
health. The injustice is clearer in the former case than the 
latter. On the other hand the protective detention (compulsory 
treatment) is used as a substitute or extension of punishment so 
it contains the idea of society's moral disapproval. There Is no 
feature like this in the situation of quarantine for disease 
carriers. Ten says that ' the difficulty is that, unlike the 
person who is quarantined, he lives under the shadow of the 
offence that he has already committed which is the moral basis 
for his punishment, and also unavoidably part of the basis for 
his allegedly non-punitive protective sentence'[92].
Let us then adopt the optimistic assumption, for the 
remainder of this argument, that the false positives, as Floud 
and Young state, are 50%. After first testing this rate in 
relation to ordinary dangerous offenders, I shall turn to the 
situation of non- responsible mentally disordered persons to 
infer how we can deal with them according to Hart's approach.
It is obvious that courts, according to the sentencing 
policy, have a wide discretion when they impose punishment on an 
offender. There is a maximum limit of punishment in each crime. 
It is rarely that the courts impose the maximum limit of 
punishment on ordinary offenders when they have committed crimes
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for the first time, but when they find out from some 
circumstances that the offender is dangerous and he may commit 
serious harm against public in future (e.g. offenders who commit 
murder with malice aforethought), they may impose the maximum 
punishment as a "protective sentence". According to the 
statistical studies above, imposing protective sentences like 
this on ordinary dangerous offenders means that half of them will 
be detained much longer than is actually warranted, because they 
would not commit serious harm in future, if they were released. 
On the other hand, if there were no protective sentences, half of 
them would commit serious harm against the public. As a result, 
it is clear that there is injustice to half of those offenders 
who would not commit any serious harm, if they were discharged. 
The latter offenders are called "unlucky offenders"[93]. Since we 
can not know which are "unlucky offenders" and which are "the 
dangerous offenders", it is necessary for both offenders to 
suffer to protect one potential victim.
According to the utilitarian point of view, it is acceptable
to impose a protective sentence on an offender if we are sure
that this would prevent him from committing a serious crime and
the harm that would be caused by punishment is less than the harm 
of the crime. The incapacity of the offender to commit serious 
crime while detained is part of the utilitarian justification of 
punishment. It is obvious that the utilitarian justifications do 
not cover all of the relevant considerations[94]. One might.
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therefore, justify the practice by saying that the harm caused by 
imposing protective sentences on two offenders might, on 
utilitarian grounds, be regarded as a lesser evil than allowing 
harm to come to the potential victim. Any protective sentencing, 
as is already mentioned, raises the problem of justice. The 
reason is that the predictions of dangerousness are not very 
reliable[95]. So there is a problem concerning distributive 
justice. Floud and Young in their report say that 'they 
(predictions of dangerousness of offenders) should be judged 
according to their purpose, which is to state the conditions for 
assessing and effecting a just distribution of certain risks of 
grave harm: the grave harm that potentially recidivist serious 
offenders may do their unknown victims and the grave harm which 
is suffered by offenders if they are subjected to the hardship of 
preventive measures which risk being unnecessary because they 
depend on predictive judgements of their conduct which are 
inherently uncertain'[96]. It is said that the protective 
sentencing here keeps the balance between punishing the unlucky 
offender and protecting a potential victim. In other words there 
would surely be additional victims of serious crimes equal to 
these who are 'unlucky offenders', if there is no protective 
sentencing.
If we think about this proportionality, we can find that it 
is difficult to accept the balance. On the one hand, it is 
difficult to limit the proportionality of the victims in a
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specific sense, because any victim has his special circumstances 
which affect his situation. That is to say, some persons have 
ability to prevent such harm by themselves and others can be 
protected by other people or the police. On the other hand , 
since the offenders will receive the protective sentencing in any 
case, they will also receive the society's moral disapproval 
which is a feature of punishment[97]. So, this feature which 
affects the "unlucky offender" in addition to the harm of 
punishment, is not received by the victim of crime. These inexact 
matters have a negative effect on distributive justice.
Even if we assume that the distributive justice in this case 
is correct, the "unlucky offenders", according to Hart's approach 
(choosing system), should have a fair opportunity to avoid the 
protective sentencing. Accordingly, the protective sentencing 
should apply to those who have committed at least two similar 
serious offences. Then any offender who commits a first offence 
can be reminded of the existence of such protective sentencing. 
So the risk of being an "unlucky offender" is one that he may 
choose to avoid.
The commission of crimes, however, by mentally disordered 
persons lacks the features of choice or control which are 
essential in criminal responsibility. It is impossible, 
therefore, according to Hart's theory, to subject them to the 
same principles that apply to ordinary offenders. My main thesis
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is that some persons with mental disorder do not have the ability 
to "understand" or "choose" and these persons can not be 
justifiably punished according to Hart's approach to punishment. 
It can be argued that small numbers of mentally disordered 
persons who can, with a high degree of probability, be predicted 
to cause serious harm in the future, require some preventive 
detention (compulsory treatment) as we shall see later. In such 
specific cases justice must give way to the protection of the 
public. At the same time the treatment should be relevant to the 
own interests of the patient and for his benefit. In Chapter Two, 
it was said that Hart's approach is a version of a modified 
retributive theory. Hart merges utilitarian and retributive 
theory aims in his approach[98]. He emphasises that the general 
justification aim of punishment is reducing crimes (utilitarian 
aim) and desert of punishment, including its distribution, is the 
retributive aim. According to Hart's view the desert of 
punishment has two faces: One of them is the principles which may 
justify punishment as a general justification aim. One can call 
this face the "public face" which is justifying the general aim 
of the punitive system (the utilitarian one of protecting society 
from the harm caused by crime). The other face is the principles 
of justice which restrict the application of punishment to only 
those who have voluntarily broken the law. One can call this face 
the "personality face". Thus, according to Hart's approach, the 
desert of punishment and its distribution are a result of 
combining of "justice" and "utility" (public and personality
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faces)[99]. But, according to Hart's approach, punishment in an 
extreme situation may reflect the public face only. Then justice 
(the personality face) may have to be sacrificed. So in extreme 
situation Hart allows for the possibility of utilitarian 
considerations overriding the principles of justice and the scope 
of punishment will be extended to cover the detention of those 
who are innocent persons such as mentally disordered people in 
mental hospital. It can be inferred from this analysis that 
society has a right to protect itself from dangerous mentally 
disordered persons, both "responsible" and "non-responsible".
But, what kind of prevention or detention can be imposed on 
non-responsible mentally disordered persons who are found 
dangerous, if we realise that Hart also emphasises the point that 
we must not use the individual's liberty for the benefit of 
society?. In order to practice the utilitarian aim (public face) 
to produce such a protective sentence, as I suppose, we must make 
a balance between this aim (utilitarian aim) and the individual's 
liberty. In general a person should not be deprived of his 
liberty unless that is essential and, if this happens, he should 
not be deprived of his liberty for a longer duration than is 
necessary. Accordingly the law should facilitate treatment where 
it is possible and available.
Nonetheless, the courts in approprate cases, must be able to 
impose protective detention since, as we have already seen.
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society is entitled to protect itself from non-responsible 
dangerous patients in the narrow sense (those who will cause 
serious harm in high probability). In this case, one can make a 
limited sacrificed of the liberty of those patients for purpose 
of treatment in order to protect society[100]. Accordingly the 
balance between the utilitarian aim and individual's liberty is 
kept. How,though, can we define the notion of dangerousness in a 
sufficiently tight and narrow manner? And what kind of treatment 
is appropriate for a dangerous patient in order to affect his 
liberty only to the minimum extent necessary?
When we describe a patient as "dangerous", it means that 
there is a substantial probability of his committing further 
crimes involving serious harm to others. So, the first task has 
to be to define "serious harm" as specifically as possible. It is 
clear now that an assessment of an individual's disposition to 
cause serious harm is a requirement of justice in protective 
detention. The quality of such assessments is the important test 
of a predictive judgment. In any event, any judgment predicting a 
high probability that the dangerous patient may commit serious 
harm, must take into account his circumstances as well as his 
character. That is to say, the risk of serious harm can be 
inferred from the gravity of the crime for which he was tried, 
the history of patient and the likelihood of his mental condition 
disposing him to cause further harms[101]. Some writers think of 
serious harm as serious physical injury only, while for other it
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would also include psychological harm or the loss of or damage to 
property[102].
For present purposes, however, it is not the classification 
of harms according to type that is at issue, but, rather, whether 
protection against the risk of their being perpetrated is 
regarded as more important than the liberty of individual[103]. 
In other words, any type of harm is a serious harm, if it is 
demonstrably grave enough to justify protecting society (by 
limited compulsory treatment for example) from someone who can be 
shown in high probability to be likely to cause it. In such cases 
a therapeutic disposition ought to be considered as long as it 
necessary for public protection. It is obvious that most non- 
responsible patients are not dangerous for many reasons. Some of 
those patients are not mentally ill in the medical sense but are 
insane in the legal sense[104] - for example, those who are
suffering from physical i1Inesses(diabetes ... etc.) which affect 
the brain temporarily. So there is entirely no reason to detain 
them in the mental hospital. Other mentally disordered persons 
may recover after they committed their crimes and during the 
trial. Again, someone might be found not dangerous enough to 
inflict serious harm in high probability. In these cases, it is 
unjust to transfer the patient to mental hospital under 
indefinite detention. If this happens, as has been argued above, 
his liberty will be absolutely used in the benefit of society. 
So, in this situation and the like, he should be released and
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subjected to ordinary treatment which can include, 
psychoanalysis, education, job training, family counselling, 
behaviour modification and drug therapies.
Otherwise, in the few cases where non-responsible patients 
are found "dangerous" and there is high probability of them 
committing serious harm in future, justice must give way to the 
protection of public.This means that detention (compulsory 
treatment) is required. We must bear in mind that it is unjust to 
deprive non-responsible patients of their liberty in an absolute 
way in order to protect society. Accordingly, we should look for 
some sort of detention (compulsory treatment) in which we can 
keep the balance between the utilitarian aim (protection of 
public) and an individual's liberty. In other words, the least 
restrictive order has to be chosen as, also, a care setting which 
is appropriate both to the requirement of the patient for 
treatment and to the right of the society for protection. So, I 
suggest that, when the court believes from the psychiatrist 
reports and other circumstances that there is a danger that a
i-jon—responsible patient may inflict serious harm in high 
probability, a limited detention In the mental hospital is 
required in order to protect the public.
The possibility to be considered initially is the probation 
order. As we have already seen above[105], the probation order is 
a flexible order which will often be suitable when the consent of
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the non- responsible patient and the co-operation of a probation 
officer and a psychiatrist are obtained and the court can review 
its decision in a suitable time[105]. This kind of compulsory 
treatment has the least effect on an individual's liberty. In a 
limited number of cases it is possible that the probation order 
will not be regarded as sufficient to prevent the non-responsible 
patient from causing serious harm. In these cases the court, 
after it is satisfied from psychiatrist reports and other 
circumstances that patient may commit serious harm in high 
probability, should consider a guardianship order. The 
guardianship order may also be considered in cases where the 
patient rejected the probation order and his condition requires 
that he receives some kind of treatment, care rehabilitation, or 
training in the community.
It is obvious that the dangerousness of non-responsible 
patients arise by reason of the illness itself. So those people 
should be dealt with like any other patients who are suffering 
for some other kinds of illness, such as cancer. Accordingly, 
these patients have to have the same fundamental rights as other 
who are suffering from other sorts of illness[106].
Finance should not be a barrier to such orders, as they are 
unlikely to cost much more than hospital orders. The cost of a 
restriction order on a mentally disordered patient in hospital is 
in the region of £30,000 per year or about £600 per week[107].
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So, in order to avoid the use of restriction orders for patients 
who still need treatment and care, guardianship orders under 
observation of professional doctors and social workers may be 
more suitable than other orders.
In order to let people accept the idea of guardianship, they 
must be encouraged to accept it. For example, they have to be 
given a special training, high wages and many other facilities 
such as a special car and a Special house...etc. So, the amount 
of money which is spent for treatment under restriction orders 
can be spent in this field. At present the grounds for 
guardianship are met by a person when:
"(a) he is suffering from mental disorder of a nature or degree 
which warrants his reception into guardianship; and 
(b) it is necessary in the interests of the welfare of the 
patient that he should be so received."[108].
These would have to be extended to include " necessary for 
the protection of others"
At present the powers of the guardianship are limited to :
"(a) power to require the patient to reside at a place specified 
by the authority or person named as guardian.
(b) power to require the patient to attend at places and times 
so specified for the purpose of medical treatment, 
occupation, education or training:
(c) power to require access to the patient to be given, at any 
place where the patient is residing, to any medical
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practitioner, mental health officer or other person so
specified"I1Ü9].
These powers could be extended to include measures necessary 
for the protection of others.
In addition, the powers of access to those placed under a
guardianship order must foe increased. At present those who have 
access are limited to medical practitioners, mental health 
officers or "person so specified". It can be argued that the 
latter category of persons could be extended to include 
relatives, friends and others who may be able to bring a more
"social dimension" to the therapy or general maintenance of those
under guardianship orders.
It should of course be borne in mind that there is scope to 
include suitable places of residence which are not designated as 
hospitals or special institutions. Accordingly, it may be 
possible for such people to reside in places which reflect a more 
socially normal environment where they can receive treatment and 
care. There is at least the possibility of a longer term 
amelioration of the mental condition and thus of the patient's 
behaviour. This is one possible way in which a more just, but 
less restrictive, control over dangerous mentally ill people 
could be put into practice.
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Finally, in very rare cases, some people might not accept 
patients under their guardianship for many reasons such as the 
patient being very dangerous to himself and others. So, in this 
situation, there is no alternative way to deal with them other 
than by a "hospital order". As we have already seen[110], the 
patient will be detained under more secure conditions. It should 
be borne in mind that the living conditions of patients must be 
made of no lesser a standard than that of a disease carrier who 
is quarantined by reason of his disease. This is necessary in 
order to avoid any unusual restriction on the patient’s liberty. 
Any other kinds of order (such as restriction orders for 
unlimited duration) should not be used, because these will affect 
the balance between "utility and liberty".
Since a prediction of non-responsible patients committing 
serious harm is a social policy judgment to be made by the 
community, so, I would argue, a jury in the court at first stage 
should determine whether the patient is dangerous enough to 
inflict serious harm or not according to the evidence of 
psychiatrists and other circumstances such as the patient's 
conduct at home or in public areas. The jury should also 
determine whether the patient needs a limited compulsory 
treatment or not.
It is worthwhile making the distinction between medical 
decisions and public policy decisions. Medical decisions must
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consider the description and diagnosis of mental disorder, the 
formulation and carrying out of treatment plans, and the 
improving of the patient. Public policy decisions, on the other 
hand, which should be taken by court or jury, as I have mentioned 
above, should include the question of what kinds of conduct 
justify intervention by society, and whether the compulsory 
treatment should be imposed, and when the patient should be 
discharged[111].
The procedures (under the three orders) must provide for 
full rights of appeal by the patient or on his behalf to 
challenge evidence and any decisions involving his liberty. At a 
second stage, therefore, the patient must have rights to appeal 
against any kind of order. Since the procedures of the English 
Mental Health Review Tribunals are quasi-judicial in character, I 
think such appeals should be taken to Tribunals. Floud and Young 
say that 'the rules governing their work deal, inter alia, with 
following matters: representation of the offender, his appearance 
before the Tribunal and presence during the hearing of his case; 
disclosure to him or his representative of evidence before the 
Tribunal; the admissibility of evidence; the administration of 
the oath and the power of subpoena; privacy of Tribunal 
proceeding; hearing procedure; decisions and the giving of 
reasons to the offenders' [112] . While there are no Review 
Tribunals in Scotland at present, there is appeal to the Mental 
Walfare Commission for Scotland. It seems that there is no
305
difference between Tribunals and MWC in this matter.
The patient under one of three orders above must have a
right to appeal at any time he wants. The Tribunals or the MWC
should re-examine all such cases from time to time according to 
the medical reports. For example, they should re-examine the 
cases every three or six months even if there is no appeal 
against the orders by the patient or on his behalf.
When the Tribunal or the MWC decides that the patient is no 
longer suffering from any mental disorder which has driven him to 
be dangerous, it should be able to release him without any 
interference from any other authorities such as the Secretary of 
State in Scotland or the Home Secretary in England . In this
situation, more flexibility in favour of the patient's liberty
may be kept .
b— Responsible Mentally Disordered people
In chapters one and two I argued that a person who has 
committed crime with mens rea (someone who understands the 
legally relevant aspects of his conduct or has physical control 
over his movements to obey the law) has to be responsible for 
it[113]. Hart says that such people are responsible because they 
may choose to avoid committing the crime. Accordingly they 
deserve punishment.
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There are two courses which a court can take when it 
considers that a mentally disordered offender is dangerous and it 
wishes to ensure that he remains in custody until he represents 
less of a risk to others:
First, the court can add a "restriction order" to the hospital 
order, with or without a limited of duration of discharge, if 
doctors state that the offender is mentally disordered, that his 
condition is treatable, for whom a bed in hospital is available, 
and if the court considers that this step is necessary for the 
protection of the public against serious harm[114].
Secondly, a life sentence may be used as an alternative course, 
if the crime which is committed is one of those for which life 
imprisonment is allowed if the offender's mental state amounts to 
mental disorder, and if there is difficulty in finding a bed in 
hospital. N. Walker states that the life sentence is limited to : 
aggravated burglary, arson, buggery, criminal damage intended to 
endanger life, grievous bodily harm, intercourse or incest with a 
girl under 13 years of age, kidnapping, manslaughter, murder, and 
rape[115].
British law depends on the discretion of the courts more 
than on any carefully considered principles. It does so in an 
unpredictable way. We have already seen in section 3 above that 
the restriction order has been imposed in many trivial cases 
because the court is satisfied that the restriction order is 
necessary to protect the public from serious harm[116]. Some
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decisions show that the court has to be satisfied from the three 
conditions below before it imposes life imprisonment;
a) Where the offences are in themselves grave enough to require 
a very long sentence. Recent decisions show that the crime 
has to justify a sentence of at least seven years 
imprisonment[117].
b) Where it appears from the nature of the offence or from the 
defendant's history that he is a person of unstable 
character likely to commit such offences in the future. It 
is emphasised that there has to be medical evidence of
mental disturbance[118]. By reason of failure to meet this 
requirement, many life sentences have been quashed[119].
c) Where if such offences are committed the consequences to
others may be specially injurious, as in the case of sexual
offences or crimes of violence[120].
In fact these procedures involve a conflict between the
logical practice of the sentencing process on the one hand and 
the practice of theories of punishment on the other.
Further, in the logical practice of the sentencing process
itself there is a conflict between criteria of "diminished
punishability"[121] (according to this principle offenders should 
get a mitigated sentence by reason of impairment of mind 
(diminished responsibility)), and the actual practice where the 
court can use a life sentence against them after they have been
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convicted of crimes. It is difficult to accept such practices as 
these.
On the other hand there is a conflict between utility and 
justice. It is clear that when the court imposes a restriction 
order for indefinite duration or life imprisonment on the 
mentally disordered offender in order to protect the public from 
serious harm[122], his liberty will be absolutely used in the 
benefit of the public. Accordingly this kind of practice will 
lose the balance between utility and justice because the offender 
may be detained longer than he would serve in prison. So, what is 
the appropriate means of avoiding these conflicts?
It is suggested that the restriction order, even if it is 
used for the purpose of care and treatment, should not last 
longer than a duration in proportion to the gravity of the crime 
and the history of the offender. It is wrong and unjust to deal 
with a mentally disordered offender more severely than warranted 
the gravity of the crime which he committed[123]. Hoggett says 
that 'people who break their responsibilities towards society are 
normally punished but their punishment must be in proportion to 
the offence. Punishment should fit crimes whether trivial or 
serious. If then we are going to hold a man responsible, we 
should accord him the right to minimal proportionality, as the 
judges seem prepared to do'[124].
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It seems to me that this approves involves a mixed procedure 
between punishment and treatment. In other words, the treatment 
is being used as substitute for punishment at a time when we 
should separate them. Hart does not agree that punishment should 
be substituted by compulsory treatment. He criticises Wootton 
when she says that punishment and compulsory treatment are just 
alternatives methods of dealing with a person in the society. 
Hart nevertheless defends the need to keep mens rea. Hart argues 
that, if as Wootton says, the formal distinction between hospital 
and prisons disappears, then there is a moral objection. His
moral objection is, as has been already mentioned in chapter two, 
that "treatment" contains an element of resentment and public 
disapproval[125].
Hart also says that some writers and courts admit that to 
substitute compulsory treatment for punishment is a compromise. 
It is a compromise because:
i~ The courts power to order compulsory treatment is
discretionary and even if the courts have medical evidence, 
they can still use conventional punishment if they want to. 
ii- The law still keeps the idea of penal methods, such as
prison, because these are seen as a payment for past 
behaviour and not just as an alternative to medical
treatment.
Hart says that the courts may order medical treatment or
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punishment, but that they do not combine them. This is because 
the courts do not think of punishment and treatment as different 
forms of "social hygiene" which can be used according to their 
effects on the person concerned.
The other reason it is considered to be a compromise is 
because the courts mostly use this power at the stage of 
sentencing, after the conviction stage of the criminal process. 
As has been already seen in chapter one, mens rea has to be 
proved for the purpose of conviction and we have seen the link 
between mens rea and criminal responsibility[126]. Hart 
emphasises that punishment is used to deter the individual and 
other people by example. So its severity is adjusted accordingly. 
Medical treatment .however, is not used to deter people in this 
fashion. Punishment such as imprisonment contains an element of 
society's disapproval of those who break the law. Hart says that 
we lose both these elements (deterrence and disapproval) by 
substituting compulsory treatment for punishment. This argument 
attaches importance to the idea that the criminal law is 
effective when there is public disapproval and deterrence by 
example.
It is clear from the above that Hart does not lend his full 
support to the substitution of compulsory treatment for 
punishment, although he acknowledges some of the merits of 
statutes such as the Mental Health Act[127]. It is worth
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emphasising here that Hart does not say that compulsory treatment 
in this sense is not punishment. For if he meant that, how could 
he defend his ideas about individual liberty?. It is obvious that 
sometimes compulsory treatment in this sense is worse than 
ordinary punishment[128]. Any detention order, even if the 
intention is to care for and treat mentally disordered people, 
involves a deprivation of liberty. So Hart's idea seems to be 
that treatment should not be used as punishment.
In spite of the fact that limited compulsory treatment 
affects the individual's liberty, it must not be used as a 
substitute for punishment. It should be used "treatment"to cure 
patients and, as much as possible, not to punish them. The one 
approach might be for the patient offender to be removed from a 
system which essentially deals with people in a criminal context 
and managed by a system which has little reference to crime, 
criminals, criminal courts and criminal procedure. For example, 
once an offender has been examined by psychiatrists along with a 
team of other professionals, e.g. lawyers, psychologists, social 
workers, and is found to be suffering from some form or degree 
of mental illness, then at this stage a decision should be made 
as to whether a criminal process should apply, or whether a "non­
criminal" system should be followed. Obviously, a crucial 
question is who decides what system the "offender" should 
undergo?. Some would argue that if the offender is in a position 
to, i.e. has the mental capacity, understand the significance of
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the different procedures, then it is clear that the decision 
ought to be left to the offender. In other instances, the 
decision ought to be left to a committee of professionals. The 
net effect would be to "decriminalise*' the potential 
circumstances in which a mentally disordered offender may find 
him or herse1f.
This approach is, however, a questionable one. It is unjust 
to "decriminalise" the procedure against somebody who was 
responsible for his crime even if he becomes mentally disordered 
after conviction or sentencing. Those responsible offenders had 
mens rea (choice) when they committed crimes, so they have to be 
punished. It is said that '...to convict and punish him is to 
report his status as a responsible agent who can and should 
answer for his action'[129].
The amount of punishment should be fixed according to many 
circumstances, for example, the degree of mental disorder, the 
gravity of the crime, the antecedents of the offender and so on. 
The treatment of a mentally disordered offender is a different 
matter. It must be separated from the procedure of sentencing. 
Thus, mentally disordered offenders who are responsible for their 
crimes must be convicted and sentenced. In this case, those 
offenders and those who have already been in prison are the same.
It is submitted that prison is unsuitable for mentally
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disordered offenders because it may be a damaging environment for 
them and they may be discharged without treatment or even in 
worse mental condition than before[1301. In consequence, they 
must be given special attention. There should be procedures to 
allow such people get appropriate treatment. One possibility is 
that mentally disordered offenders may get their treatment in 
prison. The problems which can be recognised in such system are: 
First: There is mostly little support from prison authorities 
for the efforts of mental health professionals[131].
Secondly: It is clear that the environment of prisons is not apt 
or helpful to cure the mentally disordered prisoner.
Thirdly: If the mentally disordered prisoner is not directly
under medical supervision, he may cause serious harm against 
other prisoners.
Another approach to the cure of this kind of prisoners is to 
apply a "Transfer Direction Order"[132]. It seems that this 
procedure is more appropriate in cases of persons who are serving 
sentence of less than a year or who are awaiting trial for 
trivial crimes. Prisoners under a longer sentence (more than one 
year), however, need a higher degree of security than a hospital 
or clinic has the ability to keep or desire to be responsible 
for. N. Walker states that '...no hospital or clinic is willing 
to accept them as patients.... The unwillingness of hospitals is 
excusable when...the individual offender will interfere with the 
smooth running of the hospital or the peace of mind of other
314
patients' 1133].
Thus, in order to avoid these difficulties, I propose that 
the most acceptable solution in this field is to adopt a mixed or 
dual system of management involving elements of both prison and 
hospital. Accordingly there should be two kinds of staff; the 
staff which deals with "offenders" as patients who need to be 
cured has to be from the mental health system, and the other 
staff which keeps the high security has to be from prison 
system. This system, must, however, be concentrated on the 
treatment of prisoners. A prisoner must not be held in the mixed 
system longer than the period of his sentence. The responsibility 
of each type of staff will be independent. Accordingly,the 
specific aims of each system will be achieved (the Mental Health 
System and the Prison System).
In order to avoid the long procedure which is practised by 
the Secretary of State in Scotland and the Home Secretary in 
England, the decision to transfer the mentally disordered 
prisoner to the mixed system must be made by courts at the first 
stage according to the medical evidence and other circumstances. 
In addition, the courts have ability to fulfil the requirement of 
justice better than any other authorities through these 
procedures.
At the second stage, the mentally disordered prisoners must
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have full rights to appeal against these decisions to a Tribunal 
or MWC at any time they want. These decisions must be reviewed by 
the Tribunal or MWC from time to time(e.g. every three or six 
months). The tribunal or MWC must have power to make one of the 
decisions below:
i-~ The tribunal or MWC can expire the detention of the prisoner 
in the mixed system when it establishes that the mentally 
disordered prisoner is no longer suffering from any mental 
disorder. In this situation the prisoner must be returned to 
an ordinary prison to complete the duration of his sentence.
ii- If the period of the prisoner's sentence has expired, he 
must be discharged from the detention in the mixed system 
without further restriction, but the Tribunal or MWC must 
also have power to transfer him to an ordinary mental 
hospital under limited compulsory treatment (probation 
order, guardianship order and hospital order) when it is 
satisfied that he is still suffering from a mental disorder 
from which he may in high probability commit serious harm 
against others. In others words, once mentally disordered 
prisoners have completed their sentences, they are no longer 
to be treated as responsible for their crimes. So, there is 
no reason to detain them under the mixed system or the 
prison system. If, though, there is a high probability of 
serious harm being caused to society by a patient who is 
still suffering from mental illness,there is good reason for 
justice to give way to utility ( protection of public).
,. a
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'  ::In this case the safety of society leads to sacrifice of a
■Ipart of an individual's liberty. As a result, the procedures -I
which have to be applied to non-responsible mentally disordered 
people, as they have already been explained above, must be
applied to responsible mentally disordered people who have ||
completed their sentencing in the mixed system but have still 
been found mentally disordered and dangerous to themselves and 
others.
From this argument, it appears that the present British
system in respect of the sentencing process of mentally 
disordered people - both responsible and non-responsible - is not 
just.
It must be recognised that the disposal and management of 
"mentally disordered" offenders are sources of public and 
professional concern. Indeed, however variously they may be 
labelled as "offenders", "criminals" or "patients", these
individuals present a number of problems for the legal, penal and
psychiatric professions. In the final analysis, what is required 
is a system which manages such people in a background which
exists to protect and promote the welfare and sense of
responsibility of all members of society.
Since a modified Hartian approach requires a separation 
between treatment and punishment, as we have already seen above.
314 4
the mixed system fits both with theories of punishment in general 
and Hart's ideas in particular.
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C H A P T E R  S I X  
C O NC LUS IO NS
In this thesis, I have argued that, to understand the 
meaning of "criminal responsibility", which in a broader sense 
would cover certain aspects of the criminal law (such as mens 
rea) as it applied to normal adults and normal crime, it is first 
necessary to analyse the concept of crime. From the analysis of 
the concept of crime presented in chapter 1[11, it is clear that 
a study of mental disorder and the criminal law has to consider 
both the nature and aim of punishment and the nature of criminal 
procedure.
A comprehensive definition of crime is difficult because the 
courts or legislature determine the elements which establish the 
nature of criminal conduct. There is no objective criterion in 
terms of the conduct being harmful or wrongful. The significance 
of this is that what amounts to a crime will vary from time to 
time and place to place. Therefore, in order to understand the 
nature of crime, a proper understanding of the elements of crime, 
rather than its specific content, is required. We saw that it is 
invariably true that a crime requires an act or "actus reus", 
which contains all the elements of the offence except the 
accused’s mental state. Further, actus reus normally needs to be 
accompanied by mens rea for there to be a crime[2].
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We have also seen that the concept of mens rea has been used 
in two different senses. Firstly, mens rea has been used to refer 
to the different "mental elements", e.g. intention, recklessness 
and negligence. Most crimes generally require these mental 
elements in their definition. Secondly, also mens rea has been 
used as a synonym for "criminal responsibility"[3]. A fundamental 
principle of criminal law is that before a person can be 
convicted of any crime his act or omission has to be a voluntary 
one. Although in Chapter one, we saw that the classification of 
voluntariness in relation to the first sense of mens rea faces 
problems, its relevance to the second sense is clear.
Thus it appears that mens rea in the second sense can be 
thought of as at the centre of the idea of criminal 
responsibility. Mens rea in the second sense explains its 
importance in the first sense, which refers to those mental 
elements of conduct which are necessary for particular criminal 
conviction and punishment. Accordingly, to act with mens rea is 
to act without an excuse and vice versa. Justifications are, 
however, separate[4]. So mens rea lies at the centre of the law 
of excuses, including the insanity plea.
Before we came to the crucial point in this thesis, namely 
the effect of mental illness on the issue of criminal 
responsibility and its consequences for the sentencing process.
332
it was necessary to examine which theory of punishment and 
excuses is appropriate for defences of insanity. In Chapter two, 
I argued that punishment, as Feinberg wrote, 'is a ... device for 
the expression of attitudes of resentment and indignation and of 
judgement of disapproval'[5]. It is quite difficult to define 
punishment precisely.
Justifications of punishment according to utilitarian 
theories are to be found in a future good, in this case the 
result of the punishment, the relevant good consequences. So, if 
threat of punishment has no effect in deterring the offender or 
others from committing an offence, it will be of no use as a
punishment. Accordingly, if insanity were an excuse, it might be
true that the threat of punishment would not be as useful in
deterring non-insane offenders from pretending that they are 
insane in order to cheat juries or courts. It is argued that the 
justifications of good consequences according to these theories 
are such that the innocent individual might be made to suffer if 
this deters others or is protective of society[6].
According to the retributive theory, "moral guilt" is
regarded as a necessary and sufficient condition for criminal 
responsibility regardless of any reformation or prevention. 
Anybody who has done harm shall suffer harm. This means that the 
basis of criminal responsibility must be the voluntary doing of a 
morally wrong act forbidden by penal law. Accordingly, excusing
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conditions are justified in that no one should be punished in the 
absence of the basic condition of "moral guilt"[71. The general 
principle of criminal liability is to punish only those who have 
committed moral wrongs proscribed by law as intentional or 
reckless,
Having surveyed the competing theories, I concluded, in
Chapter two, that Hart's rationale is an acceptable version of a 
moderate retributive theory which incorporates the ideas of
fairness and justice and asserts the value of individual liberty.
It is argued by Hart that it is unjust and unfair to use 
individuals to the benefit of the society unless they have the 
capacity and a fair opportunity to obey the law. It is said that 
if acts and omissions are not themselves voluntary or are not the 
foreseeable consequences of other voluntary acts and omissions, 
it is unjust to hold individuals criminally responsible for them. 
The need of excusing conditions, in Hart's view, is to emphasise 
'the much more nearly universal ideas of fairness or justice and 
the value of individual liberty'[81.
Hart's argument rests on a "choosing system" in which
individuals can find out, in general terms at least, the costs
they have to pay if they act in a certain way. According to this 
idea, individuals should not be held responsible when they cannot 
have "chosen" to disobey the law. In light of Hart's view, if the
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removal of legal excuses reduces crime, as utilitarian theory 
claims, then the essential benefits may lie in the evidence of 
harm, like physical and mental suffering, being reduced and not 
on the increase in individual liberty. The existence of legal 
excuses is one of the aspects of freedom. It was found that, 
according to Hart's theory, the utilitarian theory is inadequate 
to give an account of all the excusing conditions.
The purpose of a "choosing system" as Hart said, is to 
prevent future crimes in a fair manner and not to punish immoral 
offenders or to pay back harm that offenders have done, as 
retributivists claimed. Whereas, Hart's approach to justice gives 
an individual more freedom to use the excusing conditions for his 
benefit, and because the retributivist approach is restricted by 
"legal moralism" in this matter, so the principle of justice 
according to Hart's rationale is wider than the justice which is 
adopted by the retributivist[9].
I argued in chapter two that Hart's analysis should be 
applied because it is less rigid than either the utilitarian 
approach or the retributivist theory; it incorporates the idea 
that punishment should be useful and also makes a realistic 
attempt to reconcile punishment with the concepts of justice and 
fairness. But, in extreme cases. Hart admits that justice should 
give way to the utilitarian aim. So in this situation an innocent 
person can be punished to protect society. Hart’s emphasis on
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individual liberty, however, allows us to seek a balance between 
"utilitarian aim" and "liberty" when we impose any punishment or 
detention on an innocent person. A wide practice of this idea, 
as illustrated in this thesis, was with mentally disordered 
people who are found "not guilty by reason of insanity" or 
"insane in bar of trial" or insane after conviction or in while 
prison[10].
Before turning to find out how much Hart's theory bears on 
criminal responsibility (insanity defences) and punishment (the 
sentencing process), I examined the meaning of mental illness in 
the legal and medical senses and the role of psychiatrists in the 
determination of criminal responsibility. We saw, in Chapter 3, 
that some undesirable mental conditions respond to treatment or 
therapy and can therefore be called "mental illness". So, since 
psychopathic disorders need the appropriate cure, and can be 
affected by treatment, psychopathy can be regarded within the 
group of mental illnesses[11]. Mental handicap, on the other 
hand, cannot be cured, although it can be improved by education, 
and social care, so that it can not be regarded within the group 
of mental illness but may be regarded as a form of mental 
disorder[12].
We saw that a verdict of insanity is not a judgement about 
mental illness or handicap but about whether these and other 
facts lead the judge or jury to excuse the accused from the
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action taken. Therefore, while the psychiatrist may be an expert 
at assessing the existence of mental disorder, he is not an 
expert at assessing the accused's criminal responsibility. The 
duty of the psychiatrist is to diagnose the mental disorder of 
the offender and the duty of the court is to determine the effect 
of this mental disorder on the offender's capacity or choice at 
the time the alleged crime was committed or on the offender's 
ability to defend in bar of trial and to say whether this is 
sufficient to excuse him. So the court only determines 
"responsibility” for the accused[13]. I examined the meaning of 
mental disorder in the medical sense and the link between them 
and crimes[14]. As a general rule in the U.K. and Iraq, the role 
of the psychiatrist in the present legal process is not properly 
defined and the extent to which judges ought to rely on
psychiatric and medical evidence and experts is not properly 
understood. In other words, there is no formal method within 
British system for deciding whether certain kinds of expert 
evidence are or are not acceptable for reception in legal 
proceedings. It is argued by Kenny that experts, according to the
present system, may usurp the functions of the jury or judge, by
"testifying to the naked conclusion", instead of providing 
information about the accused to assist the jury or jujâe in 
making the ultimate judgment about responsibility and sentence. 
Equally, they may usurp the functions of the legislature by
testifying on the basis of convictions of general policy, e.g. 
that people who are mentally ill in a certain way should not be
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sent to prison[14A]. Also, Hodgkinson believes that the expert 
may fail to tell the whole truth or to point out contradictory 
information. He says as well that 'the difficulty is that the 
courts haven't yet clearly defined the duties of an expert 
witness, and it is time this was done. Just as barristers have a 
professional duty to inform the court of any previous court
decisions or statutory duties which run counter to the argument 
they are advancing, if these have not otherwise been drawn to the 
court's attention, so expert witnesses could be placed under an 
analogous duty where scientific fact or 1 ike 1ihoods would
otherwise be denied the court'[14B]. In the light of such
considerations, I have argued that the criminal law should accept 
psychiatric testimony purely as one aspect of evidence relevant 
to legal responsibility or non-responsibility.
Hart submits that the existence of excusing conditions
weakens the effect of general deterrence. Arguments for having 
the defence of insanity are, therefore, further weakened[15]. 
However, I agreed with Hart that the defence of insanity is and 
ought to be kept because the demands of deterrence should give
way to the ideas of fairness and justice - the simplest reason
being that "it is unfair to punish the insane person, because he 
did not choose to break the law". We saw that the English test of 
insanity (the McNaughten Rules) is not appropriate because it 
does not include the case of menta1ly disordered people who
lacked the ability to control their conduct (irresistible
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impulse). A person may understand very well what he is doing and 
may know that it is wrong and be nevertheless legally insane[lô).
In Chapter four it was noted that despite the fact that the
Scots Law on the test of insanity as a defence is flexible and
unsettled, it is clear from the case H .M . Adv. Kidd that the
causal approach which is that "the insane person is not
responsible if he committed an act which is a product of his 
insanity" is the best test adopted[17]. Lord Strachan's view in 
this case concentrates on "sane understanding". Accordingly, if 
somebody knows the nature and quality of his act and its 
unlawfulness, but he has not "a sane understanding of the 
circumstances of his act", he will be non-responsible. It appears 
that the causal approach is wider than the English test in the 
McNaughten Rules because the former includes something like the 
test of "Irresistible impulse". The McNaughten Rules concentrate 
only on the "capacity" (knowledge or understanding), while the 
causal approach includes "capacity" and "choice" (freewill or 
control).
The Iraqi Penal Code in Article (60) adopts the "causal 
approach" to the test of insanity, although the Iraqi Courts are 
unsure about which direction to take[18]. On the other hand 
diminished responsibility in England is interpreted more 
favourably to the accused than in Scotland. In Scotland it would 
appear that an element of disease is essential to the plea.
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whereas in England the plea may succeed where the reduction of 
responsibility is caused by external factors which have affected 
the mind[19].
Since the defence of "insanity in bar of trial" leads to 
injustice, because an accused will be detained in mental hospital 
for a long time, possibly for the rest of his life, although he 
may be innocent and not dangerous to society, I suggested this 
defence should be abolished. It is obvious that there is no 
reason for fairness to give way to the protection of the society 
in such a situation because there is no dangerous offender and no 
serious harm which may justify the sacrifice of justice. 
According to this solution such people will be either found 
responsible and deserve full punishment or diminished 
punishability or not responsible and they will not deserve 
punishment by reason of insanity or there is no case to answer 
against them[20].
1
I,#
The effect of diminished responsibility operates essentially 
as mitigating the gravity of an offence and opening the 
possibility of more flexible sentencing in "murder"[211. I favour 
this because it is the absence of control rather than its cause
■
which matters. A powerful objection to the plea of diminished 
responsibility, however, is that it has not operated in offences 
other than homicide. With the limited number of existing 
offences to which it applies the opportunity to reduce offences
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by diminished responsibility is restricted. However, it is 
impossible in all cases to reduce the offence to the lower 
category. An example of this is cases of theft where the only 
other alternative is to reduce the sentence rather than the 
charge. It seems that diminished responsibility can only operate 
where there exists a suitable lesser offence with which the
accused may be convicted[22]. Thus I agree with Gordon and the 
Butler Committee when they suggest that the plea is really only 
logical if one considers it as a form of "diminished 
punishability" rather than "diminished responsibility"[23]. The 
Iraqi Law in this matter agrees with Gordon and the Butler
Committee view[24].
It is clear from both law and practice that British legal 
systems adopt pure utilitarian aims (protection of society) in 
the sentencing process of mentally disordered people whether 
responsible or non-responsible. We have seen that the court may 
take two courses to deal with a mentally disordered offender who 
is convicted by the court of an offence, other than murder 
punishable with life imprisonment. Firstly, in order to protect
the public from serious harm, the court can add a "restriction
order" to the hospital order for limited or unlimited duration. 
The Home Secretary and the Secretary of State in Scotland are the 
ones who have the power to release such offenders. Secondly, a 
life sentence may be used as an alternative course, if the crime 
which is committed is one of those for which life imprisonment
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may be imposed, if the offender's mental state amounts to mental 
disorder and if there is difficulty in finding a bed in 
hospital[25].
In principle, the court should decide whether punishment or 
treatment is appropriate and make its choice according to its
findings. The example was given of a case where it was decided
that an offender who deserved treatment could be sent to prison, 
even though he qualified for a hospital order and a suitable bed 
was available[26].
In reality, in the present British system there is no clear 
guideline for "serious harm" in order to justify the "restriction 
order". Sometimes, it is considered that "violence" and "more 
serious sexual offences" are the criteria to determine "serious 
harm"[27]. On other occasions, the maximum term of imprisonment 
has been regarded as a good criterion to decide "serious 
harm"[28]. Some recent cases have decided that neither the 
gravity of the crime nor the maximum term of imprisonment are 
important to determine "serious harm"[29]. So the restriction 
order or life imprisonment may be imposed by the court
artificially even where there is no sign of "serious harm" which
might be inflicted by mentally disordered offenders[30]. Thus, it 
is obvious that the restriction order is not a therapeutic 
disposal but is used as a form of punishment. Further, it is 
sometimes worse than punishment, especially when mentally
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disordered offenders spend a longer time in detention in mental 
hospital than the duration of punishment which would ordinarily 
he given.
It is also recognised that a person who has been acquitted 
by a jury after a successful insanity defence is usually ordered 
by the court to be detained in a mental hospital. In serious 
cases detention in a mental hospital normally involves an 
unlimited restriction order, so the person will remain in mental 
hospital until released by order of the Home Secretary or the 
Secretary of State for Scotland, This does not happen until he is 
considered not dangerous to the public as judged by the medical 
reports. It is said that past behaviour is a good indicator of 
future behaviour and, accordingly, it is presumed that the mental 
disorder of the accused continues up to the time of committal and 
it is supposed that mentally ill persons are more dangerous than 
other offenders[313 .
On Hart's approach this open-ended detention would appear to 
be unjust. Further, it is not obvious that it is necessary for 
the protection of others. Accordingly, protective sentencing 
raises the problem of justice.
In order to suggest a remedy for this problem of justice, in 
Chapter five, two main groups were identified;
1. Non-responsible mentally disordered persons who are found
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"not guilty by reason of insanity".
2. Responsible mentally disordered person who are found guilty
or sentenced or in prison.
It was argued that there is a conflict in the present 
procedures both in law and in practice. On the one hand, how can 
it be justified for the court to acquit somebody by reason of 
being non-responsible and yet detain him for an indefinite 
duration in a mental hospital, while on the other hand an 
offender who deserves "diminished punishability" by reason of his 
limited mental disorder may be sentenced by the court to life 
imprisonment or added a "restriction order" to the hospital order 
without a limited of duration? Hart emphasises that a person must 
not be convicted if he has no choice and fair opportunity to 
avoid crime. Accordingly people who are insane at the time of the 
crime must be acquitted because they did not commit crime 
voluntarily (with choice and fair opportunity). Hart, also, 
admits that an open-ended detention after the verdict "not guilty 
by reason of insanity" is similar to punishment in respect of 
many features such as its being unpleasant to the individuals to 
whom it is applied[32]. So it is unjust to transfer such people 
to mental hospital under open-ended detention in order to protect 
society without any care for the individual's liberty, especially 
since predictions of dangerousness are not reliable. Dr. Brice 
Dickson, a senior law lecturer at Queen's University, Belfast, 
said: 'Unless the rights of all individuals are guaranteed equal
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protection, there is little prospect of a lasting solution being 
found‘[33],
At the same time Hart argues that in some cases - those in 
which small numbers of mentally disordered persons may in a high 
degree of probability commit crime in future - justice or 
fairness must give way to the protection of society 
(utility)[341. In this situation "utility overcomes justice". 
But, since the individual's liberty is an important feature in 
Hart's approach, it is necessary to find the balance between 
"utility" and "liberty" when we impose any kind of detention on 
(non-responsible) mentally disordered persons. Society is, 
therefore, only entitled to protect itself from non-responsible 
dangerous patients - that is to say only in cases where there is 
a high degree of probability that they may commit crimes 
involving "serious harm" against others. Thus, a definition of 
"serious harm" is required. In this context, any form of harm can 
be serious harm, if it is felt to be grave enough to justify 
protecting the public from a person who can be shown in high 
probability to be likely to cause it. Thus, the gravity of the 
crime, the antecedents of the patient and other circumstances are 
important to recognising the high probability of "serious harm" 
in future.
As a result, it may be found that many of the mentally 
disordered people who are transferred to mental hospital for an
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indefinite duration after they have been acquitted by the court
should be released, because, either they are not mentally
disordered in the medical sense ( for example, persons suffering
from diabetes), or because they have recovered after they 
committed the crimes, or there is no high degree of probability 
that they will inflict serious harm. So, in such cases the 
detention is quite clearly "unjust". Such mentally disordered 
people should be released and given ordinary treatment, such as 
psychoanalysis, group therapy, medical care for physical 
conditions, education job training and family counselling.
In the remaining cases, we should bear in mind that the 
liberty of the individual is important as well as the protection 
of society, so the balance between "utility" and "liberty" needs 
to be kept even when the patient may cause "serious harm" in high 
probability. Thus, I have suggested that "compulsory treatment"
may be imposed. This should be the least restriction possible in 
terms of the patient's condition. Thus, in the first instance, 
only a probation order should be imposed and the power of the 
court limited to this. Then, if this kind of order does not prove 
satisfactory, the other types of order should be considered in 
turn. At this stage the decision should be made by the Tribunal 
or the Mental Welfare Commission for Scotland, not by the court. 
The patient must have a right, at regular intervals, to ask the 
Tribunal or the Mental Welfare Commission for Scotland to review 
its decision, because in such cases it is acting as a substitute
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for a court. In addition, the Tribunal or the Mental Welfare 
Commission must re-examine all cases every three or six months 
even if there is no appeal by the patients or on their behalf. 
The Tribunal or the Mental Welfare Commission may release 
patients when it is satisfied that they are no longer suffering 
from the mental disorder according to which they were described 
as "dangerous", such as "paranoid schizophrenia"[35]. This should 
not require intervention from the Home Secretary or the Secretary 
of State in Scotland.
On the other hand, the position with responsible mentally 
disordered offenders who are convicted because they committed 
crimes voluntarily is different. The present law and practice 
have dealt with such offenders, either by transferring them to 
mental hospital under an indefinite restriction order or by 
imposing life imprisonment in order to "protect society" from 
serious harm[36]. This sort of procedure includes the pure 
utilitarian aim of punishment despite the fact that there is no 
reason to protect others in most cases and so no reason for 
justice to give way to utility. In reality there is conflict 
between such procedures and the criteria of "diminished 
punishability" which is required in case of impairment of mind at 
the time when the crime was committed. In addition, it is very 
clear that compulsory treatment is used as alternative to 
punishment, so it contains an element of resentment and public 
disapproval. It may be said that it is unjust to let a mentally
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disordered offender suffer more than in proportion to the gravity 
of the crime which he committed.
Accordingly, since such a person is responsible for his 
crimes (he is found guilty because he had mens rea or "choice" 
when he committed the crime), so he deserves punishment equal to 
the gravity of his crime. And, since, he is suffering from mental 
disorder (severe or merely impairment), he needs treatment at the 
same time. I have suggested that in order to avoid injustice in 
procedure and to separate punishment and treatment as much as 
possible, a "dual system" of management involving elements of 
both prison and hospital should be adopted. The treatment of such 
prisoner requires involvement from the Mental Health System and 
the provision of secure conditions requires involvement from the 
prison system. The responsibilities of each system should be 
independent. The duration of the dual system must be equal to the 
gravity of the crime, but not longer. When the prisoner completes 
his sentence in the dual system, he must be discharged as this is 
required by the criterion of justice. But, if there is high 
probability that he may commit serious harm against others when 
he is released, he may be transferred to mental hospital under 
one of the three orders above. Since prisoners who are already in 
the prison are also responsible for their crime, so they, too, 
should be subject to the same principle, when they become 
mentally disordered in prison.
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The power to make this kind of decision has to be In the 
hands of courts because the courts are more able to fulfil-the 
requirements of justice than any other authorities. The prisoner 
in such a system should have full rights of appeal against such 
detention to the Tribunal or the Mental Welfare Commission at any 
time. As with non-responsible patients, the Tribunal or the 
Mental Welfare Commission should have to review cases every three 
or six months even if there is no appeal from the prisoner or his 
behalf. The Tribunal or the Mental Welfare Commission either has
to release the prisoner because his sentence has expired and
there is not a high probability that he may commit serious harm 
in future or else return him to the prison where he has recovered 
from his mental disorder and his sentence has not expired. The 
Tribunal and the Mental Welfare Commission should also have power 
to transfer the prisoner to mental hospital under limited 
compulsory treatment (probation order, guardianship order or 
hospital order) when his sentence has expired but he is still 
suffering from a mental disorder which may drive him in high 
probability to commit serious harm against others. In this case 
we have to apply the procedures already suggested for non- 
responsible persons (not guilty by reason of insanity) for the 
same reasons.
All of the decisions have to be made by the courts and the
Tribunal or the Mental Welfare Commission according to medical
reports and the patient’s circumstances.
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We saw, also, that there is no Mental.Health System in Iraq 
to arrange how to deal with mentally disordered people in general 
and mentally disordered offenders in particular. So, the court 
and prison administrations use an artificial power to deal with 
such people, whether responsible or non-responsible. In order to 
keep human rights in Iraq in respect of mentally disordered 
people (responsible and non-responsible), there is an urgent need 
for a "Mental Health Code" to deal with mentally disordered 
people in general and mentally disordered offenders in 
particular, and according to my recommendations above. The main 
purpose of the legislation should be to control dangerous 
practices and the improper use of treatment by both of Mental 
Health and the Prison Administrations.
A recent report issued by the Home Office, referred to in 
The Independent newspaper on 20th September 1990, has recognised 
the problem that exists with the number of sentenced prisoners 
who are suffering from acute mental illness. It said that there 
is a shortage of alternatives such as long-term secure units 
which could accommodate such people and acknowledged as well that 
the prison system is inadequate for psychiatric care[37].
Accordingly, this report reinforces the need to adopt my 
recommendation above that a dual system be established to deal 
with such prisoners. It is clear from my analysis that the mixed 
system is required by some theories of punishment as well.
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